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1Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Objective of the thesis
The importance of innovative activity by rms for securing economic growth and welfare is by now
well recognized and has been widely documented in the scientic literature. Important as it might
be, we also know that market failure for R&D investment can be quite severe. Firms lacking internal
means of nance seek out external sources to nance their innovative activity. However, capital
market frictions generated by information asymmetry often lead to a large gap between the cost of
external nancing and internal nancing. This notion of costly external nancing stands in contrast
to the more complete-markets approach underlying conventional models of investment emphasizing
expected future protability and the user cost of capital as key determinants of investment.
Information theoretic models in nance and economics show how asymmetry in information can
lead to a large premium being charged on external funds or, at the extreme, to a rationing of external
funds. Given the nature of R&D, the risks involved in carrying out R&D activity are even greater
than physical investment. Consequently, R&D investment could be subject to even greater market
failure than physical investment.
However, these information theoretic models provide only qualitative guidance for empirical work,
since few have both endogenous investment and nance decisions, and since few are, by nature,
couched in terms of observable variables. Therefore, with the exception of few recent studies, em-
pirical literature has turned to two loose arguments to motivate tests of the connection between
nance and investment. One strand of the literature, that ad hoc classies rms as constrained and
unconstrained rms and use reduced form accelerator type models, hypothesizes that nancing con-
straints cause an excess sensitivity of investment to internal funds for constrained rms as compared
to unconstrained ones. The second strand, which uses the framework of structural Euler equations,
hypothesizes that nancing constraints aect the rm's incremental intertemporal substitution of
investment today for investment tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external funds. These
1
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models that were initially developed to study company level investment have also been used to study
to R&D investment pattern of rms.
The two methodologies, however, have been questioned in their ability to identify the eect of
nancing friction on rm level R&D investment. For the reduced form accelerator type models,
the criticism stems from the fact that proxies to control underlying investment opportunities are
imperfectly measured and the cash ows as a measure of internal wealth could be correlated with
demand signals. Also, as mentioned earlier, in order to see the eect of nancing frictions on rm
level investment, rms are ad hoc classied as constrained or unconstrained. Hence, the endogeneity
of nancing constraints are not taken into account, implying that the conclusion drawn about the
sensitivity of investment to realized cash ows as proxy for shifts in the internal wealth for the
constrained and unconstrained rm may not be correct. As far as estimation of Euler equations is
concerned, since the equations are derived on the assumption of smooth adjustment cost and ignores
the xed component, the estimation suers from misspecication. In Chapter 2, which deals with
company level investment, we point out this source of misspecication.
Given the above, part of the objective of the thesis is to use alternative strategies to study the
eects of nancing frictions on R&D investment. More specically, in three of the chapters, we use
rms' reportage on nancial constraint faced by them to assess the extent of market failure related
to R&D investment. To motivate the use of reported nancial constraint, we derive an empirical
specication from a theoretical model in a contractual framework. Also, using the reported nancial
constraint as a regressor allows us to address the issue of simultaneity of investment decision and the
constraint faced.
Apart from the main issue of the eect of nancing frictions on innovation and investment, the
study also looks into how other factors may inuence the rm's investment and innovation decision
making. These factors could well be incentives that are distributed across rm characteristics, the
study of which are topics of industrial organization. Among others, the objective of this study has
also been to empirically explore how such incentives interact with nancing frictions. In Chapter 6 we
study how nancing and innovation decision are related across the distribution of rm characteristics
such as rm size, age, leverage, and nancing constraints faced by them.
Though the literature in corporate nance, which uses the real option framework, is replete with
studies on agency issues between dierent classes of claimants over investment decision of rms, we
have not found any that studies agency issues between bond holders and stock holders over R&D
investment. Of the ve chapters in this study, one is a theoretical study of the agency problem between
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bond holders and stock holders over R&D investment, which is risky due to technical uncertainties
involved in R&D activity and due to intangibility of assets employed and produced. Apart from the
study of agency problem, this study also compares R&D investment with scale expansion program
of a rm.
1.2 Contributions and Thesis Structure
The collection of studies is presented in ve chapters, which can be read in any order. Some overlap,
especially in the discussion of the existing literature, has been inevitable. The thesis contributes
to the literature on nancing frictions and investment in several respects. In Chapter 2 we study
the eect of nancing frictions on company level investment in physical capital. The study presents
evidence that the problems of asymmetric information aect the rms' allocation of real investment
expenditure over time. We do this by estimating the structural form of Euler equation (both linearized
and nonlinear) of investment. Here we nd that including the eect of a shadow price of external
nance greatly improves the Euler equation's performance in comparison to the standard neoclassical
specication. We also construct an index of nancial constraint from the estimates of the structural
model. We nd that rm's investment decreases with the degree of nancial constraint. However,
we also nd that for a group of rms that disinvest and/or invest intermittently, the Euler equation
based on smooth adjustment cost seems inappropriate, reecting the misspecication due to ignoring
the xed or the non-convex component of adjustment cost.
In Chapter 3 we empirically investigate the eects of nancing constraints on R&D investment.
In this study, however, the analysis is conducted using CIS Netherlands data which is collected at
enterprise level rather than the company level. Here, using direct information on nancial constraints
from questionnaires as reported by the rms, rather than the commonly used balance sheet informa-
tion, this study presents evidence that; after having controlled for traditional factors as size, market
share, cooperative arrangement, and expected protability; nancial constraints aect a rm's de-
cision on how much to invest in R&D activities. Apart from nancing constraints, the study also
looks at other hampering factors as market uncertainty and institutional bottlenecks, regulations
and organizational rigidities that aect R&D investment. To estimate our model, a semiparamet-
ric estimator of sample selection is employed to control for potential endogeneity of the regressors.
Besides, studying the eect of nancial constraint on R&D the study also investigates what rm
characteristics are associated with the rm being nancially constrained. We nd that old rms and
rms that belong to a group are less nancially constrained when it comes to undertaking R&D
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activities. The empirical specication in this study had been derived from a theoretical model of
investment in a contractual framework, written by Gale and Hellwig (1985). To our knowledge, we
have not seen any other paper that empirically shows the negative eect of nancing constraints, as
reported by enterprises, on R&D investment.
In Chapter 4 we examine the importance of nancial and other obstacles to innovation in the
Netherlands using statistical information from the CIS 3.5 innovation survey. We report results on
the eect of these obstacles on the rms' decision to abandon, prematurely stop, seriously slow down,
or not to start an innovative project. In this study we nd that nancing constraints act as a major
hampering factor in the rms' pursuit of innovation. We also nd that certain fundamentals such as
market uncertainty and economic uncertainty based on which rms make their investment decision
become more relevant when nancial constraints do not bind. These results are compared with those
from other studies in the Netherlands and other countries. This chapter ends with a discussion of
policy measures that have been taken to overcome, or at least attenuate these obstacles, such as
R&D tax incentives, venture capital nancing and policy mix packages.
In Chapter 5 we study nancing and R&D investment decision in a real-option framework. The
chapter concentrates on the study of implication of risk associated with R&D investment for agency
conict between bond holders and equity holders of the rm. The riskiness for R&D investment
is primarily derived from the intangibility of assets employed in conducting R&D, which is lost in
the event of liquidation, and the technical uncertainty associated with successful completion of the
project. We nd that when intangibility of assets involved is high and the intensity with which R&D
can be completed is low the equity holders of the rm in maximizing their claim overinvest, thus
shifting the burden of risk on to the bondholders. Apart from the study of the agency problem, this
study also compares R&D investment with scale expansion program of the rm. By comparing the
two, we are able to shed some light over many empirical ndings that document R&D intensive rms
being less leveraged as compared to non R&D performing rms.
In chapter 6 we use a panel data of three waves, to investigate the eect of nancial constraint
on R&D investment and study the determinants of nancial constraints. We also investigate the
factors that inuence or provide incentives for a rm to take up R&D activity. Unlike the study in
Chapter 3, we wanted to use nancial information as reported in the balance sheet of the companies.
However, the information on R&D in the CIS data is at the level of enterprise, and not all enterprises
constituting the company were surveyed. Hence we had to get an estimate of R&D related variables
for the company using information at the enterprise level and the sampling design of the CIS surveys.
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The ndings of Chapter 6 can be summarized as follows. First, nancial constraints adversely
aect a rm's R&D intensity as measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to capital asset, reducing
the R&D intensity by more than half for an average rm. Second, rms that are highly leveraged are
more likely to be nancially constrained, and that highly leveraged rms are less likely to be innova-
tors. Third, it is more likely that a rm to will not innovate when it increases its leverage when it is
not nancially constrained as compared to a rm that is nancially constrained. Fourth, the change
in probability to innovate for a unit change in leverage, conditional on no nancial constraint is almost
constant, while the same, conditional on being nancially constrained, varies over the distribution
of rm characteristic such as age, size, and existing leverage. Fifth, the decision to innovate, the
nancial constraints faced, and the choice of capital structure are endogenously determined. Sixth,
the R&D intensity of rms with dierent characteristics, conditional on being nancially constrained
and conditional on not being unconstrained, are dierent. Seventh, the sensitivity of R&D invest-
ment to cash ows is higher for nancially constrained rms. The econometric exercise entails using
a three step procedure, where expected a posterior (EAP) values of time invariant individual eects
obtained from the rst stage reduced form are used as substitutes for the time invariant individual
eects that are to be controlled for in the structural equations of the second and third stage. The
chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings for such a procedure. To our knowledge, the estimator
proposed to estimate a system of equations with endogenous regressors in a panel data set up is new
to the literature.
Finally Chapter 7 summarizes the main ndings of the thesis, discusses the limits of the current
work and presents some outlines for further research.

2Financial Constraints and Investment: Evidence for
Large Companies in The Netherlands
2.1 Introduction
One of the implications of the well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958, 1961) is that a rm
choosing the optimal levels of investment should be indierent to its capital structure and the neo-
classical theory of the rm assumed further that its nancial position was irrelevant. Yet both
informal observations and systematic empirical evidence have suggested that capital structure and
nancial position are of considerable importance to rm behavior. In contrast with the predictions
of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, most rms seem to prefer internal sources to nance
investment. According to Stephen A. Ross et al. (2006), about 80 percent of all nancing is done
with internally generated funds. Explanations for this behavior usually highlight the role of informa-
tion asymmetries (Myers, 1984) and agency issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in raising the costs of
external funds. Many studies using dierent specications of the neoclassical investment model and
dierent data sets have convincingly rejected simple models based on the null hypothesis of perfect
capital market.
Beginning with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) there has been a spurt of empirical re-
search, exploring the determinants of rm level investment. The empirical strategy has been to assess
whether the neoclassical investment criterion holds for rms facing low information costs, while fail-
ing for rms with high information costs and to measure the eects of net worth on investment for
rms with high information cost, holding constant, investment opportunities. Theoretical models of
imperfections in capital markets imply that external nancing is more costly than internal nancing
for many rms. Hence, for given levels of investment opportunities, information costs, and market
interest rates, rms with higher net worth should invest more. Test of the eects of net worth on
investment pose signicant challenges, including the need to control for investment opportunities
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and information costs. Also, models of informational imperfections stress that net worth eects on
investment should be concentrated among borrowers for which information costs are very high and
accordingly empirical research should examine industry case studies or panel data to discriminate
between the decisions at any point in time of \constrained" and \unconstrained" rms that proxy
for the extent of informational asymmetry. An intuitive beginning is often given by selecting a priori
groupings of \constrained" and \unconstrained" rms. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, there
might be a number of problems with such splitting. The methodology we employ controls for infor-
mation cost that classify rms into \constrained" and \unconstrained" rms without running into
problems of endogeneity of sample splitting.
Most empirical research in this area has followed the approach in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988), who argued and found that if groups of rms face nance constraints, their investment will
respond strongly to movements in cash ow, holding investment opportunities constant. These au-
thors argue that a regression of investment on q | as a proxy for investment opportunity | and
cash ow should yield a greater cash ow sensitivity for constrained rms. These authors do nd
cash ow sensitivity increasing in the degree of nancial constraint. This nding they claim to be
an evidence of nancial constraints. More recently, however, a number of papers have questioned
this approach from both empirical and theoretical angles. On the empirical side Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) and Cleary (1999) have provided evidence that cash-ow sensitivity need not identify liquidity
constrained rms; that is, sensitivity is not monotonic in the degree of constraints. Further, Erickson
and Whited (2000), Bond and Cummins (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2001) have demonstrated that
observed cash-ow sensitivity is likely an artifact of measurement error in the usual proxy for invest-
ment opportunities: Tobin's q. In particular, Erickson and Whited (2000) explain that measurement
error can explain dierential investment-cash ow sensitivities across groups of rms, if combined
with at least one of the following, purely mechanical, eects: dierences in the variance of cash
ow, dierences in the covariance between investment and q, and, as also noted by Poterba (1988),
dierences in the amount of measurement error in q. On the theoretical side, Gomes (2001) and Alti
(2003) simulate dynamic investment models, demonstrating that signicant cash ow coecients are
not necessarily generated by nancing frictions. Conversely, Gomes shows that nancing frictions
are not sucient to generate signicant coecients on cash ow.
The aim of the chapter is twin fold. First, the chapter addresses the question of the interde-
pendence of nance and investment by estimating the Euler equation to isolate the role of nance
constraints in the \marginal" intertemporal decision to invest. We do this by augmenting the Euler
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equation with nancial state variables that enter through the shadow value of external nance. We
estimate both reduced form and structural versions of the model. The Euler equation methodology
complements previous studies in that it exploits the cross sectional heterogeneity among dierent
rms to test for the role of nancial factors. In addition, it points out the specic impact of nancial
factors on the intertemporal allocation of investment through their eects on the shadow price of
external nance. The results generally support the view that a rm's nancial position aects its
investment.
The methodology is in close connection to many papers in the literature: Whited (1992), Hubbard
and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995), Love (2003), Whited and Wu (2005),
to name a few. The essential idea in these papers is that the standard neoclassical assumptions of
absence of nancial frictions, perfect foresight and symmetric information are violated for rms that
face a constraint on dividend payout or a constraint on borrowing and that, among other factors,
the nancial position of the rm determines whether the above mentioned constraints are binding
or not. Consequently, nancial variables should enter directly into the Euler equation through their
eect on the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. A number of criticism could be levelled against
such an approach. One can claim that the shadow value pertaining to binding of constraint on
outside nance, being the change in the value of rm upon the relaxation of the constraint, would
require explicit solution to the value function and the Lagrange multiplier. However, Gomes, Yaron,
and Zhang (2006) have provided theoretical justication for such an approach, by showing that the
typical assumptions about the nature of the nancing frictions are captured by a \nancing cost"
function, which in turn characterizes the Lagrange multiplier .
An important contribution to the literature has been the one by Bond and Meghir (1994). By
assuming that the rm faces an exogenous time-varying probability of bankruptcy that depends on
the ratio of outstanding debt to capital they explicitly allow for debt nance and nancial assets
to enter the Euler equation. In this chapter we also estimate the specication provided by them.
We found that the model is marginally rejected through the rejection of tests of overidentication
upon instrumenting with additional nancial variables. This could suggest that there is room for
these additional nancial variables to enter the Euler equation. Besides, since our objective is to
characterize, or explore the factors aecting the nancing premium on external nance, we would
like to have a rich specication of the Lagrange multipliers that could also be thought of as a premium
on external nance.
The second purpose of the chapter is to point out one of the many potential instances where the
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Euler equation methodology that examines only marginal decisions, since it is based on models with
convex capital-stock adjustment costs, could fail even after controlling for the eect of nancial factors
on the intertemporal substitution of investment. The chapter begins by deriving the investment Euler
equation under the assumptions of the neoclassical framework. This we term as the basic model.
Our rst set of estimates show that the model based on the assumptions of the standard neoclassical
theory is soundly rejected. Also, following Whited (1988), we divide our sample into rms that invest
continuously and rms that invest intermittently or disinvest. The rationale for such a split is to be
found in the discussion in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) on the behavior of investment in the presence
of xed costs of adjustment, dierent purchase and resale prices of capital goods, and irreversibility.
These models usually predict that investment will be \lumpy" in the sense that rms will remain
inactive for periods of time, only investing when the protability of capital goods rises enough to
overcome xed costs of adjustment or, in the case of models of irreversibility, the option value of
waiting to invest. Studies of investment at the plant level, such as Doms and Dunne (1998), have
provided evidence of such behavior. Certainly, if rm investment can be characterized by this sort
of a model, tests of neoclassical Euler equations based on smooth, convex adjustment costs are
destined to fail, since the Euler equation implies that a rm will continuously adjust its capital stock
incrementally to small changes in protability. For the group of rms that invest continuously the
Euler equation of the standard model ought to hold even in the presence of xed costs, while for
those that invest intermittently it should not. Our results are in tandem with Whited (1998) that
although the model is rejected for both groups, it is rejected only marginally for the rst group and
quite strongly for the second.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 derives the Euler equation for esti-
mation under the assumptions of the neoclassical framework. In Section 2.3 presents some models
of nance and investment. Section 2.4 discusses the data and the estimation technique. Section 2.5
discusses the results. Concluding remarks and directions for further research are provided in the last
section.
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2.2 The Basic Model
The rm maximizes the expected present discounted value of future dividends, di;t, which are given
by
Vi0 = Ei0f
1X
t=0
[
tY
j=0
j ]di;tg (1)
where j is the one-period discount factor common to all rms and assuming that the costlessly
adjustable variable factor has been maximized out of the problem, di;t is given by
di;t = (Ki;t; Ii;t) = F (Ki;t)   (Ki;t; Ii;t)  pi;tIi;t (2)
In (2),  is the net revenue function. Gross investment, I, occurs at the start of the period
and is immediately productive, but the rm faces strictly convex adjustment costs of  (Ki;t; Ii;t)
in changing its capital stock, with  I() > 0,  K() < 0 and  II() > 0. F (Ki;t)is the rm's real
production function and pi;t is the relative price of capital.
Given the above innite horizon problem the optimality equation is given by
Vi;t(Ki;t 1) = max
Ii;t
(Ki;t; Ii;t) + 
t
t+1Ei;t[Vi;t+1(Ki;t)] (3)
The expectations operator Ei;t[:] is conditional on information available at the start of period t and
expectations are taken over future interest rates, input and output prices, and technologies. The
capital stock K, evolves according to the equation of motion
Ki;t = (1  i)Ki;t 1 + Ii;t (4)
where i is the rm specic depreciation rate. The model assumes symmetric information and that
the rm's objective is to maximize the wealth of the marginal shareholder. rt is dened to be the
rm's nominal required rate of return between periods t and t + 1, tt+1 = 1=(1 + rt) is the rm's
discount factor. The model also assumes that the marginal shareholder is risk neutral, so that rt,
equals the interest rate on default free bonds and is given exogenously to the rm.
With a single control variable Ii;t and a single state variable Ki;t 1, the rst order condition with
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respect to Ki;t 1 yields the following Euler equation
i;t = (1  i)(@=@K)i;t + (1  i)Ei;t[tt+1i;t+1] (5)
where i;t = @Vi;t=@Ki;t 1 is the shadow value of capital. Moreover, from the rst-order condition
for investment, Ii;t, we can obtain
0 = (@=@K)i;t + (@=@I)i;t + Ei;t[
t
t+1(@Vi;t+1=@Ki;t)] (6)
Combining (5) and (6), we can write the rst order condition for optimal investment as
(1  i)[(@=@I)i;t] + i;t = 0 (7)
since (7) holds for period t+ 1 as well, we obtain
(1  i)[(@=@I)i;t+1] + i;t+1 = 0 (8)
substituting for i;t, from (7) and i;t+1, from (8) the Euler equation, (5), can be written as
(1  i)tt+1Ei;t[(@=@I)i;t+1] = (@=@I)i;t + (@=@K)i;t (9)
To estimate the model the expectations operator in (9) is replaced with an expectational error, ei;t+1,
where Ei;t(ei;t+1) = 0 and Ei;t(e
2
i;t+1) = 
2
i;t. This gives the following equation:
(1  i)tt+1[(@=@I)i;t+1] = (@=@I)i;t + (@=@K)i;t + ei;t+1 (10)
Ei;t(ei;t+1) = 0 implies that ei;t+1 is uncorrelated with any time t information, and Ei;t(e
2
i;t+1) = 
2
i;t
implies that errors can be heteroscedastic. The rational expectations assumption also provides model
identication, since it implies that any variable known to the rm at time t   1 can be used as
instruments to estimate (10). Given (2), (10) can be written as
(1  i)tt+1[ I(Ii;t+1;Ki;t+1) + pit] = [ I(Ii;t;Ki;t) + pi;t+1]  [FK(Ki;t)   K(Ii;t;Ki;t)] + ei;t+1 (11)
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The right-hand side represents the marginal costs of investing today which consists rst of the
marginal adjustment cost minus the gains from increase in the capital stock which is marginal product
of capital and the marginal reduction in adjustment costs from an increment in the capital stock.
The left hand side is the marginal cost of investing tomorrow. Optimal investment implies that on
the margin the rm must be indierent between investing today and transferring those resources to
tomorrow.
In order to implement the Euler equation tests, it is necessary to parameterize the model in
(11). First, consider a proxy for the marginal product of capital. If the rm's production function
is homogeneous of degree  > 1, and if an assumption of constant returns to capital is made then
the proposed measure will understate the actual value by the amount (   1)(Yit=Ki;t), where Y, is
output. Also, if the rm has market power, then, strategic considerations notwithstanding, prot
maximization implies that the above measure of the marginal product of capital must be modied
by scaling the variable factor costs upward by the term  = (1   1="d) 1, where "d is the absolute
value of the elasticity of the rm's demand curve. Since rms with monopoly power operate on the
elastic portion of their demand curves, the above expression should be greater than one. Given these
considerations, the following measure of the marginal product of capital is used.
FK(Ki;t) = (Yi;t   Ci;t)=Ki;t (12)
where Ci;t is the variable cost of production.
Second, following a number of authors, eg. Bond and Meghir (1994) and Whited (1992), the
adjustment cost of capital is assumed to be of the following functional form.
 (Ki;t; Ii;t) = =2((I=K)i;t   v)2Ki;t (13)
With these two assumptions (11) can be written as
(1  i)tt+1(((I=K)i;t+1   v)) =
(((I=K)i;t   v)) + ( Yi;t + Ci;t)=Ki;t   (=2((I=K)2i;t   v2)) + ei;t+1 (14)
Rearranging we get the estimation equation as
(I=K)i;t = 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2(I=K)2i;t 1 + 3(Y=K)i;t 1 + 4(C=K)i;t 1 + 5IDi + ft + ai + ei;t (15)
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where ID is industry dummy, ft is a xed time eect, and ai is a xed rm eect. The above theory
predicts that 1 and 4 should have a positive sign while 2 and 3 should be negative.
2.3 Investment and Financial Constraints
The standard model of investment presented above has no role for nancial policy. For a rm nanced
only by equity, net revenue equals the net distribution to shareholders, i.e. dividend payments net
of any new share issues. The choice between retained earnings and new share issues as sources of
investment nance is irrelevant to the maximization of (3) since each unit of new equity issued allows
the rm to pay out dividends valued at one unit, and has no eect on net present value. If the rm
can raise nance by issuing risk-free debt at an interest rate it, the only internal solution for debt
policy requires it = r, and renders debt policy similarly irrelevant. Debt policy remains irrelevant
even in the presence of bankruptcy risk, so long as there are no deadweight costs of bankruptcy.
But we know that the rm's nancial policy may play a substantive role in the investment decision.
A rm may nd to its advantage to use one source of investment nance in preference to another.
For example, a preference for retained earnings over new share issues will arise if the tax system
favors capital gains over dividend income or if signicant transactions charges must be paid when
placing new shares. The presence of bankruptcy costs makes debt nance increasingly expensive as
the probability of bankruptcy rises, although tax advantages may make debt nance attractive at
low levels of borrowing. In this situation the rm faces a nancial \pecking order" or hierarchy of
costs associated with dierent sources of investment nance. The availability of low-cost internal
nance may then be a signicant factor in its investment decision.
Consider a rm that issues bonds and that Bi;t is the stock of outstanding debt at the beginning
of period t. The sources and uses of funds relation for a rm that issues debt can be written thus:
di;t = (F (Ki;t; i;t)   (Ki;t; Ii;t)  pi;tIi;t) +Bi;t   (1 + rt)Bi;t 1: (16)
where di;t can be thought of as dividends, i;t is a shock to the prot function that follows a Markov
process and that is observed by the rm at time t and rt is the interest rate that the rm has to pay
on the past levels of debt and pi;t is the relative price of capital . The assumption on the revenue
function F (:) and the adjustment cost function  (:; :) is the same as above.
The rm maximizes equation (1) subject to the capital stock accumulation identity (4). The rm
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also faces a constraint on outside nance:
di;t  di;t (17)
Unlike Bond and Meghir (1994) we do not model new share issue. We restore to the arguments in
Whited and Wu (2006) that (17) \limits the amount of outside equity nancing, and a negative value
for di;t implies that the rm is able to raise outside equity nance. Although negative dividends are
not a feature of most equity markets, in the absence of taxes negative dividends can be considered
equivalent to new share issues, since on the margin both have the same eect on old shareholders".
The presence of debt implies that the rm can go bankrupt. Both the probability of bankruptcy
and the interest rate charged by lenders will depend on the amount borrowed. In the event of
bankruptcy, like Bond and Meghir (1994), we assume that ownership of the rm is transferred
from the shareholders to the creditors, although the bankruptcy process in period t may involve
deadweight costs. Bond and Meghir (1994) assume that the interest rate rt and the probability
of bankruptcy both depend on the amount borrowed B, and the size of the rm K, only through
the ratio (B=K). Moreover they assume that bankruptcy costs depend on B, but not on K, and
that they are homogeneous of degree one in B. In such a case they arrive at the Euler equation
characterizing the optimal path for investment as
 (1  )tt+1Ei;t[(1 + i;t+1)(@=@I)i;t+1] =
 (1 + i;t)(@=@I)i;t   (1 + i;t)(@=@K)i;t   i;t(B=K)2i;t (18)
where it the Lagrange multiplier associated with (17)
1. It can be interpreted as the shadow cost
associated with raising new equity, which implies that external (equity) nancing is costly relative
to internal nance. In the absence of nancial constraint, that is, when it = 0, assuming constant
returns to scale and (Yi;t   Ci;t)=Ki;t as cash ows they arrive at the following equation:
(I=K)i;t = 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2(I=K)2i;t 1 + 3(Y=K)i;t 1 +
4(CF=K)i;t 1 + 5(B=K)2i;t 1 + 6IDi + ft + ai + vit (19)
where ID is industry dummy, ft is a xed time eect, and ai is a xed rm eect.This they term it
as the basic equation. In absence of bankruptcy cost this should be same as (14), but diers due to
1See Bond and Meghir (1994) for the derivation of the Euler equation and the optimal level of debt.
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the assumption of constant returns to scale.
2.3.1 Financial Regimes
Though we do not model issue of new equities, it might be worth while, if only to get a feel of the
data, to delve into what Bond and Meghir (1994) term as nancial regimes based on new equity
issue and dividend payout. Let Di;t be a dummy that takes value 0 when the rms do not pay any
dividends and 1 if it does and let Ni;t be the dummy for that takes value 1 if a rm issues new equity
and 0 if does not or withdraws some of it's outstanding equity.
Regime 1. Di;t > 0; Ni;t = 0
The rm generates sucient net revenue to nance its investment from retained earnings and pay
positive dividends. The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier it, which measures the shadow value of internal
nance, is zero.
Regime 2. Di;t = 0; Ni;t = 0
The rm generates insucient net revenue to nance all the investment it would like to make at
the cost of retentions, but nds it optimal not to issue new shares given their higher cost. Investment
expenditure is constrained by the availability of internal nance.
Regime 3. Di;t = 0; Ni;t > 0
The rm again exhausts its net revenue to nance investment, but here has suciently attractive
investment opportunities remaining that it issues shares to nance a higher level of investment. For
rms in Regime 1 in both period t and period t+ 1 , the Euler equation in (16), in absence of
bankruptcy cost, reduces to the basic form of (6). The same applies for rms in Regime 3 in both
periods, provided unit transactions costs of issuing new shares is small. In all other cases investment
depends on the unobservable it and the basic Euler equation should be rejected. Table 2.1 shows
that for the sample of 416 Dutch rms, 95.86 percentage of the rm-years do not pay dividends and
13.13 percent of them issue new equity. By this token 84 percentage of the rm year observations
could be regarded as constrained.
2.3.2 Financial Constraint Revisited
Many papers, based on essentially ad hoc criteria, have classied rms into \constrained" and \un-
constrained" to capture the extent of nancing frictions. Dierent studies have used dierent criteria
to a priory classify rms into constrained and unconstrained rms. This emphasis raises two is-
sues: whether dierent sample splits lead to consistent results, and whether any xed grouping is
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Table 2.1: Financial Regimes
Dividends
Zero Positive Total
Zeros 2,787 104 2,891
New ( 83.74) ( 3.13) (86.87)
Equity Positive 403 34 437
(12.11) (1.02) (13.13)
Total 3,190 138 3,328
(95.85) (4.15) 100.00
Time Period: 1996-2003
reasonable. The assumption that only a particular group of rms faces costly external nancing
is analytically and empirically convenient. However, it is more plausible that rms switch between
\constrained" and \unconstrained" regimes depending upon shifts in investment opportunities and
the availability of internal or external nancing. Moreover, to take an example, to test the hypothesis
of no nancial regimes Bond and Meghir (1994) dene a dummy variable Si;t, which is zero when div-
idends are positive and share issues zero in both periods t and t 1 (i.e. when the rm is in Regime 1
in both these periods), and is one in all other cases. In their sample each of the two sub-samples given
by this classication contains about half the observations in the full sample. They then interact this
dummy with all right-hand side variables and estimate the model as before. However, for our sample
pursuing such a classication does not lead to any observation in Regime 1. Also, it is important
to consider investment and nancial policy jointly; rms may, for example, accumulate liquidity as
a buer against future constraints. In other words, since the variables based upon which a sample
is split and investment are joint decisions, there is issue of endogenous splitting that would have to
be dealt with. Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2006) have avoided specifying the underlying source of
these frictions and shown that the typical assumptions about the nature of the nancing frictions are
captured by a \nancing cost" function, which provides a tractable framework to examine the role
of nancing frictions on intertemporal allocation of investment.
Recently Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) show that one can rewrite a constrained problem as
an unconstrained one with embedded multipliers, which gives a characterization of the multiplier,
it, as a measure of the premium on external nance. By linking this \shadow-price" to essentially
observable variables, one is able to recast the problem in a way that is amenable to empirical analysis,
that is to say that in the presence of nancial market imperfections, it are state-dependent and time
varying. A number of papers in the literature estimate this Euler equation directly by assuming a
parametric form for the shadow cost term: Whited (1992), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard,
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Kashyap, and Whited (1995), and Jaramillo, Schianterelli, and Weiss (1996), Love(2003), Whited
and Wu (2006).
In the absence of bankruptcy cost equation and assuming rational expectations (18) can be written
as
(1  i)tt+1Ei;tft;t+1(@=@I)i;t+1g = (@=@I)i;t + (@=@K)i;t (20)
which can, upon expansion be written as
(1  i)tt+1Ei;tft;t+1[ I(Ii;t+1;Ki;t+1) + pi;t+1]g =
 I(Ii;t;Ki;t) + pi;t   [FK(Ki;t)   K(Ii;t;Ki;t)] + ei;t+1
where t;t+1 =
(1+i;t+1)
(1+i;t)
and pi;t is the relative price of capital good. Following Love (2003), we
linearize2 the product of (1  )tt+1, t;t+1 and the marginal cost of investment (expression in curly
brackets in (20), here denoted as f:gt) as (1   )tt+1t;t+1f:gt = t;t+1 + f:gt + tt+1. Hence,
2To see this let
f(tt+1;t;t+1; f:gt) = E(tt+1t;t+1f:gt) (21)
where (1  )tt+1 = tt+1. Using a rst-order Taylor approximation around the means we get,
f(tt+1;t;t+1; f:gt) = f(E(tt+1); E(t;t+1); E(f:gt)) +
f 0(t0t+1;
0
t;t+1; f:g0t)

[tt+1   E(tt+1)]; [t;t+1   E(t;t+1)]; [f:gt   E(f:gt)]
0
(22)
where t0t+1 2 (tt+1; E(tt+1)),0t;t+1 2 (t;t+1; E(t;t+1)) and f:g0t 2 (f:gt; E(f:gt)). Also, suppressing the time
scripts, f 0(0;0; f:g0) =

@f=@; @f=@; @f=@f:g

. Replacing f with the expectation operator, E, this is equal to
E(0f:g0); E(0f:g0); E(00)

. Since t;t+1 could be above or below one, its mean should be a value around one.
Denoting the unconditional mean of f:g as , and the average of tt+1 = (1  )tt+1 as , ignoring the constant terms
and assuming that covariance between the nancing constraints factor and the marginal cost of investment (the term
in f:g) is constant, gives us
(1  )tt+1t;t+1f:gt = t;t+1 + f:gt + tt+1 (23)
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assuming that the relative price of capital is 1 3, (20) can be written as
[ I(Ii;t+1;Ki;t+1) + 1] =  t;t+1  
tt+1

+
1

[ I(Ii;t;Ki;t) + 1]  1 [FK(Ki;t)   K(Ii;t;Ki;t)] + ei;t+1 (24)
Here we assume a linear approximation representing the dependence of t;t+1 term on a nancial
state variable represented by
t;t+1 = 1(CF=K)t + 2(B=K)t + 3(LQ=K)t + 4(INEXP=K)t + 5(NE=K)t (25)
where (CF=K)t is Cash Flow, (B=K)t long term level of Debt, (LQ=K)t is Liquidity, (INEXP=K)t
is the Interest Expense of the rm and (NE=K)t is the amount of New Equity issued by the rm, all
normalized by the total assets of the rms. With the assumptions made in (12) and (13) one arrives
at the following estimation equation.
(I=K)i;t = 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2(I=K)2i;t 1 + 3(Y=K)i;t 1 + 4(C=K)i;t 1 + 5(CF=K)i;t 1 +
6(B=K)i;t 1 + 7(LQ=K)i;t 1 + 8(INEXP=K)i;t 1 + 9(NE=K)i;t 1 + 10IDi + ft + ai + ei;t(26)
The main hypothesis in this exercise can be stated as
H0 : 5 > 0;6 < 0;7 > 0;8 < 0;9 < 0 (27)
Like in most empirical studies we use the rm's cash ow as a proxy for independent changes
in the net worth of a rm. An increase in the cash ow should ease o, or have a negative impact
on the shadow value of external funds. The maintained assumption in such an approach is that
the component of shifts in net worth as a result of changes in expected future protability has
been taken care of, in the sense that given the Markovian nature of the model, the Euler equation
governs the rms decision of how much to invest today relative to investment tomorrow. Financing
constraints expected to bind or not bind in the far future have already been incorporated in the
optimal time t level of investment and have no direct impact on the time t   1 decision to invest
now versus postpone tomorrow. Secondly in order to make sure that variation in investment today
versus investment tomorrow are explained by eects of nancing constraints in general and cash
3This would be equivalent to assuming a constant rate of ination for the investment goods. In notational terms
we are assuming that pi;t+1   1 pi;t is constant.
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ows as a measure of changes in net worth in particular, on the supply side, we need to control for
productivity, which as in Whited and Wu (2006) is done via (11). The argument being that the
Markovian structure of the model implies that one only needs to control for capital productivity at
time t.
The positive coecient on the debt to assets ratio indicates that a more highly leveraged rm
will have a higher shadow value of external funds; that is, it will be more nancially constrained.
The ratio of the rm's interest expense to the rm's asset indicates the likelihood of rm nancial
distress, relative to its fundamental health or need to borrow. Since interest expenses are deducted
from cash ows, it captures the idea that if a rm can generate sucient internal funds, it will not
have a great need to borrow and will not be likely to run up against its debt limit or given a specied
probability of bankruptcy, the rm will not exceed its optimal debt limits.
The rationale for the inclusion of liquidity or cash stock among the set of nancial state variable
parameterizing the shadow value of, or the premium on, external nance is that the rms practice
precautionary savings; that is, they need to build up liquid assets in order to invest. This variable
again is likely to ease o the constraint on external nance.
Since in the absence of taxes new issues of equity can be considered equivalent to negative div-
idends this has a direct bearing on the shadow value of external nance. As far as data on equity
is concerned, the company accounts do not make a distinction between internal and external equity
and also we do not have any information as whether our rms are listed or not. Nevertheless, changes
in the equity holdings of the rms, be it internal or external, do have a bearing on the ownership
structure of the rm.
2.3.3 The Structural Model
In an alternative formulation, assuming that investment becomes productive capital with a one-
period lag and that the rm discount rate, the eective price of capital goods, and prots are all
appropriately tax adjusted, one can write, taking rational expectations, the Euler Equation as follows.
tt+1
(1 + it+1)
(1 + it)
fFK(Ki;t+1)   K(Ii;t+1;Ki;t+1) + (1  )( I(Ii;t+1;Ki;t+1) + pi;t+1)g
=  I(Iit;Kit) + pi;t + ei;t+1 (28)
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Assuming (12) and a cubic adjustment cost approximated as4,
 (Ki;t; Ii;t) =

0 +
2
2

I
K
2
i;t
+
3
3

I
K
3
i;t

Ki;t (29)
yields the following equation.
tt+1
(1 + it+1)
(1 + it)

(Yi;t+1   Ci;t+1)=Ki;t+1 

0 +
2
2

I
K
2
i;t+1
+
23
3

I
K
3
i;t+1

+
(1  i)

2

I
K
2
i;t+1
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3

I
K
3
i;t+1

+ pi;t+1

=

2

I
K
2
i;t
+ 3

I
K
3
i;t

+ pi;t + ei;t+1 (30)
If the outside equity constraint is binding, the eects of external nance constraints show up in the
term t;t+1 =
(1+i;t+1)
(1+i;t)
which is the relative shadow cost of external nance. In the absence of nance
constraints,t;t+1 = 1. On the other hand, if the equity constraint binds, then generally t;t+1 6= 1,
unless t = t+1. As also noted in Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006), this last observation implies
that nance constraints can only aect investment if they are time-varying. It is the shadow value
of the constraint today, relative to tomorrow, that is important. An important consideration is that
without the assumption of risk neutrality, this would imply that high-risk rms would have higher
discount rates than low-risk rms. However, the risk of any individual rm should be primarily
related to the variability of its earnings. To the extent that this variance is constant over time in
a short panel like ours, it should be picked up by the xed eect. However, we assume that the
expected value of the discount factor is equal to (1 + rf )
 1 where rf is the risk free rate of return
equal to long term interest rate on government bonds.
We estimate this equation using GMM technique as outlined by Hansen(1982). In this speci-
cation, however we, as in Whited and Wu (2006), parameterize i;t as function of contemporaneous
nancial state variables rather than t;t+1 as in (25).
t = 1(CF=K)t + 2(B=K)t + 3(LQ=K)t + 4(INEXP=K)t + 5(NE=K)t (31)
The main hypothesis here can be stated as
H0 : 1 < 0;2 > 0;3 < 0;4 > 0;5 > 0 (32)
After estimating (30), we construct t;t+1 =
(1+i;t+1)
(1+i;t)
and the quantity in [:] on the left hand side of
4Notice that the linear term has not been included as  I(Ki;t; Ii;t) of the linear term would be a constant and
would be subsumed in the relative price term.
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(30), LHSt+1 =

(Yt+1   Ct+1)=Kt+1 

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2
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t+1

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
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
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K
2
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+
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
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K
3
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
+pt+1

. Here we expect to see a negative correlation between t;t+1 and LHSt+1. The
expected negative correlation has the following economic interpretation. In the absence of nancing
constraints, a positive expected productivity shock increases the left side of (30). All else equal,
the optimizing rm will then invest more today relative to tomorrow in anticipation of that shock,
thereby equalizing the two sides of (30). Once nancing constraints enter the picture, the negative
correlation between t;t+1 and LHSt+1 implies a dampening of this intertemporal substitution eect.
To test whether there is a signicant negative correlation between t;t+1 and LHSt+1, we run the
following regression.
\LHSt = 1(I=K)t 1 + 2(I=K)2t 1 + 3^t 1t + 4pt 1 + 5ID + ft + ai + vit (33)
which is derived from (30) and could be thought of as a linearzation of (30), akin to the arguments
in footnote 2 used to derive (24). Here we expect, 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 < 0 and 4 > 0.
2.4 Data and Estimation
We use yearly rm-level data of Dutch manufacturing and services. These are Financial data from
balance sheets of the SFGO rms. The panel spans 8 years form 1996 to 2003.We select our sample by
rst deleting any rm-year observations with missing data or for which total assets, the gross capital
stock, or sales are either zero or negative. Also since the estimation of the Euler equation involves
lagged dependent variable, with other regressors potentially endogenous, instrumenting with period
t 2 variables would require that at least three periods of data be available. We dropped those rms
for which data was not available for at least three periods. Whited (1992), Whited (1998); Whited
and Wu (2005); Aghion et al (2004) have deleted the rms for which (de)consolidation accounts
for more than 15 percent of the book value of the capital assets, the argument being that these
investment models are not suited for large investment such as mergers and acquisition. To arrive at
the data set we nally use for estimation we also use the same criterion of 15 percent.
In this chapter we estimate (15), (19), (26) and (30). To control for the technological dierence
across sectors we also include industry dummies. The lagged values of the dependent variable on
the right-hand side of the two equations are necessarily correlated with the rm-specic eects, and
we allow the output, cost and the nancial variables to be potentially correlated with ai also. To
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estimate (15), (19), and (26), the dynamic models consistently from a short panel we use a Generalized
Method of Moments estimator of the kind developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The unobservable
ai can be eliminated from the two equations by transforming all variables by the forward Helmert's
or orthogonal deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). The important
property of this transformation is that if xi is serially uncorrelated then xi;t s will be uncorrelated
with the transformed variable for s > 2. This implies that if the error term ei;t, is serially uncorrelated
in (14), (19) and (26) lagged values of the (untransformed) dependent variable and other right-hand
side variables dated t s will be uncorrelated with the transformed error term for s  2. These lagged
values will therefore be valid instruments in the transformed model and a GMM estimator can be
formed which optimally exploits all the (linear) moment restrictions specied by the model5. The
implicit reduced form for the endogenous variables is allowed to be dierent in each cross-section and
each reduced form uses potentially all available moment restrictions. In practice very remote lags are
unlikely to be informative instruments and hence we do not use all available moment restrictions. In
our estimation we use instruments lagged t  2 onwards. This is only possible if the test statistic for
second-order serial correlation based on residuals from the rst-dierence equation does not reject
the for lack of second-order serial correlation in the rst-dierence residuals.
To estimate (30) we use GMM technique as outlined by Hansen (1982). We estimate (30) in
rst dierences to eliminate possible xed rm eects a procedure that allows us to use instruments
dated at t  2. In other words, we use GMM to estimate conditional moment conditions of the form
Et 2(zi;t 2:(ei;t ei;t 1)). To determine if the specication we use is correct we use the test developed
by Newey and West (1987), which can be described as a GMM analog to a standard likelihood-ratio
test. The product of the minimized value of the objective function and the number of observations,
the \J-statistic", has a 2 distribution with q p degrees of freedom where q is the number of moment
conditions or the number of instruments and p is the number of parameters to be estimated. Let
JU be the J-statistic for an unrestricted model, and let JR be the J-statistic for a restricted model
where a subset of the parameters are excluded. The Newey and West (1987) test for the signicance
of the parameters excluded follows from noting that JR JU will be distributed as a 2 with degrees
of freedom equal to the number of parameters excluded. Intuitively, if excluding this parameter
produces a signicant increase in the J-statistic, then this exclusion restriction is rejected.
5The instrument set for each regression is stated along with the estimates in the appendix.
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2.5 Results
The estimates of the basic equation, equation (15), are reported in Table 2.5. The Table has three
sets of estimates. Column (a) is for the whole data set, (b) for the rms investing continuously and
(c) for the rms that invest intermittently. The set of instruments includes t   2 lag of investment,
its square, output, cost, cash ow, and debt. The results indicate that the basic Euler equation
without nancial constraint is rejected. As discussed earlier the dynamics imply that the coecient
of output should have been negative and that of cost positive. As it turns out both coecients have
the opposite sign. Moreover they are signicant at 10 percent level signicance for the whole data
set and at 1 percent level of for the rms that invest intermittently, indicating that the incidental
prots and losses imbedded in these variables have an eect on investment. In other words, cash
ow, which is derived from these variables and which we deem here to be an independent change in
the net worth of a rm, might have a role to play in the determination of investment. To be noted
is the fact that the instrument set consists of two nancial variables, namely cash ow and debt. As
it turns out the Sargan Test for overidentication is rejected at 6 percent for the whole data set and
at 1 percent for the rms that invest intermittently. This could be an indication that these variables
could belong to the Euler equation. However, to be noted is the fact that, the Sargan Test does
not reject the overidentication restrictions for the data set where rms invest continuously and the
coecient on output and cost, though they have the wrong signs, are not signicant. This could lend
credence to Whited (1998), that the Euler equation of the standard model ought to hold for rms
that invest continuously, even in the presence of xed costs, while it should not for the rms that
invest intermittently.
Table 2.6 report the estimates for the Bond and Meghir (1994) specication { equation (19). The
coecients obtained in these two estimates are as expected and qualitatively the same as in their
paper. In Table 2.6 the coecients for the Cash Flow and the Debt are jointly signicant at 10 percent
level of signicance for column (a) and are highly signicant in column (b), suggesting that investment
decisions are related to the nancial conditions of the rms. However, the instrument set for the
estimates in column (b) in Table 2.6 include additional nancial variables namely Liquidity, Interest
Expense, New Equity and Current Liabilities. The Sargan test for overidentication restrictions
are rejected at 13 percent level of signicance for column (b). This could be an indication that
augmenting the Euler equation with additional nancial variables through the parameterizations of
Lagrange Multipliers that pertain to the non negativity of dividends, could improve the performance
of the model.
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Table 2.7 reports the estimates of the Euler equation, equation (16) augmented with nancial
variables. The nancial variables that appear in the equation through the shadow value of external
nance, are Cash Flow, outstanding Debt, Interest Expense, New Equity issued, and Liquidity. The
coecient on these variables, baring Liquidity, have the expected signs. The dierence between the
estimates in column (a) and (b) is that the estimates in column (b) include additional variables
namely Log of Market Share, Grants, Provision, Current Assets and Liabilities, Depreciation and
Taxes in its instrument set. While the coecients are jointly signicant for both sets of estimates,
Interest Expense is also signicant at 5 percent for column (b). Also, to be noted is the fact that
with inclusion of additional instruments, the coecients on output and cost though appearing with
the wrong sign are no longer signicant.
Table 2.8 presents separate estimates of the Euler equation augmented with nancial variables for
rms that invest continuously and for rms that invest intermittently 6. Among the set of Financial
variables for the group of rms that invest intermittently we do not include Cash Flow as it turned
out to be insignicant, with the wrong sign. In Table 2.8 for the rms that invest intermittently
we have three columns. The estimates in column (a) are obtained using orthogonal deviations while
those in (b) and (c) are obtained using rst dierences. In these estimates we do not obtain the
correct sign for the adjustment cost parameters. However, we obtain signicant results with correct
signs on the Financial variables. Also the magnitude of the coecients on these nancial variable are
larger than that obtained for the full sample. To be noted is the fact that liquidity, as precautionary
savings has a signicant eect on the lowering the shadow price of external nance for these rms
and its eect for these rms appear to be 10 times as important compared to the full sample of rms.
Interest expense seem to have twice as much eect on the shadow price of external nance than it
is for the full sample of the data. But the failure of the model for rms investing intermittently, in
terms of incorrect signs on investment terms still suggest some sort of misspecication, which may
arise due non-convexities in adjustment cost. The estimates for the rms that invest continuously,
suggests that nancial variables do not signicantly aect the shadow value external nance, but
that adjustment costs are signicant determinants in the intertemporal substitution of investment.
6For the rm that invest intermittently we also have a specication, column (c) in Table 2.8, where the adjustment
cost assumed is an approximation of cubic adjustment cost, to see if such an specication might provide with a better
proxy for adjustment cost to these set of rms. With such an adjustment cost we obtain
(I=K)i;t = 1(I=K)i;t 1 + 2(I=K)
2
i;t + 3(I=K)
2
i;t 1 + 4(I=K)
3
i;t 1 + 5(Y=K)i;t 1 + 6(C=K)i;t 1
7(B=K)i;t 1 + 8(LQ=K)i;t 1 + 9(INEXP=K)i;t 1 + 10(NE=K)i;t 1 + 11IDi + ft + ai + ei;t (34)
In this specication we would expect 1 > 0, 2 < 0, and 4 < 0, while the sign on 3 is indeterminate and depends
on the relative magnitude of the parameters of the adjustment cost.
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Table 2.9 presents the results of our structural estimates. Here we assume constant returns to
scale, that is  = 17. The set of instruments here is fairly large. The instrument set comprises of
t  2 lag of (I=K), (I=K)2, (I=K)3, (I=K)4, Output, Cost, Cash Flow, Debt, Dividends, Liquidity,
Log of Total assets, Interest Expense, Log of Market Share, Grants, Provision, Other liabilities,
Inventories, Depreciation, Current Assets, Currents Liabilities, Dummy if Equity was repurchased,
Sales Growth, Dummy if Protability was positive in the last period, Long Term Interest Rates on
Government Bonds and 4 Industry Dummies. Dividends and Dummy if Protability was positive in
the last period have been found by Fama and French (2000) to be good predictors of protability.
In our application, Protability is represented by the ratio of cash ow to assets as in Whited and
Wu (2006). Unlike Whited and Wu (2006) we do not include average protability over any number
of previous periods, as we only have 8 periods of data and this would restrict the number of periods
with which we can work.
One potential weakness in our estimation seemed to be that we do not control for the stochastic
discount factor tt+1 by parameterizing it as do Whited and Wu (2006), since company accounts data
do not provide the needed information to do so. Now we know that a high risk rm will behave as
if it had a higher discount rate than a low risk rm. To the extent that the risk of any individual
rm which is primarily related to the variability of its earnings and the variability in earnings being
related to protability, see Fama and French (2000), we have included the predictors of protability
in our instrument set and see what the test of overidentifying restrictions suggest. However, our
overidentication results are sound. Other instruments such as Dummy for Equity repurchase, Log
of Market Share and Sales Growth, would seem to play a role in aecting the nancing premium on
external nance. But often these turned out be insignicant factors with wrong sign. The denition
of other instruments are included in the appendix.
As we can see from Table 2.9 the variables that enter t have the expected sign. For example,
the positive coecient on the debt to assets ratio indicates that a more highly leveraged rm will
have a higher shadow value of external funds; that is, it will be more nancially constrained. The
sign on interest expense is again positive as expected, though insignicant here. Liquidity in this
estimate seems to have a signicant negative impact on the shadow cost of external nance. Most
studies in the literature do not consider nancing through new equity, claiming that most of the
external nancing takes place through debt nancing. In our data, however 98 percent of rms have
outstanding equity and 52 percent of rms report issuing new equity at least once during the period
7The estimates of  did not turn out to be signicant and were not robust to changes in the starting values.
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of our sample. Note this does not include retained earnings. As our results suggest issuance of new
equity does increase the chances of a binding constraint on external nance.
The other parameter estimates also seem sensible. For example, the mark-up and adjustment
cost parameters are all positive and signicantly dierent from zero. Our adjustment cost parameters
suggest that on the margin for a unit Euro of investment the rm has to pay an adjustment cost of
about 20 cents. The mark-up, as expected, is greater than one, and is signicantly so.
In our next step, we construct ^t;t+1 =
(1+^i;t+1)
(1+^i;t)
and \LHSt+1 dened earlier using the estimates
of the structural equation. Having constructed these we estimated Equation (33). We expect a
negative sign on the coecient of ^t;t+1 as ^t;t+1 has a dampening eect on the intertemporal
substitution of capital. Table 11 reports a simple correlation between ^t;t+1 and \LHSt+1 and this
correlation is negative. Illustrated in Table (12) are the the estimates of Equation (33). The sign of
the estimated coecients are as expected and ^t;t+1 comes out to be strongly signicant, albeit small
in magnitude, upon being instrumented with additional variables, lending credence to the estimates
of our structural model.
2.6 Conclusion
In part this chapter has tried to identify some of the sources of misspecication in the neoclassical
model of investment. The poor performance of the neoclassical model of investment can be attributed
to the presence of frictions in the nancial market. We nd that the neoclassical model of investment is
better behaved for rms that invest continuously than for those that invest intermittently or disinvest.
This could be attributed to the presence of xed costs of adjustment that may be signicant factor
in explaining the investment patterns for rms that do not invest continuously.
We also nd that ad hoc augmentation of the nancial variables, though with some justication,
leads to a better t. In particular, we nd that the impact of some of the nancial variables on
the shadow value of external nance is more pronounced for the rms that invest intermittently or
disinvest. However, we also nd that the model in a reduced form setting, based on the dynamics
implied by dierentiable adjustment cost, has not produced the desired result. Output and cost terms
continue to have the wrong signs for the full sample of the data as well as the for rms investing
intermittently though not signicantly for this set of rms. And the adjustment cost parameters, for
the rms investing intermittently are certainly not as expected. Such results as obtained from our
sample for rms investing intermittently puts into question the nature of intertemporal substitution of
investment in presence of nancial constraint. The failure of the model could be due to the restrictions
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imposed through the linearization and/or ignoring the non convexities in the adjustment cost. The
index of nancial constraint constructed through the estimated parameters of the structural model
does, seem to have a bearing in explaining intertemporal substitution of investment in presence of
nancial frictions.
Much room remains for further investigation of investment process in presence of nancial con-
straint. In particular we would like to ask how nancial position of the rm and the cost of adjustment
(xed and smooth) interact and to what extent it aects investment. We intend to take up such an
exercise in the future.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of rms among dierent Sectors
Sector No. of Firms Percentage
Agriculture and Hunting 2 0.48
Extraction of Minerals 7 1.68
Industry 163 39.18
Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas and Water 17 4.09
Building 24 5.77
Wholesale and Retail Activities 123 29.57
Hotels and Restaurants 4 0.96
Transport, Storage and Communications 40 9.62
Exploitation and Trade in Real Estate and Leasing 25 6.01
Other Socio-Cultural Activities 11 2.64
All 416 100
Denition of Variables
Output is the Net turnover and other company revenues of the rm.
Cost constitutes of wages, salaries and all social security charges plus cost of raw and ancillary
materials and all other costs.
Capital assets constitutes of tangible and intangible assets.
Cash ow if dened as provision for depreciation of assets plus operating prot after tax, interest
and preference dividend.
Debt constitutes of the book value of Long-term liabilities to group companies, capital members
co-operative society and other participating interests, subordinated loans and debentures.
Current Liabilities are the book value of Long-term liabilities that are due within one year.
Grants are the value of the sums relating to investment premiums, subsidies and such like.
Provisions are liabilities that include latent tax liabilities, pension liabilities, and liabilities per-
taining to guarantees, reorganization, important up keeping, own risk and environment.
Liquidity is dened as short-term receivables such as trade receivables, commercial papers, bal-
ances in the current account and the periodic payments of long-term receivables from group companies
and participating interest. It also consists of short-term securities, easily transferable in cash and
cash, bills of exchange, cheques, deposit accounts current accounts and other short term receivables
from nancial institutions.
Ln(Market Share) is the log of the ratio of rms output with respect to the industry output.
New Equity is dened as the dierence between the year beginning and the year end of the book
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value of Capital Paid and Called and Share Premium Reserve.
Note: As far as data on equity is concerned, the company accounts do not make a distinction
between internal and external equity. Internal equity is reported as "share premium reserve". But
"share premium reserve" has another component, which is the one that arises from the truest sense
of its denition, that is, what is over and above the par value of "capital called and paid".
i, the rate of Depreciation is calculated as follows, suppressing the rms subscript,  = 2=L,
where L is the estimated average life of capital goods. The estimated average life of capital good in
any year is calculated as
Lt =
GKt 1 + It
DPRCt
(35)
where, GKt is the reported value of gross property, plant, and equipment at time t, DPRCt is the
reported depreciation at time t. L is calculated by taking the average over Lt.
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Table 2.5: The Basic Euler Equation
The Euler Equation takes the following form (I=K)t = 1(I=K)t 1 + 2(I=K)2t 1 + 3(Y=K)t 1 +
4(C=K)t 1+5ID+ft+ai+vit. I/K is the ratio of investment to the capital stock, Y is Output, C
is Cost, ID is industry dummy, ft is a xed time eect, and ai is a xed rm eect. The estimates in
column (a) are for the whole data set, those in (b) are for the rms that invest continuously and the
estimates in (c) are for the rms that invest intermittently. The instrument set used in estimation is
t  2 lags of (I=K), (I=K)2, Output, Cost, Cash Flow, and Debt.
Transformation Used: Orthogonal Deviations
Normalizing Variable: Deated Tangible and Intangible Assets
Dependent Variable (I=K)t (a) (b) (c)
(I=K)t 1 0.0981 0.0703 0.1447
(0.061) (0.102) (0.120)
(I=K)2t 1 -0.0161 -0.0165 -0.0357
(0.009) (0.016) (0.012)
(Y=K)t 1 0.0063 0.0301 0.0143
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003)
(C=K)t 1 -0.0062 -0.0302 -0.0139
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003)
Wald(Joint) 31,83 12,95 43.77
Degress of Freedom 10 10 10
Probability [0.000] [0.226] [0.000]
Wald (Time) 8.095 6.669 4.132
Degress of Freedom 6 6 6
Probability [0.231] [0.353] [0.659]
Sargan Test 5.767 4.015 10.26
Degress of Freedom 2 2 2
Probability [0.056] [0.134] [0.006]
AR(1), N(0,1) -3.997 -1.938 -3.045
Probability [0.000] [0.053] [0.002]
AR(2), N(0,1) 1.438 1.179 0.6998
Probability [0.150] [0.238] [0.484]
Total No. of Observations :3328
Total No. of Firms : 416
No. of Observations for Firms Investing Continuously:2368
No. of Firms Investing Continuously : 296
No. of Observations for Firms Investing Intermittently: 960
No. of Firms Investing Intermittently : 120
Time Period: 1996-2003
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
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Table 2.6: Bond and Meghir Specication
The Euler Equation takes the following form (I=K)t = 1(I=K)t 1 + 2(I=K)2t 1 + 3(Y=K)t 1 +
4(CF=K)t 1+5(B=K)2t 1+6ID+ft+ai+vit I/K is the ratio of investment to the capital stock,
CF is rm's Cash Flow, Y is Output, B is the stock of long-term debt, ID is industry dummy, ft is
a xed time eect, and ai is a xed rm eect. The instrument set used in estimating column (a) is
all lags of (I=K), t  2 and t  3 of (I=K)2 and t  2 of Output, Cost, Cash Flow, square of Debt .
The instrument set for the estimates in column (b) include the additional nancial variables namely;
Liquidity, Current Liability, New Equity, Interest Expense. All variables are expressed in real terms.
Transformation Used: Orthogonal Deviations
Normalizing Variable: Total Assets
Dependent Variable (I=K)t (a) (b)
(I=K)t 1 0.05223 0.0675
(0.041) (0.035)
(I=K)2t 1 -0.0367 -0.0395
(0.018) (0.016)
(Y=K)t 1 0.0218 0.0118
(0.012) (0.006)
(CF=K)t 1 0.0666 0.0663
(0.041) (0.028)
(B=K)2t 1 -0.1049 -0.0903
(0.062) (0.040)
Wald (Joint) 25.94 30.81
Degress Of Freedom 11 11
Probability [0.007] [0.001]
Wald (Time) 25.27 43.65
Degress Of Freedom 6 6
Probability [0.000] [0.000]
Sargan 36.91 44.69
Degress Of Freedom 31 35
Probability [0.214] [0.126]
AR(1) -3.673 -3.533
Probability [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) 1.655 1.504
Probability [0.098] [0.133]
Wald (Finance) 4.735 8.227
Degress Of Freedom 2 2
Probability [0.094] [0.016]
No. of Observations: 3328
No. of Firm: 416
Time Period: 1996-2003
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
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Table 2.7: Euler Equation Augmented with additional Financial variables
The specication here is (I=K)t = 1(I=K)t 1 + 2(I=K)2t 1 + 3(Y=K)t 1 + 4(C=K)t 1 + 5(CF=K)t +
6(B=K)t+7(LQ=K)t+8(INEXP=K)t+9(NE=K)t+10ID+ ft+ ai+ ei;t. The debt term in column
(a) is Total Debt, Long Term debt and Current Liability, while in column (b) is Long Term Debt. The
instrument set for the estimates of column (a) consists of all lags of (I=K), t  2 and t  3 of (I=K)2 and t  2
of Output, Cost, Cash Flow, Total Debt, Liquidity, Interest Expense. Where as the instrument set for (b)
also includes Depreciation, Log of Market Share, Grants, Provision, Current Assets and Liabilities and Taxes.
Transformation Used: Orthogonal Deviations
Normalizing Variable: Total Assets
Dependent Variable (I=K)t (a) (b)
(I=K)t 1 0.096 0.048
(0.047) (0.039)
(I=K)2t 1 -0.055
 -0.032
(0.023) (0.019)
(Y=K)t 1 0.127 0.092
(0.063) (0.058)
(C=K)t 1 -0.112 -0.090
(0.067) (0.061)
(CF=K)t 1 0.051 0.056
(0.042) (0.029)
(B=K)t 1 -0.147 -0.133
(0.046) (0.042)
(LQ=K)t 1 -0.139 0.028
(0.098) (0.064)
(INEXP=K)t 1 -0.092 -0.110
(0.078) (0.062)
(NE=K)t 1 0.003 -0.008
(0.015) (0.011)
Wald (Joint) 41.040 43.280
Degrees of Freedom 14 14
Probability [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (Time 17.400 18.770
Degrees of Freedom 6 6
Probability [0.008] [0.005]
Sargan 33.750 38.400
Degrees of Freedom 30 37
Probability [0.291] [0.406]
AR(1) -3.654 -3.551
Probability [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) 1.560 1.673
Probability [0.119] [0.094]
Wald (Finance) 12.740 12.470
Degrees of Freedom 5 5
Probability [0.026] [0.029]
No. of Observations: 3328
No. of Firm: 416
Time Period: 1996-2003
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
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Table 2.8: Euler Equation Augmented with additional Financial variables: For rms
Investing intermittently and Investing Continuously
The specication for column (c) is (I=K)t = 1(I=K)t 1 + 2(I=K)2t + 3(I=K)
2
t 1 + 4(I=K)
3
t 1 +
+5(Y=K)t 1 +6(C=K)t 1 +7(CF=K)t +8(B=K)t +9(LQ=K)t +10(INEXP=K)t +11(NE=K)t +
12ID + ft + ai + ei;t, while for (a) and (b) is the same as Table 7. The instrument set for the estimates of
column (a) consists of all lags of (I=K), t   2 and t   3 of (I=K)2 and t   2 of Output, Cost, Cash Flow,
Debt, Liquidity, Interest Expense, New Equity, Taxes, Grants, Provision, Deprecation and Current Assets and
Liabilities . Transformation used for column (a) and (d) is Orthogonal Deviation and for (b) and (c) is First Dif-
ference. Column (d) has the estimates of the augmented Euler equation for the rms that invest continuously.
Normalizing Variable: Total Assets
Dependent Variable (I=K)t
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(I=K)t 1 -0.046 -0.040 -0.018 0.267
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.048)
(I=K)2 0.268
(0.028) -0.145
(I=K)2t 1 0.012 0.013 -0.022 (0.036)

(0.009) (0.010) (0.032)
(I=K)3t 1 0.015
(0.013)
(Y=K)t 1 0.192 0.127 0.125 0.079
(0.048) (0.042) (0.049) (0.056)
(C=K)t 1 -0.188 -0.121 -0.118 -0.077
(0.051) (0.043) (0.050) (0.058)
(CF=K)t 1 -0.003
(0.039)
(B=K)t 1 -0.313 -0.144 -0.152 -0.036
(0.032) (0.036) (0.039) (0.028)
(LQ=K)t 1 0.066 0.170 0.187 -0.070
(0.043) (0.047) (0.048) (0.039)
(INEXP=K)t 1 -0.388 -0.229 -0.242 0.329
(0.051) (0.051) (0.055) (0.289)
(NE=K)t 1 0.007 -0.020 -0.020 -0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.019)
Wald (Joint) 860.300 252.200 369.600 125.9
Degrees of Freedom 13 13 15 14
Probability [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Wald (Time) 32.000 37.560 23.530 12.46
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 6 6
Probability [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.052]
Sargan 43.490 46.620 45.000 48.21
Degrees of Freedom 38 38 36 37
Probability [0.249] [0.159] [0.144] [0.103]
AR(1) -2.121 -2.076 -3.828 -4.089
Probability [0.034] [0.038] [0.000] [0.000]
AR(2) 1.327 1.518 1.464 1.589
Probability [0.184] [0.129] [0.143] [0.112
Wald (Finance) 178.900 126.700 107.000 7.41
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4 5
Probability [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.192]
No. of Observations: 960
No. of Firm: 120
Time Period: 1996-2003
2.7. Appendix 37
Table 2.9: Structural Estimates
The Euler equation estimated is the following: tt+1
(1+it+1)
(1+it)

(Yi;t+1   Ci;t+1)=Ki;t+1 
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The instrument set used in estimation is t   2 lag of (I=K), (I=K)2, (I=K)3, (I=K)4, Output, Cost, Cash
Flow, Debt, Dividends, Liquidity, Log of Total assets, Interest Expense, Log of Market Share, Grants, Provi-
sion, Other liabilities, Inventories, Depreciation, Current Assets, Currents Liabilities, Dummy if Equity was
repurchased, sales growth, Dummy if Protability was positive in the last period, Long Term Interest Rates
on Government Bonds and 4 Industry Dummies.
(a)
2 0.5056

(0.2181)
3 -0.2876

(0.1216)
 1.0145
(0.0198)
(CF=K)t 1 -0.6303
(0.0708)
(B=K)t 1 1.4738
(0.8240)
(LQ=K)t 1 -0.8698
(0.0675)
(INEXP=K)t 1 1.2905
(1.1014)
(NE=K)t 1 0.7822
(0.2864)
Test of Overidentication 4.368
Degrees of Freedom 18
Probability 0.9996
No. of Observations: 3328
No. of Firm: 416
Time Period: 1996-2003
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Table 2.10: Behavior of Variables among Three Categories of rms sorted according to
Index of Financial Constraint constructed using Structural Estimates
CINDEX the Index of Financial Constraint is dened as
CINDEXt = ^t = ^1(CF=K)t + ^2(B=K)t + ^3(LQ=K)t + ^4(INEXP=K)t + ^5(NE=K)t,
^t;t+1 =
(1+^t+1)
(1+^t)
and
LHSt+1 =

(Yt+1 ^Ct+1)=Kt+1 

^2
2

I
K
2
t+1
+ 2^33

I
K
3
t+1

+(1 )

^2

I
K
2
t+1
+^3

I
K
3
t+1

+pt+1

Least Moderately Most
Constrained Constrained Constrained
CINDEX -0.527 -0.114 0.487
^t;t+1 0.946 1.021 1.065
LHS 0.824 0.858 0.926
(I=K) 0.050 0.067 0.077
(Y=K) 2.315 1.657 1.018
(C=K) 2.175 1.542 0.902
(CF=K) 0.127 0.096 0.088
(LQ=K) 0.564 0.292 0.183
(B=K) 0.023 0.119 0.436
(NE=K) -0.002 0.005 0.025
(INTEXP=K) 0.009 0.016 0.031
Table 2.11: Correlation between LHSt and ^
t
t+1
LHS ^
LHS 1.0000
^ -0.0030 1.0000
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Table 2.12: The Euler Equation augmented with the Estimated Index of Financing Pre-
mium on External Finance
The Euler equation estimated is the following: LHSt = 1(I=K)t 1+2(I=K)2t 1+3^
t 1
t +4pt 1+5ID+
ft + ai + vit. The estimates in column (a) and column (b) are exactly identied while the estimates in (c) use
additional instruments as GMM type instruments of all lags of (I=K)1 and (I=K)2 and t 2 level instruments
constituting of ^tt+1, Grants, Provision, Taxes Inventories, Depreciation, Current Assets, Current Liabilities,
Other Liabilities, Log of Market share and Industry dummies. The estimates in (a) and (c) use orthogonal
deviations and that (b) uses rst dierence.
Normalizing Variable: Total Assets
Dependent Variable LHSt (a) (b) (c)
(I=K)t 1 0.146 0.113 0.012
(0.354) (0.107) (0.028)
(I=K)2t 1 -0.077 -0.076 -0.012
(0.154) (0.056) (0.015)
^t 1;t -0.027 -0.117 -0.042
(0.193) (0.104) (0.014)
pt 1 0.366 0.704 0.097
(0.387) (1.051) (0.109)
Wald Joint 3.676 11.060 27.660
Degrees of Freedom 10 10 10
Probability [0.961] [0.272] [0.002]
Wald Time 6.770 18.950 53.270
Degrees of Freedom 5 5 5
Probability [0.238] [0.002] [0.000]
Sargan Overidentication 42.760
Degrees of Freedom 36
Probability [0.203]
AR(1), N(0,1) -1.044 -2.559 -2.759
Probability [0.297] [0.011] [0.006]
AR(2), N(0,1) 0.152 0.672 0.583
Probability [0.879] [0.502] [0.560]
Wald Variables of Interest 1.396 3.349 21.840
Degrees of Freedom 4 4 4
Probability [0.845] [0.501] [0.000]
No. of Observations: 2912
No. of Firm: 416
Time Period: 1997-2003

3Financial Constraints and R&D Investment: Evidence
from CIS
3.1 Introduction
The connection between nance and investment starts with any violation of the Modigliani- Miller
theorem, Modigliani and Miller (1958), usually modeled formally via imperfect information. Accord-
ing to Ross, Westereld and Jordan (2006) about 80 percent of all nancing is done with internally
generated funds. Explanations for this behavior usually highlight the role of information asymme-
tries (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and agency issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in raising the costs of
external funds.
The notion of nancial constraint that is employed in this paper is that of credit rationing which
arises due to informational asymmetry between the borrower/rm and the lender about the quality
of project that a rm wishes to undertake and also due to the risk of bankruptcy in the event of
the failure of the project. Gale and Hellwig (1985) compare optimal contracts with the rst best
situation. First best situations are those that arise when borrowers and lenders share the same
information about the nature and the outcome of the project, that is, they are situations where there
is no informational asymmetry. An optimal contract is incentive compatible, which allows borrowers
to truthfully reveal (since the rm has more information about the project than the lender) the
outcome of the project and also takes into consideration that borrowers in their optimization program
account for the possibility of bankruptcy and the costs associated with it. Gale and Hellwig (1985)
also show that standard debt contracts that require a xed repayment when the rm is solvent and
that require the rm to be declared bankrupt if this xed payment cannot be met and the creditor
is allowed to recoup as much of the debt as possible from the rm's assets, are also optimal. In
equilibrium, a standard debt contract, which is also optimal, will usually involve credit-rationing in
the sense that the optimal loan is smaller and interest rate is higher than it would have been under
the rst best outcome.
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Empirically, the existence of nancial constraints for innovative rms is most frequently inves-
tigated by examining the sensitivity of R&D investment to nancial factors, see Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994), Harho (1998), and Mulkay, Hall and Mairesse (2001). It is estimated by using
the same models as for physical investment, see Mulkay et al. (1999), that is to say, by using the
reduced form of accelerator models of investment, see Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) and
Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997), or by using the structural framework of Euler equations
as in Bond and Meghir (1994). Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) nd a large and signicant relation-
ship between R&D and internal nance for US small rms in high-tech industries. Similar results
are obtained by Mulkay et al. (2001) with French and United States rms. In addition, they nd
that cash ow has a much larger impact on R&D investment for US rms than for the French ones.
Harho's results about German rms are less conclusive. He nds a weak but signicant cash ow
eect on R&D by using an investment accelerator model, while Euler-equation estimates appear to
be non-informative. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) have provided
evidence that cash ow sensitivity need not identify liquidity constrained rms, that is, sensitivity is
not monotonic in the degree of constraints. Cash ow provides information about future investment
opportunities, hence, investment cash ow sensitivity may equally occur because rms are sensitive
to demand signals. On the theoretical side, Gomes (2001) and Aydogan (2003) simulate dynamic
investment models, demonstrating that signicant cash ow coecients are not necessarily generated
by nancing frictions. Conversely, Gomes (2001) shows that nancing frictions are not sucient to
generate signicant coecients on cash ow.
Among the many ways to study the eect of nancing frictions on physical/R&D investment, one
is to construct an index of nancial constraints based on a standard intertemporal investment model
augmented to account for nancial frictions. External nance constraints aect the intertemporal
substitution of investment today for investment tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external
funds. Recently Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) showed that one can rewrite a constrained problem
as an unconstrained one with embedded multipliers that give a characterization of the shadow value,
as a measure of the premium on external nance. This shadow value, in turn, depends on observable
nancial variables and proxies that signal the worthiness of rms, as debt, equity, liquidity, cash ow,
and bond ratings to name a few. Generalized method of moments estimation of the model provides
an estimate of the shadow value that is then used as an index of nancial constraint. Many papers
in the literature on nancing frictions use this approach to study the eect of nancing premium on
the behavior of investment, see Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) and Whited and Wu
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(2006).
However, in our data set, which we obtain from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), we do
not have information on balance sheets of the rms/enterprises1, which would allow us to assess the
eect of internal/external nance on the behavior of R&D investment. But, from a question asked to
the rms we know whether a rm, and to what degree, was hampered in its pursuit of R&D activities
by the presence of nancial constraints. This avoids the task of constructing an index of nancial
constraint to study the behavior of R&D investment in the presence of capital market frictions. That
is, we have an index of nancial constraint that is a function of the nancial position of the rm
and its willingness to undertake R&D activities. The above statement needs some explanation. A
constructed index of nancial constraint is only a function of the nancial state variable and this
index is purged of the eects of future expected protability. However, this is not the case for rms
reporting whether they are nancially constrained or not in our data set. In other words, the rms
reporting that they are nancially constrained are also the ones that express a willingness to invest in
R&D activities, but their nancial position is not sound enough for them to take up R&D activities.
That is, if two rms are equal in every respect but one rm is in a better nancial position than
the other, then the rm that is in a better nancial position is less likely to hit its debt limit than
the rm whose nancial position is not sound. Ceteris paribus, the worse the nancial position of
the rm, the greater is the loan demanded, which implies that higher is the repayment obligation
to the lending agency and hence greater the risk of bankruptcy. This risk is the prime factor for
underinvestment. That is, rms might get some external nance to nance their projects, but not
to the extent that they desire.
There are many situations when the rm may report that nancial factors are constraining
innovation. The prerequisite is that the rm is attempting to undertake innovative activity. The
rm must then consider that its attempt to pursue that activity has been hampered by the lack of
nance and or the cost of that nance. It need not be that all rms that are nancially constrained
would report that they are nancially constrained, for example, they may not be innovation active
in the period, or they may face other kinds of constraints that inhibit their R&D activities, which
imply that nancial constraint is not binding.
The aim of the paper is twin fold. The rst is to study the eect of nancial constraint, as reported
by the rms among other variables, on innovation activity here measured by R&D investment, and
secondly, to establish determinants of nancial constraint.
1The data collected through CIS are at the enterprise level and not at the company level. Here we use the term
rm and enterprise exchangeably.
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There are many problems one faces when estimating the impact of nancial and other variables
on innovation, selection and endogeneity of the explanatory variables being the chief among them.
Problems of sample selection arise since only those rms report R&D expenditure that chose to in-
dulge in R&D activities. Savignac (2005) examines the impact of nancial constraints on innovation
for established rms in France. An indicator based on the rm's assessment of nancial constraints
is found to signicantly reduce the probability that a rm undertakes innovation activities. However,
in her paper she only account for the endogeneity of the indicator, indicating whether a rm is nan-
cially constrained or not. But, endogeneity of other control variables could also lead to inconsistent
estimates. To overcome the potential endogeneity of the regressors we use Lewbel's approach to
handling such problems. For studying the determinants of R&D investment we use Lewbel's (2006)
semiparametric estimator that handles both the problem of selection and endogeneity. For the bi-
nary response model, in which we study the determinants of nancial constraint we employ Lewbel's
(2000, 2004) semiparametric binary choice model that accounts for endogeneity of the regressors.
Our results generally support the view that nancial constraints aect R&D investment and
that the nancial constraints are less binding in the presence of other constraints on innovation,
such as market or economic uncertainty or regulation and organizational rigidities. Other signicant
determinants of R&D investment that we nd are the age of the rms, market share, cooperation in
R&D activities and rms' share of innovative sales.
Ideally, we would have liked to assess the impact of the nancial position of the rms after
controlling for investment opportunities or future expected protability. However, the Community
Innovation Surveys do not provide us with the balance sheet information of the rms. Instead of this
nancial information we include age and a dummy for group membership of the rm. Our results
suggest that age and belonging to a group are signicant determinants of nancial constraint. We
believe that these variables pick up the eect of nancial health of the rm. Our results also suggest
that the presence of other constraints on innovation, such as market uncertainty, regulation and
organizational rigidities, also reduces the probability of a rm being nancially constrained though
not signicantly so. Expected future protability, as proxied by the share of innovative sales in the
total sales of the rm, increases the probability of nancial constraint after controlling for information
costs that are implied by the nancial position of the rm, which is proxied by age, market share
and a dummy for belonging to a group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 presents
the models of nancial constraint and a model to assess the eect of nancial constraint on R&D
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investment. Section 3.4 discusses the results and nally section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The data used for our analysis are collected by Statistics Netherlands. The Dutch Innovation Surveys
are conducted every two years. To implement our model we use the fourth Dutch Innovation Survey,
CIS 3.5, which pertains to the years 2000-02. The Innovation Survey data are collected at the
enterprise level. A combination of a census and a stratied random sampling is used. A census is
used for the population of large (250 or more employees) enterprises, and stratied random sampling
is used for small and medium sized enterprises. The size of an enterprise is measured by the number
of employees, and the stratum variables are the economic activity and the size of an enterprise, where
the economic activity is given by the Dutch standard industrial classication.
Since in our model we want to control for the endogeneity of the regressors, we use as instruments
lagged values of some of our potential endogenous regressors. Hence we merged CIS 3.5 with the
CIS 3, containing information for the years 1998-2000. This leaves us, after cleaning the data, with
a total of 3958 enterprises for our analysis out of which 1531 report to be innovating.
The last page in the appendix shows a table that is directly borrowed from the CIS 3.5 question-
naire. Section 8a of the table asks an innovating rm if it is hampered in its pursuit of innovating
activities. Section 8b of the questionnaire asks the non-innovating rms if it is important for them
to take up innovating activity and whether they are hampered in some way or another. The number
of non-innovating rms that answer in the armative to question 8b is 95. These 95 rms could
be thought of as potentially innovating rms. Thus the total number of innovating and potentially
innovating rms is 1626. If either type of rm, innovating as well as potentially innovating, replies
in the armative to the general hampering question then it is asked to ll out Section 9, in which it
is asked to specify the hampering factor(s) and to what extent it aects its innovation projects. We
construct a binary variable DFIN that takes value 1 if the rm answers that, because of nancial
problems, some of its projects are (a) seriously delayed, (b) prematurely stopped or(c) did not start.
Out of 1626 innovating as well as potentially innovating rms, 583 rms report that they are ham-
pered in some way or another in their innovation activities. Of these, 178 rms report that they are
hampered due to nancial reasons.
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3.3 The Model
In this section we present a model of nancial constraint and then study the decision of the rm
to innovate and how much to invest in R&D in the presence of nancial constraint2. We refer to
appendix A for a discussion of the model.
Firms wish to undertake risky ventures but lack the necessary resources, so they turn to the
investors (banks or other deposit-taking, nancial institutions) for external nance. Venture capital
and other types of non-deposit private equity are not considered in our analysis. The rm is assumed
to be risk-neutral; it maximizes the expected value of its wealth. The returns to the risky venture
are described by a revenue function f : an investment of R units produces a revenue of f(s;R) units
in state s, s being the state of nature. The revenue function is also assumed to exhibit decreasing
returns to scale. Assume that f(s;R) = s(R; :), \." represents other parameters characterizing the
rm. A crucial assumption is that agents have asymmetric information. The rm observes the state
free of charge, but the lender can only observe the state by paying some observational cost. Gale and
Hellwig (1985) have shown that the optimal contract between the rm and the lender is a standard
debt contract that involves a xed repayment obligation and a declaration of bankruptcy if and only
if the repayment obligation cannot be met, and a conscation of whatever wealth remains in the
event of bankruptcy.
Under an optimal contract the rm maximizes its wealth taking into account the possible risk of
bankruptcy and subject to the constraint that the zero prot condition of the lender is satised. The
zero prot condition states that the expected return from lending to the rm should at least be equal
to the amount that the lender can earn from lending this amount at the risk free rate of interest ir.
Let Rop be the amount of R&D capital demanded by the rm under an optimal contract.
To invoke the notion of nancial constraint, let us now see what happens under the assumption
that both the lender and the rm can directly observe the state of nature. In such a situation, which
is termed rst best, since the rm and the lender share the same information about the nature of
the project and the lender can costlessly observe the states of nature, the problem is the same for
the rm and for the lender.
Let, Rfb be the solution to the rm's problem under the rst best situation. Gale and Hellwig
(1985) have shown that Rfb  Rop that is to say that the amount of R&D capital demanded in the
rst best situation is at least as great as the amount lent under an optimal contract. Rfb is strictly
greater than Rop if there is a positive probability of bankruptcy and if the cost borne by the lender
2See Gale and Hellwig (1985) for a detailed discussion.
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for investigation in the event of bankruptcy is positive.
However, it should be noted that Rop is a function of the distribution of the states of nature over
which it bases its expectations and which we seek to capture through the expected future protability
E(), rm characteristics FC, the organizational and the institutional constraints that the rm faces
and which deter a rm from taking up R&D activities CON , the liquid wealth W0 that the rm has
at its disposal, and the risk free rate of interest ir.
Rop = Rop(E(); FC;CON;W0; ir): (1)
Gale and Hellwig (1985, 1986) and Gomes et al. (2006) show that R0opir < 0, R
0
opW
> 0, R0opE > 0
and R0opCON < 0. In words this means that as the risk free rate of interest rises the demand for R&D
capital decreases, as the liquid wealth of the rm increases the demand for R&D capital increases
and as the future expected protability, E(), increases the demand for R&D capital increases. Also
since the xed payment to the lender when the rm is solvent increases with the amount lent, the
eects of ir;W0; E(); CON on the xed payment to the lender are qualitatively the same as those
on Rop.
Let r be the equilibrium rate of interest that the rm pays so that the lender's zero-prot con-
straint is satised. This rate of interest is the interest rate actually paid by the rm when it is not
bankrupt. This implies that
r = r(Rop):
Since the xed repayment obligation by the rm to the lender increases with the amount of loan
it can be shown that rate of interest is non decreasing in the amount of R&D demanded under an
optimal contract. Equation (1) implies that
r = r(E(); FC;CON;W0; ir): (2)
Since the demand for R&D capital increases in expectation of future protability it can be shown
that r0E > 0 and since the demand decreases due to presence of institutional factors that hamper
R&D activities, r0CON < 0. Also since the demand for external sources of funding decreases with the
increase in the internal wealth of the rm, this implies that r0W0 < 0.
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Dene the function fin3 as
fin = finfr(E(); FC;CON;W0); g; (3)
where  is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. The inequalities discussed above imply that fin0E  0,
fin0CON  0 and fin0W0  0. We say that a rm is nancially constrained if,
fin  F; (4)
where F corresponds to the threshold value on the loan that the rm can get. This constraint
becomes binding if the rate of interest demanded by the lender on extra units of loan exceeds a
certain threshold that the rm is unable to meet. Consequently, the rm would not be able to meet
its required R&D investment level. The rate of interest corresponding to the threshold could be
thought of as the interest rate on the maximum amount of debt a rm can incur. This threshold
can dier from rm to rm depending on the nancial position of the rm. Take the example of
two rms that are equal in every respect but one rm has a better nancial position than the other.
The rm that is in a better nancial position is less likely to hit its debt limit than the rm whose
nancial position is not sound. It should be noted that what is driving these results is the positive
probability of bankruptcy. Ceteris paribus, the worse the nancial position of the rm, the greater
is the loan demanded, which implies that the xed repayment obligation and the risk of bankruptcy
are also greater.
Before we set up our econometric model we would like to note that the observed R&D expenditure
corresponds to Rop, the optimal R&D capital demanded under the optimal/standard debt contract,
but the observed outcome is closer to the rst best level if the rm does not report that it is nancially
constrained. Our objective here is to assess how the observed outcome/R&D expenditure behaves
under the presence of nancial constraint.
We hypothesize that
DFIN = I[fin  F > 0]; (5)
where DFIN is the binary variable that takes value 1 if the rm reports that it is nancially
3We now ignore the risk free rate of interest ir, since it should stay constant for a single period of survey.
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constrained and 0 otherwise and I is the indicator function that equals one if its argument is true
and zero otherwise.
For our empirical analysis of the eects of nancial constraints on R&D investment we now seek
to set up a model, whose estimation will help us judge the eects of nancial constraint on R&D
investment. Any such empirical model would have to take into account the sample selection that
arises in our data set. Also, in a model of sample selection, common unobservables may aect both
the outcome (R&D investment) and the probability of selection (the decision to innovate) in unknown
ways. To handle endogeneity in a model of sample selection we use Lewbel's (2006) estimator, which
takes the form of simple weighted averages, GMM or two stage least squares. Lewbel shows that
the distribution function of potential outcomes, conditional on covariates, can be identied given an
observed variable V , called very exogenous variable, that aects the selection probability in certain
ways and is conditionally independent of the error terms in a model of potential outcomes. The nice
thing about this estimator is that it is semiparametric and there are no stringent assumption on the
error terms4.
We specify the model below. Equation (6) is our main regression equation in which we seek to
establish our determinants of R&D intensity, (7) is our innovator selection equation, and (8) is the
indicator function given in (5).
Let LRi be log of R&D intensity of a plant i, where R&D intensity is dened as level of R&D
investment in a year divided by the year value of the plant i0s sales ,
LRi = (SINVi1 +DFINi2 +Xi3 + Vi4 + i)Di (6)
Di = I[0  Vi +M(SINVi; DFINi; Xi; ei)] (7)
DFINi = I[fini   Fi > 0]; (8)
where Di equals one if the rm i is an innovator and zero otherwise. If Di = 1 we observe some R&D
expenditure which may also be zero. In our estimation we use log of R&D intensity instead of R&D
expenditure. For those rms that are innovators and for whom R&D intensity is zero5, log of R&D
intensity is taken to be a little lower than the lowest R&D intensity for a rm with positive R&D
expenditure. We do this because logarithmic transformation of zero is not dened and therefore such
4Appendix B carries a note on estimation.
5Out of 1531 innovating rms 107 or about 7 percent of them do not have R&D expenditure for the period of the
survey.
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an exercise prevents us from losing any data during estimation.
Our variable V 6, the very exogenous regressor, is the size of rms measured in terms of employ-
ment. The assumption on V is that it is an observed, continuously distributed covariate (or known
function of covariates) with large support. The coecient on V has been normalized to 1. In the
Schumpeterian tradition, it makes sense to include size as an explanatory variable in the main as
well as the selection equation. It can also be argued that if there are xed costs of investing, then
as Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue, large rms are more incited to engage in innovative activities
because they can amortize these costs by selling more units of output7.
M is an unobserved latent variable which is a function of explanatory variables other than size.
We also assume M to be linear function of its arguments. I is the indicator function that equals one
if its argument is true and zero otherwise.
SINVi is the share of innovation in the total sales of the rm. Analogous to the literature on
physical investment SINVi could be thought of as a proxy for q which is the expectation of the
marginal contribution of new capital goods to future prot. We also experimented with alternative
proxies for q, like lagged values of share of Innovation8. Mulkay et al. (2001) assess the impact of
cash ow or prots on R&D and physical investment. The share of innovative sales could be a more
accurate measure of the value accruing out of R&D investment than cash ow or prots.
Below are listed the other explanatory variables included in X of equations (6) and (7):
DOTH: This variable caries the eect of other hampering factors. This is a dummy variable
that takes value one if a rm is constrained because of one of the following factors: (a) internal
organization, (b) market uncertainties, or (c) regulation. The primary aim of constructing this
variable is to see the eect of other hampering factors as uncertainty or institutional factors such as
regulation and organizational rigidities on R&D intensity and to see the eect of nancial constraint
in the presence of such factors.
DCOOPERATION : The literature on cooperation and R&D activities is not sparse. The
crux of the issue lies in knowledge spillover and its eect on investment. Spillovers increase the
relative protability of R&D cooperation once spillovers are suciently high. But higher spillovers
also increase the incentives to cheat by partner rms and the prots from free riding. Firms can
increase the eectiveness of incoming spillovers by investing in "absorptive capacity". Cohen and
6To make sure that V or the log of size has a large support we demean it. With this exercise, we make sure that
V takes negative as well as positive values.
7Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) nd strong statistical evidence of this relationship, including much greater inci-
dences of zero investments in small versus large plants. They attribute this relevance of plant size both to the presence
of absolute as well as relative xed costs and to potential indivisibilities in investment.
8See Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003)
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Levinthal (1989) show that external knowledge is more eective for the innovation process when the
rm engages in own R&D. Increased absorptive capacity through investments in internal R&D eorts
thus increases the eectiveness of incoming information. Also when rms are not direct competitors
but market independent or produce complementary goods, cooperation is associated with higher
R&D investment levels independently of the amount of spillovers.
AGE9 : In our specication we also include the age of the rms. CIS data do not provide this
information. The birth date of the rm was obtained from the Business Register.
LOG(MKTSHARE): This variable is a logarithmic transformation of the market share, dened
as the ratio of sales of the rm to the total sales of the industry. It is a proxy for concentration or
the degree of monopoly. Schumpeter (1942) argues that a rm is incited to innovate if it enjoys a
monopoly position to prevent entry of potential rivals.
Firms in the questionnaire were asked if the innovation activities of the rm were driven by
non-technological (market oriented) reasons or by technological aspect, for example new technology.
NONTECHR: This variable takes value 1 if non-technological (market oriented) factors dom-
inated the innovation activities of the rm. In the literature on innovation activities it has been
argued that demand pull plays an important role in driving innovation activities. The basic under-
lying premise in demand pull playing a role is (a) that the ability to make inventions is widespread,
exible, and responsive to prot-making opportunities; and (b) that the larger an the market is, the
more inventive activity will be directed toward it, partly because the protability of invention rises
with market size, all else equal, and partly because chance encounters between inventive talent and a
problem needing solution are more frequent, the more productive activity there is devoted to meeting
some demand. We assume that the variable, NONTECHR, proxies the demand pull that that the
rm faces with regard to the output it produces.
TECHR: This variable takes value 1 if technological factors dominated the innovation activities
of the rm. Also, the literature on innovation activities it has been argued that changes in the
state-of-the-art in technological knowledge gives rise to technological opportunity, which the rms
want to reap. We assume that TECHR proxies the technological opportunity or technological push
that arise out of development in science and technology.
Innovating rms are asked if they have introduced new products or processes into the market, and
if so, if the new products or processes are (a) developed by the enterprise, (b) developed in alliance
with third parties, or (c) developed mainly by third parties.
9The age of the rms are available from 1967 onwards.
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PDOTH is a dummy equal to one if the new products were developed mainly by third parties.
PDALOTH ia a dummy equal to one if the introduced new products were developed in alliance
with third parties.
PCOTH is a dummy equal to one if the introduced new processes were developed mainly by
third parties.
PCALOTH, is a dummy with value one if the new process were developed in alliance with third
parties.
The rationale for including these dummies in the specication can be found in Table 3.1. It is
evident from that Table that the R&D intensity monotonically decreases with the degree of alliance.
However, it should be mentioned that this is not the same as cooperation in R&D activities with
other institutions. Summary statistics reveal, see Table 3.2, that the mean R&D intensity is higher
for those rms that have entered into cooperative arrangements with other institution than for those
that have not, but also that the R&D intensity monotonically decreases with the degree of alliance
in the introduction of new products or processes.
In some of the specications we also include a dummy variable DSINPL that takes value one if
the enterprise is also a company. That is, it takes value one if it does not belong to a group headed
by a company that has many enterprises working for it.
Earlier we have explained the construction of our binary variables DFIN . In our bid to explain
what causes nancial constraint we use Lewbel's (2000, 2004) semiparametric estimator to estimate a
binary choice model. For our estimation we choose a simple functional form for the function, fin F ,
that is given by
fini   Fi = Vi +R(Xi; i);
where V and X include variables that parameterize the arguments in the function fin. R is a latent
variable, which we assume to be a linear function of variables other than V , the very exogenous
regressor, and the error term . Thus, the estimation equation is given by the following equation:
DFINi = I[0  Vi +R(Xi; i)]: (9)
V in our model is the size of rms measured in terms of employment. The coecient on V has been
normalized to 1. The assumption on V is that it is an observed, continuously distributed covariate
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(or known function of covariates) with large support10. It is known that small rms may be more
tightly constrained because they have less access to internally generated funds for the nancing of
an innovation project and therefore have to approach outside nanciers. These considerations imply
that the size of the rm has a bearing on the nancial wealth of the rm, especially with respect to
nancing of R&D investment from internal funds. Problems of information asymmetries may also
be more severe for small rms in terms of raising outside nance. Moreover for smaller, newer rms
there may be no track record upon which to base a case for funding and/or there may be fewer
realizable assets to use as collateral. Thus size may have an implication in raising the required rate
of return independently of the nancial position of the rms.
For the same reason as stated in the model on R&D intensity we use SINVi, the share of
innovation in the total sales of the rm as a proxy for future expected protability.
As mentioned earlier, a proper explanation of a rm being nancially constrained necessitates
information on the balance sheet of the rms. But since we do not have such information we use the
age of the rm, the log of market share, and a dummy if a rm belongs to a group, as proxies for
wealth.
We include the age of the rm since it might be the case that long established rms that have
survived exit are nancially more sound than new entrants. Age carries a reputation eect which
can have a bearing on accessability to outside funds.
In our specication we also include a dummy, DSINPL, which takes value 1 if the rm does
not belong to a group. It could be quite possible that the rm in question, if faced with nancial
distress, could be bailed out by the company to which it belongs. It is also possible that the company
to which this enterprise belongs engages in diverse activities and produces diverse products which
reduces its risk of being bankrupt, thus enhancing its ability to borrow more. Descriptive statistics
of the variables used can be found in Table 3.2 of Appendix C.
3.4 Results
The section discussing the results has two subsections. The rst section discusses the results of the
sample selection model in which we establish the determinants of R&D intensity and the next section
discusses the result of the binary choice model, where we sought to explain the probability of a rm
being nancially constrained.
10An implication of the large support assumption for V is that, for any value X and  may take on, it is possible for
V to be small enough to make D = 0 , with probability one, or large enough to make D = 1 with probability one.
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3.4.1 R&D Intensity
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the eect of the nancial variable, DFIN , after controlling
for the eect of other variables that inuence the choice of R&D investment.
Table 3.3 presents the result for R&D intensity. The estimates in the columns dier by specica-
tion and the choice of instruments.
The common set of instruments for all the seven columns includes the age of the rm, AGE; the
logarithm of market share, LOG(MKTSHARE), the lagged dummy variable for nancial constraint,
DFIN 1; the lag of the share of innovative sales in total output of the rm, SINV 1; the lag of
the dummy if the rm cooperated with others in its R&D endeavors, DCOOPERATION 1; the
lag of the log of market share, LOG(MKTSHARE) 1; the dummy if the rm does not belong to
a group (DSINPL); the dummy if a rm also did nontechnological innovation (DNONTECH)
and its lag, (DNONTECH 1); the dummy that is equal to one if new products were developed
in alliance with third parties (PDALOTH); the dummy that takes value one if new processes were
developed in alliance with third parties (PCALOTH); dummy variable that takes value 1 if non-
technological reasons or market oriented reasons were important in driving innovation activities,
NONTECHR; dummy variable that takes value 1 if technological reasons were important in driving
innovation activities, TECHR; total investment of the rm during the last period, INV T 1 and
sectoral dummies.
The instrument set in Column (a) also includes PDALOTH, PCALOTH, DFIN  DOTH 1
and DOTH 1. In Column (b) the additional instruments are PCALOTH and DOTH 1. The
specication in column (c) and (d) do not include NONTECHR and TECHR. The instrument set
for column (c) is the same as those of column (b), while in column (d) the only additional instrument
is PCALOTH. The specication in column (e) and (f) does not have SIZE. The additional
instrument in column (e) is PCALOTH, while that in (f) the additional is PDALOTH. From the
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions it seems that the decision to introduce new services in
alliance with the third parties could be potentially endogenous to the decision on how much to invest
in R&D activities.
The results from the estimates suggest that, controlling for other factors, a rm is adversely
aected in its pursuit of R&D activities, as measured by R&D intensity, by the presence of nancial
constraint. The large negative sign on DFIN is testament to this fact. From our discussion of the
model we know that given the uncertainty, the risk of bankruptcy is large for rms that are not
nancially healthy. This risk plays an important part in reducing the amount of R&D investment.
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We include DOTH to assess the eect of other constraints and also to assess the impact of nancial
constraint in presence of other hampering factors. The results of our analysis suggest that such
factors as captured by DOTH also have a negative eect on the amount of R&D capital a rm
wishes to use. We also nd that the eects of these constraints are much weaker with respect to
nancial constraint suggesting that, if there are any major hampering factors, then these are nancial
constraints. To capture the eect of nancial constraint in the presence of other hampering factors,
we include the interaction of DFIN and DOTH, DFIN DOTH. The eect of nancial constraint
in the presence of other constraints that are not functions of nancial constraints is captured by the
sum of the coecients of DFIN , DFIN  DOTH and DOTH. Our results imply that nancial
constraints are less binding if other market uncertainties or institutional hampering factors are also
present. It should also be noted that, in spite of the fact that these variables are very correlated, the
coecient estimates are individually signicant. The sum of the coecients on DFIN and DOTH,
DFIN DOTH is negative in columns (a) and (b), but turns out to be positive positive for the rest
of the variables. This, however, does not weaken our conclusion that, if a rm is only constrained
because of nancial reasons in its pursuit of R&D activities, the eect of nancial constraint is quite
prominent.
Our results suggest that R&D intensity reacts strongly to SINV , which is the share of innovative
sales in the total sales of the rm that we assumed to be a proxy for future expected protability. The
strong positive sign on SINV suggest that, higher the future expected protability higher would be
the R&D investment. In addition we nd that older rms are more R&D intensive after controlling
for other factors. However, we nd that rms that have a higher market share also have a lower
R&D intensity. Not surprisingly, the sign of this coecient is positive when we use the logarithm of
R&D expenditure instead of the logarithm of R&D intensity as dependent variable. These ndings
are not new; they only suggest that a monopoly rm does indeed invest more than a rm in a more
competitive industry but proportionately less as it increases in size measured by sales11. Our results
suggest that, controlling for other factors, older rms tend to have a higher R&D intensity than
younger rms and that the spillover eects of cooperation lead to higher R&D intensity. It could also
suggest that the cooperative arrangements are made with non-rivals or with rms that are engaged
in producing complementary goods12.
The specication also includesDSINPL, which is a dummy for being a single plant in a company,
that is it takes value 1 if it does not belong to a group. What we nd here is that, after controlling
11See Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987) and Geroski (1990).
12See De Bondt et al., (1992) and Roller et al. (1997).
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for other factors, the rms that do not belong to a group have lower investment than those who do
belong to a group, reecting the fact that, enterprizes belong to a group could be special units, set
up with the purpose of carrying our R&D activities for the whole group. We nd that larger and
younger rms are more R&D intensive. The variables NONTECHR and TECHR, however do not
turn out to be signicant.
3.4.2 Financial Constraint
This section discusses the results of the binary choice models in which we seek to explain the determi-
nants of the nancial constraint itself. Our dependent variable is DFIN which is the binary variable
that takes the value one if the rms nds itself being nancially constrained in the pursuit of R&D
activities and zero otherwise. As stated earlier to handle potential endogeneity of the regressors we
use Lewbel's (2000, 2004) semiparametric estimator.
To estimate the binary choice model we construct another dependent variable DFIN which is
DFIN   I(V  0) weighted by the inverse of the conditional density function of the negative of the
logarithm of the size of the rm measured in terms of employment, the very exogenous variable V ,
using the same notation as in Lewbel's (2000, 2004) papers. I is an indicator variable that takes the
value 1 if the argument in parentheses is true. Y , the set of conditioning variables is the union of
all the explanatory variables and the instruments (see Appendix 3B). We take the negative of the
logarithm of size because one of the assumptions of the model is that, as V decreases, the probability
of DFIN being zero increases (refer to footnote 9).
The results of the binary choice model in which we seek to explain the determinants of nancial
constraint are presented in Table 3.4. The set of instruments is mentioned in the Table. The more
striking results of this part of our analysis are the coecient estimates that we obtain on age and
DSINPL. The results suggest that the older a rm is, the less likely it is to be nancially constrained
and signicantly so. This is understandable, since older rms, having survived preemption, are
more likely to be nancially stable than new rms. Also, older rms have a better reputation than
younger rms and therefore they have greater access to external funds. Secondly, the estimation
results indicate that a rm is more likely to be nancially constrained if it does not belong to a
group. This could suggest that if it belongs to a group, then the rm has at its disposal some
alternative avenues of nancing its projects, that are closed to rms that do not belong to a group.
The fact that it belongs to a group may be an indication that the group is engaged in diverse activities
and thus less prone to risk than a single enterprise engaged in a single activity. As explained earlier,
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DFIN is a function of the nancial state variables. In the absence of information on the balance
sheets, the eect of nancial state variables is included in the error term. Hence, the instruments
that are supposed to be correlated with the regressors are also correlated with the error term. But
since the results of the test of overidentifying restrictions do not lead to rejection, we conclude that
age and the dummy indicating that the rm belongs to group are picking up the eects of nancial
variables.
As explained earlier the binary variable DFIN is an indicator of the rm's willingness to under-
take R&D activity as well as of its nancial position. As a proxy for future expected protability
we experiment both with the current value of the share of innovative sales SINV and with its lag.
Our results suggest that controlling for other variables, the probability of a rm being nancially
constrained is higher, the higher is its future expected protability, as proxied by SINV or its lag,
but not signicantly so.
The results in Table 3.4 also suggest that a rm facing a priori hampering factors other than
nancial constraints are less willing to undertake R&D activities and are thus less likely to be hit
by nancial constraints. The results on overidentication restrictions do not suggest that there is
simultaneity in the determination ofDOTH andDFIN , sinceDOTH is included in the instrumental
variables.
3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of R&D and investment. In particular,
our aim is to see how nancial constraints aect a rm's R&D intensity. We nd that a rm that
reports that it is nancially constrained but not otherwise constrained is adversely aected in its
pursuit of R&D activity. Financial constraints have a large and a signicant impact in aecting
R&D investment.
However, nancial constraints are less binding if the rm runs up into other hampering factors
or other constraints that are not a function of nancial constraint itself. We obtain this result both
by looking at the eect of nancial constraint on R&D intensity in the presence of other constraints,
such as market uncertainty, institutional constraints and organizational rigidities, and looking at the
probability for a rm to be nancially constrained in the presence of other than nancial constraints.
We also nd that the eect of these other constraints is much weaker than that of nancial constraint,
which conrms the ndings of many papers that nancial factors are the major stumbling block in
pursuit of any activity. However, this does not diminish the fact that institutional and organizational
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rigidities also reduce the amount or R&D investment. Policy makers while taking into account the
hampering factors that inhibit R&D activities should also consider such factors. Also, since nancial
constraint seems to be the most important factor that inhibits R&D activities, policy makers should
consider setting up institutions that would allow economically sound projects get the required nance
to be carried out. In particular, care should be taken of young rms and rms that do not belong
to a group, since these rms are the ones that are more susceptible to the exigencies of nature, as is
well reected in our analysis. Finally, as a comment on nancial constraint, we note that, age and
group membership, as proxies for the nancial wealth of a rm, appear to be signicant predictors
of a rm being nancially constrained.
One of the shortcomings of our paper is that, we have not used nancial information from the
balance sheet of the rms, but instead used proxies for nancial state variables. As a part of our
future research agenda we would like to enrich our model by using data from the balance sheet of the
rms in the explanation of nancial constraint. Also, for our future research we plan to carry out our
investigation of nancial constraint on R&D investment in a dynamic setting by using more waves
of CIS data. This would also necessitate a dynamic model of nancial constraint and investment.
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3.6 Appendix
3.A A Model of Financial Constraint
In this appendix we present a model of nancial constraint and study the decision of a rm to innovate
and how much to invest in R&D in the presence of nancial constraints13. Firms wish to undertake
risky ventures but lack the necessary resources, so they turn to the investors, banks or other deposit-
taking, nancial institutions, for external nance. Venture capital and other types of non-deposit
private equity are not considered in our analysis. The rm's initial net wealth is W0 = A0   R0,
where A0 is the rms's initial liquid assets and R0 the rm's initial indebtedness. Assume that the
rms need of R&D expenditure R is greater than W0. The rm is assumed to be risk-neutral; it
maximizes the expected present value of its wealth. The returns to the risky venture are described
by a revenue function f : an investment of R units produces a revenue of f(s;R) units in state s,
s being the state of nature. The revenue function is also assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to
scale. Assume that f(s;R) = s(R; :), \." represents other parameters characterizing the rm. A
crucial assumption is that agents have asymmetric information. The rm observes the states free
of charge, but the lender can only observe the states by paying some observational cost. Gale and
Hellwig (1985) have shown that the optimal contract between the rm and the lender is a standard
debt contract, which involves a xed repayment obligation Rl, and a declaration of bankruptcy if
and only if the repayment obligation cannot be met, and a conscation of whatever wealth remains
in the event of bankruptcy.
Under an optimal contract the rm takes into account the possible chances of bankruptcy. If
the rm declares bankruptcy its revenue is reduced to s(R; :), where 0    1, and it suers
a xed nonpecuniary penalty whose monetary equivalent is K  0. Under an optimal contract the
rm solves the following problem:
max
R; R
E[s(R;FC;CON)  Rl]+   Pr[s(R; :) < Rl]K (10)
13See Gale and Hellwig (1985) for a detailed discussion.
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subject to
E ~Rl  (1 + ir)(R W0) (11)
R  0;
where [X]+  maxfX; 0g, Pr[:] denotes a probability, the expectation is taken over the states of
nature, ir is the risk free rate of return, FC is rm characteristics, CON is other constraints such
as institutional factors that deter rms from taking up R&D activities and ~Rl is given by
~Rl =
8<: Rl if s(R; :)  Rls(R; :) if s(R; :) < Rl
~Rl is a random variable, which is the lender's gross return under a standard debt contract. Rl,
under the standard debt contract is the xed payment to the lender when the rm is solvent. In
the event of bankruptcy, that is if s(R; :) < Rl, the revenue is reduced to s(R; :), and since the
lender is allowed to recoup whatever he/she can, the lender's revenue in the state of bankruptcy is
s(R; :). One can interpret(1   )s(R; :) as the cost borne by the lender for investigation in the
event bankruptcy. Equation (11) is the zero prot condition of the lender, which states that the
expected return from lending to the rm should be at least equal the amount he/she can earn from
lending the same amount at the risk free rate of interest ir. Let Rop be the solution to (10) and (11).
To invoke the notion of nancial constraint let us now see what happens under the assumption
that both the lender and the rm can directly observe the state of nature. In such a situation, which
is termed rst best, since the rm and the lender share the same information about the nature of
the project and the lender can costlessly observe the states of nature, the problem of rm as well as
the lender is the same. This can be written as
max
R
E fs(R; :)  (1 + ir)(R W0)g: (12)
Let, Rfb be the solution to the above problem. Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown that Rfb 
Rop and that Rfb > Rop if Pr[s(R; :) < Rl] > 0 and  < 1, that is to say that the amount R&D
capital demanded in the rst best situation is at least as great as the amount lent under an optimal
contract and is strictly greater if there is a positive probability of bankruptcy and if the cost borne
by the lender (1  )s(R; :) is positive.
Let r be the equilibrium rate of interest that the rm pays so that the lender's zero-prot con-
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straint is satised. This rate of interest r in (13) is the interest rate actually paid by the rm when
it is not bankrupt and is given by:
(1 + r)(Rop  W0) = Rl: (13)
This implies that
r = r(Rop; Rl);
However it should be noted that both Rop and Rl are determined simultaneously and are functions
of the distribution of the states of nature, which we denote here by h(s); rm characteristics, FC;
the organizational and the institutional constraints that the rm faces and which deters a rm from
taking up R&D activities, CON ; the liquid wealth W0 that the rm has at its disposal and the risk
free rate of interest ir.
Rop = Rop(E(); FC;CON;W0; ir) (14)
Rl = Rl(E(); FC;CON;W0; ir): (15)
Here we seek to capture the distribution of the states of nature on which a rm bases its expectation
with a single variable, E(), the expected future protability and is given by E()  E[s0(R)] =R
s0(R)h(s)ds.
Gale and Hellwig (1985, 1986) and Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) show that R0opi < 0, R
0
opW
>
0, R0opE > 0 and R
0
opCON
< 0, where \0" denotes the derivative of the variable with respect to the
subscript variable. In words this means that as the risk free rate of interest rises the demand for R&D
capital decreases, as the liquid wealth of the rm increases the demand for R&D capital decreases
and as the future expected protability, E() increases the demand for R&D capital increases. Also
since the xed payment to the lender when the rm is solvent, Rl, increases with the amount lent,
the eect of ir;W0; E(); CON on Rl are qualitatively the same as those on Rop.
Equation (14) and (15) imply that14
14In fact the rate of interest r does not have an independent meaning in the context of the model. It is just another
characterization of the xed repayment obligation of the rm, Rl. We only introduce it here so that we can write the
estimation model.
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r = r(E(); FC;CON;W0; ir): (16)
Since the demand for R&D capital increases in expectation of future protability it can be shown
that r0E > 0 and since the demand decreases due to presence of institutional factors that hamper
R&D activities, r0CON < 0. Also since the demand for external sources of funding decreases with the
increase in the internal wealth of the rm, this implies that r0W0 < 0.
Dene the function fin15 as
fin = finfr(E(); FC;CON;W0); g; (17)
where  is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. The inequalities discussed above imply that fin0E  0,
fin0CON  0 and fin0W0  0. We say that a rm is nancially constrained if,
fin  F; (18)
that is, if the rate of interest demanded by the lender on extra unit of loan exceeds a certain threshold,
which the rm is unable to meet. Consequently the rm would not be able to meet its required R&D
investment level. The rate of interest corresponding to the threshold could be thought of as the
interest rate on the maximum amount of debt a rm can incur. This threshold can dier from rm
to rm depending on the nancial position of the rm. For example, consider two rms that are
equal in every respect but one rm has a better nancial position than the other. The rm that is
in a better nancial position is less likely to hit its debt limit than the rm whose nancial position
is not sound. It should be noted that what is driving these results is the positive probability of
bankruptcy. Ceteris paribus, worse the nancial position of the rm, greater is the loan demanded
which implies higher the xed repayment obligation and thus greater the chances of bankruptcy.
15We now ignore the risk free rate of interest ir, since it should stay constant for a single period of survey.
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3.B Note on Estimation
Given our estimation model equation (6) and (7)
LR = (SINV 1 +DFIN2 +X3 + V 4 + )D
D = I[0  V +M(SINV;DFIN;X; e)]
where LR, the log of R&D intensity is the outcome and D is the decision variable to innovate. D
takes value = 1 if the rm chooses to innovate and zero otherwise. Dene
U = Z(LR   (SINV 1 +DFIN2 +X3 + V 4))
where Z is the vector of instruments and LR is the unobserved R&D intensity for rms which
report to be non-innovators and therefore do not report their R&D intensity. In such a situation the
coecients of the model could be estimated by two stage least squares or a GMM technique using
the the moment condition E(U) = 0. But what we observe in fact is U , which is given by
U = Z(LR  (SINV 1 +DFIN2 +X3 + V 4))D
In the presence of selection, GMM or two stage least squares is infeasible because we only observe
LR instead of LR, and unobservables that determine the selection such asM , the unobserved latent
variable, are correlated with LR and U. But the estimation of our required coecients could become
feasible given a consistent estimator of E(U). Dene the weighting scalar W by W = D=f(V jY )
where f is the conditional probability density function of V , introduced earlier, given Y , which is the
union of the set of instruments and the other covariates, that is, DFIN , SINV and X, that appear
in equation (6). Lewbel (2005) shows that
E(U) = plimn!1
nX
i=1
(UiWi)=
nX
i=1
Wi: (19)
The main assumptions required for equation (19) to hold are that the support of V jY contains
the support of  M jY (these could all equal the real line, for example), and that
V jY; U;M  V jY; (20)
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that is, V is conditionally independent of the unobserved latent variables of the model, conditioning
on the set of covariates X. Given the above our estimates are based on the moment conditions.
E[ZW (LR  (SINV 1 +DFIN2 +X3 + V 4))] = 0:
We estimate the above by using the method of two stage least squares. To estimate the conditional
density of V given Y , f(V jY ) we employ nonparametric density estimation, the estimator being
described in Lewbel and Schennach (2007).
3.C Descriptive Statistics and Results
Table 3.1: Mean Distribution of R&D Intensity along Alliance in the Introduction in
New Products and Process
Mainly by Cooperation Mainly by
your with third parties
enterprise third parties
Product 1.45 .68 .35
(1363) (679) (296)
Process 1.70 .77 .24
(643) (601) (441)
The gure in parentheses is the number of observations.
These number are from the full sample of CIS 3.5,
which has 10628 observations.
3.3. Descriptive Statistics and Results 65
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables of Interest
Variables that are observed only for the Innovators
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
LR -5.09 3.80 -19.70 4.84
SINV 17.15 22.61 0 100
DCOOPERATION .41 .49 0 1
PDALOTH .21 .41 0 1
PDOTH .08 .28 0 1
PCALOTH .16 .36 0 1
PCOTH .08 .28 0 1
Variables that are observed for all rms
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
DFIN 0.04 0.21 0 1
DOTH 0.11 0.32 0 1
DFIN DOTH 0.04 0.18 0 1
LOG(MKTSHARE) -8.88 2.27 -18.26 -0.48
SIZE 218.34 1014.91 2.67 39591.50
DSINPL 0.44 0.50 0 1
AGE 22.37 11.59 2.00 35.00
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Table 3.4: Specication for Financial Constraint
The set of instruments in all columns contains DOTH, DOTH 1, AGE, DSINPL,
LOG(MKTSHARE), LOG(MKTSHARE 1), DCOOPERATION 1, PDOTH, PDALOTH,
PCALOTH, PCOTH, SINV 1, DNONTECH, DNONTECH 1, lagged size, and sectoral dum-
mies.
Very Exogenous Variable: Log of Size
Dependent Variable: DFIN : Binary Variable indicating
if the rm was Financially Constrained or not
(a) (b) (c) (d)
SINV 0.36 -0.06
(0.35) (0.59)
SINV 1 22.61 20.6 20.87
(25.9) (15.18) (15.1)
DOTH -15.25 -13.09 -13.46 -13.31
(9.36) (9.67) (8.87) (8.84)
AGE -0.96 -0.94 -0.95 -0.95
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
LOG(MKTSHARE) 0.16 0.27 0.25
(1.38) (1.38) (1.36)
DSINPL 17.45 17.65 17.62 17.54
(5.54) (5.53) (5.53) (5.51)
Sargan Test 13.23 12.51 12.52 12.55
Degrees of Freedom 10 9 10 11
P-value 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.32
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%

4Financial Constraints and Other Obstacles: Are They a
Threat to Innovation Activity
4.1 Introduction
The Lisbon Strategy launched in March 2000 by the heads of State or Government and aimed at
making the European Union the most competitive economy in the world and achieving full employ-
ment by 2010 emphasizes in the rst pillar the need to adapt constantly to changes in the information
society and to boost research and development. The importance of innovative activity by rms for
securing economic growth and welfare is generally recognized and widely documented in the scien-
tic literature. While insisting on the necessity of more investment in R&D and more innovations
to get Europe on a high growth path, Aghion (2006) emphasizes the need of \a comprehensive and
coherent strategy which also involves: (i) more competition and entry on product market; (ii) more
investment in higher education; (iii) more developed nancial sectors and markets and more exible
labour markets; (iv) a more proactive macroeconomic policy over the business cycle1".
Financial problems are particularly acute in the case of innovation activities due to some of
their inherent characteristics(see Hall (2002) for a discussion). First of all, innovation projects are
riskier than physical investment projects and therefore outside investors require a risk premium for
the nancing of innovation activities. Secondly, because of problems of appropriability innovators
are reluctant to share with outside investors information about their innovations. This asymmetric
information problem hampers the nancing of innovation. Providing convincing signals about the
quality of the innovation project is costly (see Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) on this point) and
sometimes leads to market failure (due to the lemon's problem). Thirdly, the diculty of using
intangible assets as collateral also leads to increased costs of external capital in the form of a risk
premium. Because of the dierences between internal and external costs of capital in the case of
1A critical assessment of Aghion's recent work on these issues can be found in Brouwer (2007).
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innovation, we observe the pecking order theory of nance, where rms prefer to use internal funds
over external debt and nally new equity to nance innovation investments (see e.g. Myers and
Majluf, 1984). The riskiness of innovation projects may raise other nancial problems, especially in
the case of young and small and medium sized rms. Some innovation projects may not be started,
delayed or abandoned because of the risk of bankruptcy and the low value of intangibles in case of
liquidation (see Gomes et al. (2006) for a modeling of this issue). Attracting additional equity to
nance an innovative activity is hampered as this is likely to aggravate the agency problem and the
moral hazard on the part of the inventor (reluctance to invest in risky projects due to risk aversion)
arising from the separation of ownership and management of the rm (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling
1976). Information asymmetry, moral hazard and tax considerations (dierent tax treatment of
external nance and nancing by retained earnings) explain the positive gap between external and
internal costs of capital and the preference of nancing innovative activities by internal capital. The
objective of this contribution is threefold. First, in Section 4.2 we provide some evidence about the
importance and the eect of nancial and other constraints on innovations in Dutch rms using the
data from the Dutch Community Innovation Survey CIS 3.5. Second, in Section 4.3, we compare
this evidence with some other evidence about the importance of nancial and other constraints on
innovation from empirical studies on Dutch and other country data. Third, we discuss in Section 4.4
the policy implications of the empirical ndings as well as some alternative solutions to remove or to
by-pass these obstacles. Finally, in Section 4.5, some concluding remarks will be presented.
4.2 Obstacles to Innovation and their Impact: Some Facts
In the Dutch CIS 3.5 survey, covering the years 2000-2002, participating innovative or potentially
innovative rms were requested to answer some detailed questions about the hampering factors and
their consequences for innovative projects. The hampering factors included in the survey question-
naire are the lack of appropriate sources of nance, but also too high innovation costs, too much
uncertainty of future benets and costs, lack of qualied personnel, lack of knowledge on technolo-
gies needed, organizational rigidities within the enterprise, uncertainty of future market developments
and the existence of regulation [see e.g. Statistics Netherlands, Community Innovation Survey 2000-
2002 (CIS 3.5), 2002, question 9]. The rms had to answer whether in the period 2000-2002 one
or several among the above obstacles lead to seriously delaying, prematurely stopping, abandoning
and/or not starting innovation projects. The questions had to be answered by the innovative rms
(i.e. rms that introduced or tried but failed or were still in the process of introducing a new product
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Table 4.1: Frequency Distribution of being Hampered
Hampered Not Hampered
Financial Constraints 401 820
Cost Too High 410 811
Economic Uncertanity 529 692
Shortage of Personnel 373 848
Shortage of Knowledge 287 934
Organistional Rigidities 322 899
Marrket Uncertanities 472 749
Regulations 194 1,027
Other Factors 187 1,034
Total No. of Firms2: 10592
Total No. of Potential Innovators: 3456
Total No. of Hampered Firms: 1221
or a new process into the market during this period) but also by rms which stated that they did
not engage in activities aimed at technological improvements despite the fact these activities were
needed (question 8, CIS 3.5). Among the 10,592 rms which answered the questionnaire were 3,456
(potential) innovators. Among the (potential) innovators, 1,221 rms (11.52% of the rms in CIS
3.5) indicated that they were hampered in one way or the other. Of the reported potential innovators
that number 3,456, 264 were non-innovators who could not take up any kind of innovative activity
since they were hampered by one factor or another. In Table 4.1, the frequency distribution between
being hampered or not is given for each hampering factor. The row totals are 1,221.
Table 4.2: Contribution of various Factors towards Abandoning, Prematurely Stopping,
Seriously Slowing Down and Not Starting of at least one R&D Project
Abandoned Prematurely Seriously Did Not
Stopped/Abandoned Slowed Down Start
Financial Constraints 162 135 220 264
Cost Too High 203 185 231 266
Economic Risk 266 238 275 327
Shortage of Personnel 151 113 246 220
Shortage of Knowledge 117 83 195 152
Organizational Rigidities 124 100 191 193
Market Uncertainty 232 187 280 265
Regulations 82 64 110 129
Other Factors 53 35 107 92
Total No. of Firms that reported Abandoning of R&D Projects: 737
Total No. of Firms that reported Prematurely Stopping/Abandoning of R&D Projects: 353
Total No. of Firms that reported Seriously Slowing Down of R&D Projects: 654
Total No. of Firms that reported Not Starting of R&D Projects: 553
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The frequencies of being hampered are fairly high across all hampering factors. Obviously, rms
do not only experience nancial constraints. They appear to have been hampered in various ways with
costs too high, economic uncertainty and market uncertainty mentioned more often as a hampering
factor than nancial constraints. Even organizational rigidities are mentioned more frequently to
constrain the execution of innovative activities than nancial constraints. Economic uncertainty
(43.30% of the rms) and market uncertainty (38.65%) are the most frequently listed obstacles. Of
course, the obstacles are not mutually exclusive. For instance, market and economic uncertainty
are likely to be closely related to the occurrence of nancial constraints. It is instructive to link
the occurrence of hampering factors to consequences regarding the smooth realization of innovation
projects. This is done in Table 4.23. From Table 4.2 it appears that the various hampering factors
lead most frequently to failure of starting a project. Financial constraints, cost considerations and
economic uncertainty, organizational rigidities and regulations are the reasons most often mentioned
for not starting a project. This nding makes sense as rms are likely not to start projects for which
the nancing issue has not been resolved, the costs are too high, returns too uncertain, organizational
rigidities and regulations are prohibitive. Shortage of personnel, shortage of knowledge, market
uncertainty and other factors most frequently lead to seriously slowing down a project. Economic
uncertainty and market uncertainty appear to be the leading obstacles for the four types of decisions.
To measure the impact of the obstacles on each of the four decisions4 of abandoning (AB),
prematurely stopping (ps), seriously slowing down (SSD), or not starting (NS) a project, we use a
probit model with sample selection. The rst equation models each of these decisions separately for
innovative rms. The equation explains the probability that an innovative rm takes one of these
four decisions given dummy variables for three types of obstacles, nancial constraints (BFIN),
economic uncertainty (BEC) and market uncertainty (BINF ), and controlling for rm size (LSIZE)
measured in terms of number of employees. We decided not to include costs too high, shortage of
knowledge and shortage of personnel because we felt that they were somehow related to nancial
constraints. We excluded regulations and other factors because, as shown in Table 4.1, they were
relatively minor. However, economic uncertainty and market uncertainty are forward looking and
assess the future potential benets that a rm can receive from undertaking an R&D project. Hence
these factors are about certain fundamentals that aect the rm and its R&D project. Also included
3Addition of the gures across the various actions for dierent types of constraints in Table 4.2 will not lead to the
gure of the total number of hampered rms in Table 1 for dierent types of constraints. The reason is that a rm can
have more that one project, and a single constraint can lead to dierent types of actions for dierent projects.
4The decisions \Abandoning" and \Prematurely stopping" refer to two dierent questions asked to the rm. While
the former refers to a question asked directly to the rm, the later refers to the kind of action taken as a consequence
of being faced by a hampering factor.
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are sectoral dummy variables for several sectors and an intercept (The results for the sectoral dummies
and the intercept are not in Table 4.3). We allow size, economic uncertainty and market uncertainty
to be interacted with dummies for being or not being nancially constrained (denoted by  F and
 NF , respectively). For instance, BEC F is the interaction between the dummy variables of being
hampered by economic uncertainty and being nancially constrained. The selection equation explains
the probability that a rm is an innovator using the following explanatory variables: the logarithm of
size, the age of the rm, the market share (RLSALE), a dummy variable for being a single plant rm
(D LP ), dummies for some sectors and an intercept (not reported). The estimation results for each
type of action separately for CIS 3.5 data using the maximum likelihood method are given in Table 4.3.
Coecient estimates and their standard-errors are reported in Table 4.3 for the main probit equation
and for the selection equation that explains the probability of being an innovator. The number of
observations is 10,592 with 3,456 being uncensored (innovators and potential innovators). We also
report estimates of , the correlation coecient between the disturbances of the two equations, and
its standard-errors. Using the 2(1)statistic this coecient is found to be signicantly dierent from
zero. The 2(15) statistic tests the joint nullity of the coecients in the rst equation.
The marginal eects for the main probit equation of some of the explanatory variables, evaluated
at their means and at BFIN = 1, and their standard-errors are given in Table 4.4. The marginal
eects are in general smaller than the coecient estimates of the underlying probit equation and
fewer marginal eects than coecients of the probit equation are signicant. This is not surprising
given that the marginal eects are evaluated at sample means. The ndings for the marginal eects
basically conrm the conclusions from the estimation results in Table 4.3. The estimation results
show clearly that nancial constraints, BFIN , have a signicant and positive impact on the three
probabilities of prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down and not starting a project, but not
on that of abandoning a project. Financial constraints aect the least the decision of abandoning a
project, which is also what Table 4.2 revealed. This result is also reported with rm data by Savignac
(2006) and by Canepa and Stoneman (2002)for a cross-section of 15 European countries from the
CIS2 survey.
It is likely that rms that encounter nancial constraints for their innovative activities face si-
multaneously other hampering factors. Therefore, when we allow for dierent coecients for these
other obstacles depending on whether or not nancial obstacles are perceived as constraining, in
most cases the other obstacles (economic and market uncertainty) have less of an eect on the timely
realization of the innovative projects when nancial constraints are present, and this dierence has
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Table 4.3: Determinants OF Abandoning (AB), Prematurely Stopping (PS), Seriously
Slowing Down (SSD), and Not Starting (NS) R&D Projects
AB PS SSD NS
BFIN 0.385 0.918 0.912 1.079
(0.257) (0.301) (0.259) (0.286)
BEC   F 0.087 0.353 -0.297 0.622
(0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.146)
BINF   F 0.161 0.083 0.338 0.126
(0.132) (0.124) (0.13) (0.142)
BEC  NF 0.747 1.291 0.654 1.26
(0.098) (0.17) (0.101) (0.112)
BINF  NF 0.593 0.674 1.016 0.733
(0.096) (0.115) (0.125) (0.107)
LSIZE   F 0.174 0.049 0.071 0.133
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.065)
LSIZE  NF 0.107 0.001 -0.027 0.0003
(0.044) (0.057) (0.048) (0.049)
Selection
LSIZE 0.175 0.177 0.179 0.177
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
AGE -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RLSALE 0.083 0.083 0.081 0.082
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
D   LP -0.053 -0.039 -0.044 -0.047
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
 -0.469 -0.642 -0.562 0.311
(0.147) (0.158) (0.18) (0.253)
2(1) :  = 0 6.33 6.01 5.11 1.16
Prob. 0.012 0.014 0.024 0.281
2(15) 251.12 368.61 537.6 849.21
Prob. 0 0 0 0
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Table 4.4: Marginal Eects of the Explanatory Variables evaluated at their Means and
BFIN = 1 for the Probit Equation
AB PS SSD NS
BFIN 0.153 0.362 0.328 0.358
(0.105) (0.305) (0.087) (0.17)
BEC   F 0.034 0.139 -0.107 0.206
(0.054) (0.119) (0.05) (0.072)
BINF   F 0.064 0.033 0.122 0.042
(0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.047)
BEC  NF 0.297 0.509 0.236 0.418
(0.038) (0.395) (0.055) (0.116)
BINF  NF 0.235 0.266 0.366 0.243
(0.038) (0.208) (0.079) (0.075)
LSIZE   F 0.069 0.019 0.026 0.044
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.014)
LSIZE  NF 0.042 0 -0.010 0.0001
(0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016)
The gures in the parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates.
been tested to be signicant. It is only when the rm is nancially well o that fundamentals such
as market uncertainty and market uncertainty become relevant. Financial constraints also matter
indirectly by reinforcing the hampering eect of other obstacles. With the exception of the impact
of economic uncertainty on the decision to seriously slow down a project, the simultaneous presence
of nancial and other constraints whenever signicant has a positive sign, implying that nancial
constraints reinforce, or are reinforced by the other constraints. The equations for the four types of
decisions have also been estimated jointly by maximum likelihood in an ordered probit model and
in a multinomial logit model with sample selection. Our main nding that the eects of nancial
obstacles and their interactions with market and economic uncertainty are signicant and positive is
basically conrmed.
4.3 Review of Empirical Evidence on Financial and other Obstacles
to Innovation
The existence of nancial constraints to innovation is frequently studied by examining the sensitivity
of R&D investment to nancial factors. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)nd a large and signicant
relationship between R&D and internal nance for small US rms in the high-tech industries. Similar
results have been obtained by Mulkay et al. (2001) for French and US rms.Bond et al. (2003)nd
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that cash ow is not informative about the ow of R&D for panels of German and UK rms.
They interpret their ndings as indicating that UK rms face a higher wedge between the cost
of external and internal nance than German rms. Actually, Stockdale (2002)reports ndings from
the third CIS for the UK showing that the presence of nancial constraints is the second most
important inhibiting factor for innovation active rms, next to high innovation costs. However,
Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) and Cleary (1999) provide evidence that cash ow sensitivity of
investments need not identify liquidity constraints. Cash ow may also be indicative of high demand
and expectations of future prots. Several studies have regressed R&D, innovation activities, and/or
innovation output, measured by the share in total sales of the sales of new products, on innovation
obstacles. The typical, at rst sight, counterintuitive result is that innovation is positively correlated
with perceived obstacles. At second thought this result can be explained by the fact that innovating
rms are more likely than non-innovating rms to perceive the various obstacles that stand in their
way. In other words, the perception of hampering factors is itself endogenous and co-determined by
some of the same factors that condition innovation. Corrections for the endogeneity of innovation
obstacles has been done in a study on French manufacturing rms by Savignac (2006) and on Dutch
rm data by Tiwari et al. (2008). Savignac (2006) reports that for all rms with more than 500
employees and a sample of small business rms 17.25% of the rms suer from nancing constraints.
In the electrical and electronic equipment sector this proportion reaches 30.18%. She estimates
that nancing constraints reduce by 22% the probability to implement innovation projects, that the
existence of nancial constraints on innovation decreases with rm size, and that nancing problems
also depend on sectors, ex-ante nancing structure and past economic performance. Tiwari et al.
(2008) using the Dutch CIS3.5 data conclude that nancial constraints adversely aect R&D, and
that nancial constraints are the major stumbling block in the pursuit of R&D. They also nd that
older rms and rms that do belong to a group are less likely to be nancially constrained. Using
CIS 2 data for European countries, Canepa and Stoneman (2002) nd that nancial constraints have
more of an impact on not starting, delaying or postponing projects than other internal or external
hampering factors. Financial constraints are found to matter more in market based systems than
in bank based systems (a nding that is in line with that of Bond et al. (2003) for Germany and
the UK) and the more the riskier and newer industries are. Both Savignac (2006) and Canepa and
Stoneman (2002) conrm our nding reported in Section 4.2 that nancial constraints lead less often
to the abandonment of projects than to them not being started or being delayed. Another sort of
evidence that R&D is constrained by nancing diculties are the studies conducted in many countries
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about the eectiveness of R&D tax incentives. In a recent econometric study on the eectiveness
of the Dutch WBSO scheme (Wet bevordering speuren ontwikkelingswerk) Lokshin and Mohnen
(2007) conclude that the WBSO program has been eective in reducing the user cost of R&D and
therefore successful in stimulating rm R&D expenditures. According to their results WBSO has
the largest impact in the rst period after which the eect of the tax incentives declines. They
nd that the eect is larger for the smaller rms and is smaller for the larger rms. The R&D
additionality of WBSO points to the existence of nancial constraints. By lowering the cost of
conducting R&D, the R&D incentive scheme stimulates additional R&D expenditures by private
business rms. Financial constraints as a hampering factor for innovations has been extensively
dealt with in the literature. Other obstacles to innovations have received some attention too in the
theoretical and empirical literature. For instance, Aghion et al. (2005, 2006) provide evidence on the
increased benecial eects of competition and entry respectively on innovative activity in industries
close to the technology frontier. Aghion et al. (2006) nd positive eects on entry of new rms and
their post-entry growth of nancial development, regulations aecting start-up costs and regulations
on hiring and ring employees. As these other obstacles have been found to have a signicant impact
on innovative activity, they deserve more attention by researchers.
4.4 Discussion of the Empirical Findings and of their Policy Impli-
cation
The nding that about 11.52% of the rms that answered the questionnaire reported to have been
hampered in one way or the other and that about 3.8% reported to have been nancially constrained
may be reassuring, especially when it is compared to the 17.25% of rms found by Savignac (2006)
to be nancially constrained in France. Realizing that almost one out of three innovative or poten-
tially innovative rms (i.e. 1,221 out of 3,456 rms or 35.3%) have been hampered and 15.3% of
innovative rms (529 out of 3,456 rms) have been hampered by at least one factor and that the
major hampering factors were found to have a signicant detrimental impact on decisions of aban-
doning, prematurely stopping, seriously slowing down or not starting innovative projects (See Table
4.3) should be reason for serious concern. There is even more reason for being concerned when one
realizes that these gures might underestimate the true proportions of constrained innovative rms.
Reasons for underestimation are the likely higher attrition rate among constrained rms leading to
a survivorship bias of unconstrained rms. Another reason might be that because a combination
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of a census of large enterprises (rms with 250 or more employees) and a stratied random sample
of small rms is used for the CIS are under represented in the survey. Small rms often face more
severe constraints than large enterprises so that gures for the complete survey are not necessarily
representative for the population of small rms. To assess the importance of the gures on nancial
constraints, one has to realize that policy measures have been taken long ago and that venture capital
and other forms of private equity have become a major source of nancing of innovation activities.
Since long tax subsidies are provided through expensing R&D in many countries, special nancing
schemes are available for small, innovative enterprises in many countries (e.g. the US SBIR/SBIC
programs, nancing of patent projects by the Swedish government, see Svensson 2007). Moreover, in
the last decade venture capitalists have provided an increasing share of the nancing of early stage
investment. For instance, Engel and Keilbach (2007) state that between 1995 and 2000 the volume
of newly closed deals by venture capital in Germany increased by a factor of 8, in the years between
2001 and 2004, however, it decreased. Kortum and Lerner (2000) provide evidence that while the
ratio of venture capital to R&D averaged less than 3% from 1983 to 1992, venture capital may have
accounted for 8% of innovations in the same period. Venture capital provides nancing and con-
tributes to reducing the information asymmetry and the moral hazard through active involvement
with the enterprise and through increased leverage (see e.g. Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) on the
complexity of the venture capital contracts and Gompers (1995) on the structure of staged venture
capital investments when agency and monitoring costs exist). Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide
evidence for Silicon Valley start-ups that venture capitalists play important roles in the profession-
alisation of these start-ups over and beyond those of traditional nancial intermediaries. However,
venture capital is not the panacea. The ndings for German rms by Engel and Keilbach (2007),
which are somewhat at variance with those of Kortum and Lerner (2000), suggest that the higher in-
novativeness and growth rates of venture-funded enterprises is due to the selection process by venture
capitalists using patent applications as a selection criterion. This would mean that venture capital
is not available for rms that are not able to convincingly signal growth perspectives to an external
investor by providing patent applications. The importance of patents as signals to attract venture
capital is also documented for Quebec biotechnology rms by Niosi et al. (2002). Gompers et al.
(2007) document the venture capitalist industry's volatility over the period 1975-1998 and show that
its investments are closely tied to valuations in public stock markets, i.e. they increase when signals
of public stock markets become favorable. Rates of return on venture capital appear to be highly
correlated with those on public stock markets (see also Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003; Cochrane
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2005; Kaplan and Schoar 2005). More generally, as shown by Black and Gilson (1997) and Rajan
and Zingales (2001) venture capital works best when there is an active equity market which allows
investors to exit by selling their shares. Another policy aspect that has been shown to be important
by looking at the responses to the obstacles to innovation is the issue of complementarity of innova-
tion policies, something that is also called \the policy mix" in current discussions in European policy
circles. Indeed, as the descriptive statistics reported in Section 4.2 have shown, rms face a number
of obstacles in their attempts to innovate. If only one obstacle was important, the problem would be
easy to solve, but if various obstacles co-exist, it is necessary to introduce a policy package, taking
into account the complementarity and substitution between various policies. In two similar studies
examining the joint occurrence of reported innovation obstacles in innovation surveys, Mohnen and
Rosa (2002) on Canadian data and Galia and Legros (2004) on French data conclude that many
signs exist of complementarity between obstacles, in the sense that obstacles tend to be reported
jointly even after controlling for other covariates. Mohnen and Roller (2005) consider the obstacles
to innovation as indications of failures or weaknesses in the corresponding innovation policies. They
examine whether innovation policies are complements or substitutes in the sense of reinforcing their
negative eect on innovation behavior and innovation output. They conclude that the two phases
of innovation, i.e. the probability of becoming an innovator and the intensity of innovation, are
subject to dierent constraints. The evidence seems to suggest that substitutability among policies
is more often the norm as far as the intensity of innovation is concerned and complementarity as far
as making rms innovative is concerned. When it comes to turn non-innovators into innovators, it
is important to remove a bunch of obstacles at the same time. Governments should adopt a mix of
policies, for instance easing access to nance and allowing rms to cooperate with other rms and
technological institutions, or increasing the amount of skilled personnel and reducing the regulatory
burden. When it comes to increasing the amount of innovation, one or the other policy will do:
easing access to nance, making more skilled labor available, or allowing for more collaborations.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the nature and the degree of obstacles, in particular nancial
constraints, to innovative activity using statistical information from CIS 3.5 for the Netherlands. We
have studied the impact on rm decisions to abandoning, prematurely stopping, seriously slowing
down or desisting from starting an innovative project as a result from the occurrence of hampering
factors. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the constraints faced by innovative rms are important
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and have had a major negative impact on innovative activity. Financial constraints continue to
hamper innovative activity despite the fact that the tax treatment of R&D is favorable to innovations,
that there exist programs to support small innovative rms and that the venture capital sector
experienced a signicant growth over recent decades. Other ways of nancing innovations such as
business angel nance contribute to mitigate the nancing problem of many young, small rms but
in terms of size this type of nance is of less importance than venture capital (see Berger and Udell,
1998). Our empirical ndings are very much in line with the conclusions by Aghion (2006) about
the important benecial eects on economic growth of the absence of barriers to competition and
entry, of spending on education reducing the shortage of qualied labor, of nancial development
or appropriate scal policy providing the required nance to innovative activity and of increased
exibility of labor market and reduction of regulation aecting start-up costs. Hampering factors
such as shortage of qualied human resources have received less attention in the innovation literature
than nancial constraints. This is an unjustied omission which calls for more research into the
obstacles to innovative activity and economic growth and also for collecting more rened statistical
information on these obstacles and their economic impact.
5Capital Structure, Innovation, and Agency: A
Contingent Claim Analysis
5.1 Introduction
Hall (1993,1994), Opler and Titman (1993, 1994), Blass and Yosha (2001), and Alderson and Betker
(1996) are some of the papers that provide empirical evidence that R&D intensive rms are less
leveraged than those that are not. More recently, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009), nd similar
evidence for a panel of R&D performing US rms. Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) draw out
a nancing hierarchy for R&D intensive rms, where equity might be preferred to debt as a means
of nancing R&D, especially for young rms. Hall and Lerner (2010) argue that although leverage
may be a useful tool for reducing agency costs within a rm, it is of limited value for R&D-intensive
rms. Because the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is intangible, partly embedded in
human capital, and ordinarily very specialized to the particular rm in which it resides, the capital
structure of R&D-intensive rms customarily exhibits considerably less leverage than that of other
rms. Williamson (1988) points out that \redeployable" assets (that is, assets whose value in an
alternative use is almost as high as in their current use) are more suited to the governance structures
associated with debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) report that having \unique" assets is associated
with lower debt levels. The logic is, rst, that consumers will only buy unique products if they are
condent that the rm will survive to provide after-sales service. Second, the lack of a secondary
market for R&D and the non-collaterability of R&D activity mitigates against debt-nanced R&D
activity.
Aboody and Lev (2000) nd that the extent of information asymmetry associated with R&D
is larger than that associated with tangible (e.g., property, plant, and equipment) and nancial
investments because of the relative uniqueness (idiosyncrasy) of R&D. This is because the relative
uniqueness of R&D investments makes it dicult for outsiders to learn about the productivity and
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value of a given rm's R&D from the performance and products of other rms in the industry,
thereby contributing to information asymmetry. Shi (2003) nds evidence that R&D activity, which
increases the market value of equity, also increases bond default risk and debt risk premia. Bond
holders, ceteris paribus, may be unwilling to hold the risks associated with greater R&D activity.
Because of (a) the intangibility and the uniqueness of the assets involved and created, and (b)
various sort of uncertainties, such as the technical uncertainty in successfully completing the R&D
project, the uncertainty about the future cash ows from a successfully completed R&D project,
and risk of obsolescence, make R&D activity a risky venture. Pindyck (1993), Childs and Triantis
(1999), Schwartz and Moon (2000), Berk, Green, and Naik (2004) and Miltersen and Schwartz (2004)
are some of the papers that study R&D process as a contingent claim on the value of an underlying
asset, which happens to be the present value of the expected cash ows from a successfully completed
and implemented R&D program. Some of these papers, for example Berk, Green, and Naik (2004),
incorporate the above mentioned uncertainties in a very comprehensive way. However, these papers
either treat the R&D project in isolation or as \pure growth" rms and not as a project which an
existing rm, facing a threat of liquidation, might undertake. Also, these papers do not study the
implications of the risk associated with R&D on the debt valuation of the rm and the attendant
agency conict between the bond holders and the equity holders over R&D investment policy of the
rm.
The aim of the chapter is twin fold:
(I) given bankruptcy costs and limited liability of the equity holders, to explore the sources
of potential agency conict between the bond holders and equity holders that could arise in R&D
investment decision, and
(II) to compare R&D investment to that of scale expansion program which involves employing
the existing technology, and which is inecient as compared to the successfully implemented R&D
output.
Some of the papers that use real-options models to analyze nancing and investment decisions of
rms are Mello and Parsons (1992), Leland (1994), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral
(1999), Leland (1998), Mauer and Sarkar (2004), Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005), Lambrecht and
Myers (2008), and Egami (2009). These paper dier in their scope and the issues they address.
Apart from Lambrecht and Myers (2008) who study the agency problem between managers and
stockholders, the central issue studied in these papers is the agency conict between the bond holders
and the stock holders of the rm over investment decisions of the rm. Given bankruptcy costs and
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limited liability the agency problem these papers study is either the problem of risk-shifting or the
problem of underinvestment. The investment decision considered in these papers is either that of
asset substitution or scale expansion, but not R&D investment which is risky due to the various kinds
of uncertainties mentioned above and due to the fact that in the event of liquidation its intangible
asset base is lost.
This chapter studies sequential R&D investment in a real-option framework. While R&D could
be about developing a new product, the problem we consider in this chapter is R&D investment for
development of a more ecient technology for production, which could either supplement existing
operation or subsequently replace it. The problem faced by the rm is rst to start the R&D project
and then continue to invest in the project which will be completed at an uncertain date. Starting
an R&D project involves spending a lump sum investment cost. Subsequently, after having started
the R&D project, in order to complete the project the rm has to incur additional investment cost.
The rm also has the option to mothball the project if the cash ows to be realized from the project
are low. Apart from the problem of investing the rm also has the option to liquidate both before
and after starting the R&D project. The problem we study is analogous to the two sided optimal
stopping time in Egami (2009).
The model gives results on the maximum amount of default risk-free debt that the rm can
sustain before and after starting the R&D project. The maximum amount of default risk-free debt
sustainable by the rm, both before and after starting the R&D project, among other things, is a
function of the degree of intangibility of the assets the rm employs to carry on the R&D project
and the intensity of successfully completing the R&D project.
We nd that if the net revenue of the rm at liquidation is positive, or in other words, if the
closure value and going-concern value of the rm move together, then the maximum amount of
default risk-free debt sustainable before and after starting the R&D project dier. If the degree of
intangibility of the assets employed is high and if the intensity of successfully completing the R&D
project is low, then the maximum amount of default risk-free debt sustainable, after having started
the R&D project, is lower than some debt levels that are deemed safe before starting the R&D
project. This implies that if the rm undertakes R&D investment, then certain levels of debt, which
are deemed safe before starting the R&D project, turn risky upon starting the R&D project, with the
result that bondholders claim on the rm is reduced once the R&D project is undertaken. Moreover,
in such a situation the equity holders of the rm, protected by limited liability, maximizing their
claim overinvest and shift the burden or risk on to the bond holders. On the other hand, if assets
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employed to conduct R&D involves greater tangibility and if the intensity with which the rm can
complete the R&D program is high, then the rm can increase its preexisting default risk-free debt
to higher level.
The chapter also compares scale expansion, in which the rm employs the old existing technology,
to that of R&D investment. Scale expansion mainly involves employment of physical assets whose
resale value in the event of liquidation is high as compared to intellectual capital employed in R&D.
In comparing the two, we are able to provide some answer to why R&D is desirable as compared
to scale expansion that uses old technology, and yet { as documented in many empirical ndings {
dicult to nance with debt.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model, where there is a
description of the R&D project, debt characteristics, the cash ows realized before and after R&D
investment, and the liquidation value of the rm before and after R&D investment. In Section 3
we discuss equity and rm valuation when before and after R&D investment and the outcomes in
terms of trigger thresholds at which the rm invests and liquidates when the level of outstanding
debt is default risk free. Section 4 discusses the valuation and outcomes when debt is risky. Section
5 compares scale expansion to that of R&D investment and, nally, Section 6 concludes.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Description of the R&D Project
The growth of the rm comes through a R&D project the rm wishes to undertake. That is, all
discretionary investments of the rm is related to the R&D project. The R&D project, generates
a stream of stochastic cash ows xt after the rm successfully completes the R&D project.  is
the constant revenue parameter and xt represents exogenous demand, which follows a geometric
Brownian motion
dxt = xtdt+ xtdwt: (1-1)
Without loss of generality we assume  to be equal to 1. Since in this chapter we deal with R&D in-
vestment for more ecient technology, the demand xt of the produce from a successfully implemented
R&D project is the same as the demand for the output from its existing operation. Consequently,
even if the project is not complete the rm can still observe xt, the potential cash ows from the
R&D project it wishes to undertake.
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To start the R&D project, the rm requires an initial investment of I. Having started the R&D
project, to successfully complete the project, we assume that an investment cost of a+ bxt has to be
paid per instant of time. a being the xed component of the investment cost and bxt the variable
component of the cost. I(t) is the investment decision variable, that takes value 1 if the rm decides
to continue with the ongoing R&D project and 0 if it decides to mothball the R&D project. In
states of nature when the R&D project has to be mothballed, the investment costs, a + bxt, are
not incurred. For sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no maintenance costs involved in
maintaining a mothballed R&D project.
Successfully completing an R&D project requires time. When the rm is active with the R&D
project, investing a + bxt per unit of time, the rm does not know with certainty when it can suc-
cessfully complete the R&D project. We assume, like Miltersen and Schwartz (2004), that the rm
will successfully complete the R&D project at some random date  , where  is exponentially dis-
tributed with intensity, , and that the time to completion is independent of the process, fxtgt2[0;1).
Hence, the expected time to completion, Tp is 1=. After the rm has successfully completed the
R&D project at the random date,  , it has the option to pay a xed investment cost, K, required to
implement the project. (t) is an indicator function indicating whether the R&D project has been
successfully completed or not, that is
(s) =
8<: 1 if the R&D project has been completed0 if the R&D project is still uncompleted
The initial investment, I, needed to start the R&D project is the amount spent in building a
capacity to do research and development. This capacity or the asset, which the rm needs to acquire,
comprises both of physical as well as intellectual capital. The extent of intangibility of I, though
is likely to be high, is also rm and R&D project specic. Building a capacity to conduct R&D,
among other, requires setting up an administrative organization that can ensure smooth functioning
of R&D activity and creating mechanisms to monitor the progress of R&D activity. Moreover, there
are adjustment costs involved in hiring scientic personnel and sta. By spending resources on the
above mentioned activities the rm is able to earn intellectual capital, in form of ideas and knowledge
of scientists and engineers, required for R&D activity. Now, it is well known that the second hand
market for intangibles is fraught with friction and generally do not exist. Hence, after having invested
the amount I, if the rm liquidates itself, only a fraction of I can be recouped, which can be very
low. We denote this fraction as f . The lower f is, higher is the intangibility of I. This is one reason
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that makes R&D activity a risky venture.
The second reason why R&D activity is risky is because of the uncertainty involved in successfully
completing the R&D program. Following Miltersen and Schwartz (2004), we have modelled the
interarrival time of success in R&D activity as a Poisson Process with parameter . This implies
that both the expected time, Tp, at which success can be realized as well as the variance of that time
increases as  becomes low. Thus, if expected time to complete the R&D project is large, it might
happen that before successfully completing the project, the rm may experience a down fall in the
cash ows, forcing it to liquidate, during which it stands to loose a large fraction of I.
5.2.2 Income/Cash Flows of the Firm and Firm Valuation
Assume that the owner of the rm in question derives an income/cash ow of  xt, where  is strictly
less than  = 1, and xt follows the Brownian motion described above. We can assume that  is
a constant revenue parameter and xt represents exogenous demand
1. Hence, if the owner of the
rm manages to be successful in its R&D endeavor and manages to implement the R&D project, it
receives a cash ow of ( + 1)xt per instant of time.
Let V b(xt) be the present value at time, t, of the cash ows from the operation that yields a
cash ow of  xt per instant of time, and V
p(x ) the present value of the cash ows from the R&D
project after it has been successfully completed at the random date  . To obtain the values V b(xt)
and V p(x ), consider an asset or dynamic portfolio of assets that is perfectly correlated with x. Let
p be the price of this asset or dynamic portfolio of assets, where p follows a geometric Brownian
motion, given by
dpt = pptdt+ ptdwt (1-2)
Now, according to CAPM p should reect the asset's systematic risk. Hence p is given by
p = r + pm (1-3)
where r is the risk-free rate of return, pm is the coecient of correlation between p the price of the
asset or the dynamic portfolio of assets that tracks x and the market portfolio, and  is the market
price of risk. Assume that p > . Let xm be the coecient of correlation between x and the market
1There could be a xed cost, f , incurred while reaping a revenue of  xt per instant of time. If only to keep the
algebra simple we normalize it to zero.
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portfolio. Since x is perfectly correlated with p we have xm = pm. Since no one would be willing
to hold x, unless  = (p   ) > 0, accrues as some kind of dividend2 for holding x or convenience
yield on x. The risk adjusted rate of return on the cash ows, x, dened as , is given by
 =   xm (1-4)
then
 =   xm = r   [(r + xm)  ] = r   [p   ] = r    (1-5)
The present value, V b(xt), of the expected cash ows from the operation that yields a cash ow
of  xt per instant of time is then given by:
V b(xt) =
Z 1
t
Et( xs)e
 psds =
Z 1
t
 1xte
se psds =
 1xt
p    =
 1xt
r   : (1-6)
The value of the R&D project after it has been successfully completed at the random date  is given
by:
V p(x ) =
Z 1

E (xs)e
 psds =
Z 1

xe
se psds =
x
p    =
x
r    (1-7)
Since the rm has option to pay nal (xed) investment costs K in order to obtain the present value
of V p(x ) at the random completion date,  , the value of rm's cash ows, V
a(x ), after successfully
completing the R&D project at  is given by
V a(x ) = V
b(x ) +maxf0; V p(x ) Kg (1-8)
5.2.3 Debt Characteristic
Assume that the rm has issued perpetual debt with principal D and debt service rD. The market
value of the debt is B(x). When the debt is default risk-free, B(x) = D. The values of the levered
rm and the levered equity are V (x) and E(x), where the value of the equity is given by the identity:
E(x) = V (x)   B(x). In our setup shareholders are also the managers of the rm. The rm or
the borrowers cannot extract concessions from the banks or bondholders, so that lenders get the full
2Note that the economy has an asset or a portfolio of assets, p, which has the same volatility, , as x but has a
higher return, p, than , the return on x.
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debt service rD as long as the rm continues as a going concern. Failure to service the debt allows
lenders to take over. Lenders are willing to advance nancing only if they have property rights to
the rm's assets when it defaults. Their property rights can be protected by laws against fraudulent
conveyance and by covenants. We assume these laws and covenants are eective and that lenders
are protected against purely dilutive debt issues.
We assume that debt covenants prohibit distribution of collateral or the proceeds of additional
debt issues to shareholders, unless existing lenders are compensated for any decrease in the value
of their claims. This assumption does not prevent risky debt issues if the proceeds are invested or
if existing lenders are made whole. It does rule out liquidating dividends that would distribute the
value of the rm's assets to managers or shareholders. The assumption also prevents the rm's from
piling on additional debt if the only motive is to harm existing lenders.
5.2.4 Liquidation
Now, at any instant when the rm is operating, if it realizes that the prots from the current operation
is not sucient, it might want to liquidate the rm. Although the set of physical assets could be
operated forever, the rm has the alternative to abandon operations and sell these assets. That is,
usually a set of physical assets has worthwhile alternative uses in the hands of competitors. This is
because the assets of the rm in the hands of other market participants could yield an alternative
period income ow. At any time these alternative uses determine competitors' willingness to pay for
the rm's assets. To simplify, as in Mella-Barall (1999), we consider that partial asset sales destroy
existing economies of scale. If a fraction of the assets of the rm are sold, the remaining income ow
from operations is reduced by more than this fraction. Therefore, gradually selling the assets through
a sequence of auctions is not protable, and the assets of the rm are best sold simultaneously. Selling
the assets is an irreversible decision, so that when the incumbents decide to do so, they essentially
liquidate the rm. Overall, once it is constituted, the rm consists of a set of physical assets which
(i) are currently operated but (ii) could alternatively be irreversibly liquidated.
The value of the rm at closure, after it has embarked on the R&D project but before successful
realization of the R&D endeavor is given by 0 +
1x
r  , where 1 <  , 0 = f + p and p = fI. f
is the constant liquidation value at closure that results from that operation of the rm, which yields
 xt per unit instant of time and p is the constant liquidation value at closure accruing from the
R&D investment project. p is assumed to be a fraction, f , of the initial investment, I, required to
embark upon the project. If the rm liquidates itself prior to the starting of the R&D project, then
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its value at liquidation is given by f +
1x
r  .
The restriction 1 <  is necessary for the existence of a unique optimal closure threshold. If
1 = 0, value at closure is constant and there is no link between closure value and the demand
variable x that drives the value of the going concern. This could be thought of as the liquidation
case, where assets are sold o piecemeal and scrapped or put to entirely new uses. If 1 > 0, closure
value and going-concern value move together. This is plausible if, say, the assets are used to produce
a dierent product in the same industry, or if the values of all assets depend on some common
macroeconomic factor. f , the fraction of the rm's initial investment, I, that can be recouped in
the event of liquidation is a function of the degree of intangibility of the assets I. If the extent of
intangibility involved is high, as is likely to the case in R&D investment, then the fraction f is likely
to be low. As we will see, if f is high then the rm is able to borrow more. This is due to the fact
that a large part of the asset, I, can be recaptured by lenders in liquidation states. However, if f
is low and if 1 > 0, then existing debt levels that are deemed safe before the starting of the R&D
project can potentially turn risky.
5.3 Valuation of the Levered Firm: Valuation when Debt is Safe
5.3.1 Mothballing and Resuming of the R&D Project: The Switching Problem
Assume that rm has already embarked upon the R&D project by paying a lump sum cost I, and
that it has debt in place, that has a principal value of Dsw. Assume that the rm's managers are
also the shareholders, and that they maximize their equity. Since the investment project can be
switched from an active investment phase to a passive investment phase and vise-versa, the owner
of the investment project can temporarily suspend investing in the project and mothball the R&D
investment project. When the investment project is suspended, both the on-going investment costs
rate, a+ bxt, and the intensity of completion, , switch to zero. For simplicity, we assume that there
are no costs involved in keeping the project alive in a mothballed state. Clearly, in this model it
would never be optimal to abandon the investment project since there are no costs of keeping alive
the R&D project in a passive state.
Given the above, the value of the rm's Equity is given by the solution to the following stochastic
control problem:
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E(xt) = sup
I(s);L(s);I(s)2f0;1g;s2(t;T )
EQt
Z T
t
e r(s t)

(1  L(s))

(1  (s))

 xs   rDsw   I(s)(a+ bxs)

+I(s)(s)( xs + xs   rK   rDsw)

+ L(s)[maxf0; (r0 + 1xs   rDsw)g]

ds+ e r(T t)E(xT )

;
(2-1)
where T is an arbitrary point in the future, EQ is the expectation under the risk-neutral measure Q.
(s) is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the rm successfully completes its R&D project and
0 otherwise. I(s), L(s), and I(s) respectively, are dened as follows
I(s) =
8<: 1 is the decision to continuen invest0 is the decision to mothball the project
L(s) =
8<: 1 is the decision to liquidate0 is the decision to continue
and I(s) is dened as
I(s) =
8>>><>>>:
1 if the rm decides to pay the xed investment cost, K,
required to implement the completed project
0 if the rm decides to discard the completed project.
 xs   rDsw   (a+ bxs) in the above expression is the net revenue of the rm if the rm decides
to invest in the project that it has embarked upon. rDsw is the amount paid out to the creditors per
instant of time. If no debt restructuring were to take place at the time of the implementation of the
R&D project, then debt service after implementation of the project remains rDsw. In such a case,
 xs + xs   rK   rDsw, in the above expression is the net ow of revenue per instant of time after
the implementation of the successfully completed R&D project.
In the control problem we study, we do not consider the possibility of liquidation after the rm
has successfully completed its R&D project and implemented the outcome of the project to reap
the additional cash ows. We assume that the rm continues indenitely after implementation 3.
3Liquidating the rm after the rm has successfully completed and implemented the R&D project is uninteresting
and does not present any new insights. Liquidation after the rm has successfully completed and implemented the
R&D project requires, respectively, the following value matching and smooth pasting conditions
Cx +
x(1 +  )
r     Dsw = 
0
0 +
01xl
r     Dsw
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Now, we know that the rm always has the option to mothball the project, which it can do without
incurring any cost, if it knows that the project will nish out of the money, and that the rm will be
active, investing a+ bxt at every instant t, when the R&D investment project nishes in the money,
that is, when Ep(x ) = V
p(x )   Dsw > K. This implies that the rm never abandons the R&D
project, and that, when the rm is active, it always pay the strike price, K, to implement the R&D
project that it successfully completes with intensity . Hence, the investment decision, I(s), becomes
redundant and the control problem can be written as follows:
E(xt) = sup
I(s);L(s)2f0;1g;s2(t;T )
EQt
Z T
t
e r(s t)

(1  L(s))

 xs   rDsw   I(s)(a+ bxs)

+L(s)[maxf0; (r0 + 1xs   rDsw)g]

ds+ e r(T t)E(xT )

(2-2)
Thus, in the above optimization problem, the only two decision that the owners of the rm have to
take are, (1) whether to invest a+ bxt at time period t and (2) whether to liquidate the rm or not.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation4 corresponding to the above problem is given by
1
2
x22Exx(xs) + xEx(xs)  rE(xs)+
sup
I(s);L(s)2f0;1g

(1  L(s))I(s)



[Ea(xs) K]  E(xs)

+  xs   (a+ bxs)  rDsw

+
L(s)[maxf0; (r0 + 1x(s)  rDsw)g]

= 0 (2-3)
where Ea(xs)  K = (V a(xs)  Dsw)  K, is the value of the rm's equity after the completion of
the project minus the xed cost (strike price) to implement the project and is equal to the present
value of the perpetual income ow of  xs + xs   rK.
Assume that the rm is still in the hands of the owners of the rm. Now, the rm's ex post
optimal liquidation trigger level of exogenous demand xt, which we denote by xl, is essentially a
point, such that, if xt falls below xl then it is optimal for the rm to irreversibly exchange their
current claim for their residual one: maxf0; (0 + 1xlr    Dsw)g. The maximum between 0 and
Cx 1 +
1 +  
r    =
01
r   
to hold when debt is safe. Assuming 00  0 and 01  1 reects the fact that the constant liquidation value and
the value of the rm as a going concern at liquidation might be higher after the rm has successfully completed and
implemented its R&D project. Not to mention, Cx is the value of the option of the rm to liquidate it self. Liquidation
after implementing the R&D project when debt is risky requires, Cx + x(1+ )
r    Dsw = 0 and Cx 1 + 1+ r  = 0 ,
and the valuation of risky debt.
4The derivation of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is provided in Appendix 1.
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0 +
1xl
r    Dsw ensures that there are no violations of limited liability of the shareholders. Since
here we are assuming that the debt level, Dsw, is default risk-free, in the event of liquidation,
maxf0; (0 + 1xlr   Dsw)g = 0 + 1xlr   Dsw. Thus, the maximum level of debt, such that, Dsw is
default risk-free is, Dsw = 0 +
1xl
r  .
At time t, conditional on L(s) = 0, or in other words when xt > xl, the value of the control
that maximizes equation (11) is either I(s) = 1 or I(s) = 0. When the R&D investment project
is in a passive state there is no possibility of completion, therefore, there will be a threshold level,
x, such that, if the exogenous demand, xt, is above this threshold at a certain date, then it would
be optimal for the rm to resume the R&D project, and if xt is below x
, then it is optimal for the
rm to remain in the passive state at that date. Since there are no costs involved in maintaining
the R&D project in the passive state, the threshold level at which the rm resumes with the R&D
project and the threshold level at which it mothballs the project coincide. In the region where the
rm does not invest, I(s) = 0, that is, when the rm mothballs the R&D project, the evolution of
the value is driven entirely by the dynamics of xt. Dene Em(x) as the value of the rm's equity in
the \mothball region".
In the region in which the rm chooses to invest, I(s) = 1, which we will call the \continuation
region", the terms that capture the consequences of investment must be included. With probability ,
over the next instant the rm will achieve a technical breakthrough and the value of the rm's equity
will jump from Ec(x) to E
a(x) K, where Ec(x) is the value of the rm's equity in the continuation
region. Thus the value of the rm's equity in the various regions implied by the thresholds xl and
x can be written as
E(x) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Ec(x) if x  x: (s) = 0, L(s) = 0, I(s) = 1
Em(x) if xl < x < x
: (s) = 0, L(s) = 0, I(s) = 0
El(x) if x  xl: (s) = 0, L(s) = 1, I(s) = 0;
where El(x) is the residual claim of the owners after liquidation. The above implies that the value of
the rm's equity in the continuation region, the mothball region and after liquidation, respectively
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satisfy the following set of dierential equations:
1
2
x22Ecxx(x) + xEcx(x)  rEc(x) + 

x
r     K +
 x
r      Ec(x) Dsw

+
 x  (a+ bx)  rDsw = 0 if x  x; (2-4)
1
2
x22Emxx(x) + xEmx(x)  rEm(x) +  x  rDsw = 0 if xl  x  x; (2-5)
and
1
2
x22Elxx(x) + xElx(x)  rEl(x) + maxf0; (r0 + 1x  rDsw)g = 0 if x  xl: (2-6)
Equation (2-4) describes the value of the investment project when it is active. Since we know that
the investment project would be in the money when it is active, this equation reects the fact
that with intensity , the value of the investment project would jump to the completion value,
Ea(x)   K = (V a(x)   Dsw)   K5. At the same time, at completion, the rm looses Ec(x), the
value of the rm in the continuation region, an inevitable consequence of completion. The term
 x (a+bx) rDsw reects the fact that the owner earns  x per instant of time, pays an investment
costs at the rate a + bx per unit of time, and services debt of the amount rDsw. Equation (2-5)
describes the value of the investment project when it is passive. This equation reects the fact that
as long as the investment project is passive, i.e., I(s) = 0 there is no chance that the project will be
completed, i.e.,  = 0.
Debt is safe or default risk-free if the value of the rm at liquidation is more than or equal to the
value of debt principal at closure, that is, if 0 +
1xl
r   Dsw  0. Thus for safe debt, equation (2-6)
becomes
1
2
x22Elxx(x) + xElx(x)  rEl(x) + r0 + 1x  rDsw = 0 if x  xl: (2-7)
The above equations, (2-4), (2-5), and (2-6), are 2nd order Non-Homogeneous Cauchy Euler dier-
5Though we have postulated that the value of the equity after the implementation of the successfully completed
project is Ea(x) = ( +1)x
r   Dsw, ideally this value should be Cx+ ( +1)xr   Dsw in case of safe debt as was alluded in
Footnote 3, Cx, being the value of the option to liquidate the rm after implementation. In case of risky debt the value
of equity after the implementation of the completed R&D project is Ea(x) = Cx+ ( +1)x
r   B(x), B(x) being the value
of debt after implementation. However, if only to keep matters simple, we abstain from the issue of liquidation and
default after the implementation of the successfully completed R&D project and assume that rm operates indenitely
after implementation. This assumption also implies that debt, which might be risky during the completion of the R&D
project, is no longer risky after implementation and has a value of Dsw.
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ential equations. The solution to (2-4) is given by:
C1cx
 + C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw; (2-8)
where  and  are the roots of the characteristic polynomial,
1
2
22 + [  1
2
2]   (r + ) = 0:
As it turns out,  =
 [  1
2
2]+f[  1
2
2]2+22(r+)g1=2
2
> 1, and  =
 [  1
2
2] f[  1
2
2]2+22(r+)g1=2
2
< 0.
The solutions to (2-5) and (2-7) respectively are given by:
C1mx
 + C2mx
 +
 x
r     Dsw (2-9)
C1lx
 + C2lx
 + 0 +
1x
r     Dsw; (2-10)
where  and  are the roots of the characteristic polynomial,
1
2
22 + [  1
2
2]   r = 0:
 =
 [  1
2
2]+f[  1
2
2]2+22rg1=2
2
> 1, and  =
 [  1
2
2] f[  1
2
2]2+22rg1=2
2
< 0.
Thus, we are left with the constants, C1c, C2c, C1m, C2m, C1l, and C2l and the two threshold
level of exogenous demand or the free boundaries, x and xl, which we determine using boundary
conditions. The rst boundary condition that we consider is the following:
lim
x!1E(x) / x: (2-11)
Now, it might happen that as x !1, then people might value the asset, above its fundamentals if
they expect to be able to resell it later at a sucient capital gain. Equation (2-11) precisely rules
out such speculative bubbles as x!1. The boundary condition in (2-11) in particular is pertinent
to value of equity in the continuation region, Ec(x). We know that the solution to the dierential
equation applicable to the continuation region is given by (2-8). Since,  > 1, therefore we require
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that C1c = 0, else we will face a violation of the boundary condition (2-11). Thus
Ec(x) = C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw; (2-12)
where C2cx
 is the value of the option to mothball the project and  xr +
x
(r )(+r )  K+r  bx+r  
a
+r is value of the rm's equity to continue forever without the option to mothball the project.
Since Em(x) is the value of the rm's equity when it is not actively engaged in R&D investment,
hence Em(x) constitutes of the value of the option for the rm to invest a + bxt, and the value of
the option to close all operations and liquidate the rm. Also, since Em(x) is the value of the rm
in the mothball region, that is, when x lies between x and xl, and since the boundaries x and xl
are positive and nite, C1m and C2m are both non zero. Since the rm receives as cash ow of  xt
per instant of time from its existing operation,  xr  is the claim on, or the value of the rm arising
out of the cash ow of  xt. Hence,
Em(x) = C1mx
 + C2mx
 +
 x
r     Dsw: (2-13)
Now, we know that the value of the rm's equity at liquidation, El(xl), satises the following
condition:
El(xl) = C1lx

l + C2lx

l + 0 +
1xl
r     Dsw = 0 +
1xl
r     Dsw: (2-14)
Hence, the above implies that C1l = C2l = 0
6. Thus, we have
El(x) = 0 +
1x
r     Dsw: (2-15)
Thus we are left with ve unknowns C2c, C1m, C2m, x
, and xl. These can be determine by two
value matching, two smooth pasting, and a super contact condition. The value matching conditions,
(2-16) and (2-17), respectively reect the fact that the value function should be continuous respec-
tively at the switching point, x, where the dierential equations (2-4) and (2-5) meet, and at the
liquidation point, xl, where the dierential equations (2-5) and (2-7) meet.
Em(x
) = Ec(x) (2-16)
6Proof : Suppose that C1l 6= C2l 6= 0, then C1lC2l =  x
  8 x. Since  6= , this implies that C1l
C2l
is not constant, a
contradiction.
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El(xl) = Em(xl) (2-17)
The smooth pasting conditions, (2-18) and (2-19)
@Em(x
)
@x
=
@Ec(x
)
@x
(2-18)
@El(xl)
@x
=
@Em(xl)
@x
; (2-19)
respectively reect the fact that the value function should be dierentiable respectively at the switch-
ing point, x, and at the liquidation point, xl. Equation (2-20) is the super contact condition.
@2Em(x
)
@x2
=
@
2
Ec(x
)
@x2
(2-20)
The condition is based on the following instantaneous trade-o argument,
(
x
r     K) = E
p
c (x
) + (a+ bx); (2-21)
where Epc (x) =

Ec(x
) 

 x
r    Dsw

is the value of the R&D investment project in the con-
tinuation region. This value is equal to the value of the equity in the continuation region, Ec(x
),
less the value of the equity that accrues from its exiting operation,  x

r   Dsw. The left hand side
of the equation (2-21) is the increased instantaneous benets from switching from a passive state
to an active state. The instantaneous benet is the increased intensity of completion which has a
value ow of ( x

r   K) per unit of time. The right hand side is the increased instantaneous costs
of switching and comprises of: (i) the increased intensity of loosing the investment project (an in-
evitable consequence of completion), which has a ow value of Epc (x) = 

Ec(x
) 

 x
r   Dsw

per unit of time and (ii) the increased on-going investment costs at the rate (a + bx) per unit of
time. Substituting the value of ( x

r   K) as implied by equation (2-21) in to equation (2-4) at x
we obtain,
1
2
(x)22Ecxx(x
) =  xEcx(x) + rEc(x)   x + rDsw: (2-4a)
We also know from equation (2-5) that at x,
1
2
(x)22Emxx(x
) =  xEmx(x) + rEm(x)   x + rDsw: (2-5a)
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Since, Ec(x
) = Em(x), (value matching condition) and Ecx(x) = Emx(x), (smooth pasting
condition), the right hand side of equations (2-4a) and (2-5a) are equal. This implies that the left
hand side of (2-4a) and (2-5a) are equal, giving rise to the super contact condition (2-20).
Given the value of equity in the continuation region, the mothball region, and the value of the
equity at liquidation, the value matching, smooth pasting, and the super contact condition at x and
the value matching and the smooth pasting condition at xl respectively can be written as:
C1mx
 + C2mx +
 x
r     Dsw = C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )
  K
+ r
  bx

+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw (2-22)
C1mx
( 1) + C2mx( 1) +
 
r    = C2cx
( 1) +
 
r    +

(r   )(+ r   )  
b
+ r   
(2-23)
(   1)C1mx( 2) + (   1)C2mx( 2) = (   1)C2cx( 2) (2-24)
C1mx

l + C2mx

l +
 xl
r     Dsw = f + fI +
1xl
r     Dsw (2-25)
C1mx
( 1)
l + C2mx
( 1)
l +
 
r    =
1
r   : (2-26)
Five equations, (2-22), (2-23), (2-24), (2-25), and (2-26) determine the ve unknowns C2c, C1m, C2m,
x, and xl. Since no analytical solution exits to the above set of equations, we have to resort to
numerical techniques. Table 1 below lists the parameter values chosen to solve the above system of
equations.
Table 5.1: Parameter Values
r = 0.06 b = 0.1
 = 0.03 a = 1
 = 0.3 K = 125
 = 0.80 I = 50
0 = 200  = 0.5
1 = 0.50
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We set 1 = 0:5, which implies that, given  = 0:8, net revenue, post liquidation, is 62.5% of
its pre-closure value in the best alternative use of assets7. For the above chosen parameter values
we solve the non-linear system of equations for dierent values of f , starting from 0.5 to 0. As
discussed earlier, f is the fraction of the initial investment that can be recouped in the event of
liquidation. Figure 1 below plots x, the trigger point at which the rm resumes its R&D investment
from the inactive state, and xl, the trigger point at which the rm liquidates from the inactive state
for dierent values of f . We nd that both x and xl increases with, f , the degree of tangibility of
the asset, I, needed to embark on the R&D project8.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
2
4
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8
10
12
14
f
x
x|{
xl- - -
Figure 5.1: Mothballing/Resuming threshold, x, and Liquidation threshold, xl.
Let f 0 and f^ be two levels of fraction of the initial investment, I, that can be retained in the
event of liquidation, where f 0 > f^ . For the above two values of f , we nd that x(f 0) > x(f^).
To understand the above result, suppose the current level of exogenous demand, x, is such that
x(f^) < x < x(f 0). At x, it is clear that the rm with an R&D project involving higher f has
mothballed the R&D project. What the result in Figure 1 says, is that the rm with an R&D
project with higher f waits longer to resume investment from the state of inaction. This is because,
if starting from x, the cash ows do start falling to the point that the rm eventually has to liquidate
itself, in the event of liquidation, the rm with higher f is able retain a higher fraction of the initial
investment. This fact gives an advantage to the rm with higher f , thereby making it possible for it
to wait longer before resuming with the R&D project, with the result that at the completion of the
7Lambrecht and Myres (2007) assume net revenue, post liquidation, to be 70% of the pre-closure value in the best
alternative use of assets. The net revenue of the rm as a going concern, post liquidation, 1, also aects the optimal
strategy of a rm, our numerical results show that @x

@1
> 0 and @xl
@1
> 0.
8It can be shown analytically that @x

@f
=
 I
( )



x
xl

 

x
xl

1
x

( 1)C2cx  rK(r+)  ra(r+)
 > 0, and @xl
@f
= @x

@f
xl
x . However, the
proof is not interesting and has been omitted from the text.
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R&D project the rm with a higher f has a higher chance of completing the project in the money.
Also, by waiting more avoids paying the investment cost, a+ bx.
The result also suggests that for f 0 > f^ , xl(f 0) > xl(f^). This is because, having already invested
I to start the R&D project, if in the event of liquidation the fraction, f , of the initial investment
that can be recouped is small, then the rm in question would like to wait longer before it liquidates,
hoping that x might eventually rise. We know that the maximum amount of default risk-free debt,
D, is D = f + fI + 1xlr  . Thus, as a result of both lower f and lower xl as consequence of lower
f , the maximum amount of default risk-free debt the rm can incur is lower.
The value of debt in the continuation region and the value of debt in the mothball region are
denoted respectively by Bc(x) and Bm(x). Debt level, Dsw, being default risk-free, the value of debt
in the both the regions is equal to the debt principal Dsw. The value of the rm in the continuation
region, V sc (x), when debt is safe is then given by,
Vc(x) = Ec(x) +Bc(x)
= Ec(x) +Dsw
= C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
; (2-27)
and the value of the rm in the mothball region, V sm(x), is given by,
Vm(x) = Em(x) +Bm(x) = Em(x) +Dsw = C1mx
 + C2mx
 +
 x
r   ; (2-28)
where C2c, C1m and C2m are obtained by solving the system of equations (2-22)-(2-26).
5.3.2 Starting the R&D Project: The Irreversible Investment Problem
Let Dir be the level of outstanding debt when the rm is planning to start the R&D project, but has
not started as yet. As mentioned earlier, at the point in time when the rm embarks on the R&D
project it can restructure its debt to Dsw. Since the rm is not going to invest if after investing I, it
lands up in the mothball region, the gain from investing I is Ec(x)  I, where Ec(x) is the value of
the rm's equity in the continuation region of the switching problem, post starting the R&D project.
At the time when the rm is contemplating starting R&D project, the value of the equity is given
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by the following optimization problem:
E(xt) = max

Ec(xt)  I; maxL(s)2f0;1g;s2(t;t+dt)E
Q
t
Z t+dt
t
e r(s t)

(1  L(s))( xs   rDir)
+L(s)maxf0; (rf + 1xs   rDir)g

ds+ e rdtE(xt+dt)

: (2-29)
Since the rm is not going to invest if after investing I it has to mothball the R&D project, it needs to
value the decision to continue without investing for a small period of time, dt, against Ec(x)  I, and
then again review the situation after the elapse of that time interval. Continuing without investing,
during the small period of time dt, it receives a cash ow of  xt from its existing operation, and
also maintains the option to liquidate itself if the cash ows of the rm fall down suciently. Let
xI denote the threshold level of exogenous demand at which the rm invests I, and let xLI be the
threshold level of exogenous demand at which the rm liquidates itself.
Assume that after having started the R&D project, the debt level, Dsw, for the next stage
switching problem continues to be default risk-free. The debt level, Dir before having started the
R&D project, is default risk-free when the value of the rm at liquidation is higher than the value of
debt, that is, when f +
1xLI
r   Dir. Dene Ed(x) as the value of the rm's equity when the rm is
deciding whether to embark upon the R&D project or to liquidate. As before let El(x) be the value
of the rm at/after liquidation. Thus the value of equity, for the rm can be written as follows
E(x) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
Vc(x)  I  Dsw if x  xI ; L(s) = 0
Ed(x) if x
LI < x < xI ; L(s) = 0
El(x) if x  xLI ; L(s) = 1,
where E(x) = Vc(x)   I   Dsw when x  xI follows from the fact that Dsw, for the next stage
switching problem continues to be default risk-free. Thus we have,
E(x) = Ec(x)  I
=
 x
r    + C2cx
 +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
  I  Dsw:
Then, for the irreversible investment problem or the starting of the R&D project problem we
need to solve for the value of the rm's equity in the decision region, Ed(x), when the rm is deciding
5.3. Valuation of the Levered Firm: Valuation when Debt is Safe 101
between liquidating itself and starting the R&D project, and the value of the rm at/after liquidation.
To obtain the dierential equation governing the value of the equity in the decision region we employ
Ito^'s lemma to get
e r(dt)E(xT ) = E(xt) +
Z t+dt
t
e r(s t)

DE(xs)  rE(xs)

ds+
Z t+dt
t
e r(s t)

Ex(xs)dws

(2-30)
where
DE(x) = 1
2
x22Exx(x) + xEx(x):
Taking expectations with respect to the risk neutral measure we obtain
E(xt) = EQt

e r(dt)E(xT ) 
Z t+dt
t
e r(s t)

D(xs)  rE(xs)

ds

: (2-31)
Now, when it is neither optimal to liquidate the rm nor start the R&D project, then equation (2-29)
becomes
E(xt) = EQt
Z t+dt
t
e r(s t)

( xs   rDir)

ds+ e rdtE(xt+dt)

: (2-29a)
Comparing equation (2-29a) and equation (2-31) we obtain the dierential equation governing the
value of equity, Ed(x), in the decision region
1
2
x22Edxx(x) + xEdx(x)  rEd(x) +  x  rDir = 0, xLI  x  xI : (2-32)
We know that the solution to the above dierential equation is given by
Ed(x) = C1dx
 + C2dx
 +
 x
r     Dir (2-33)
where  > 1 and  < 0 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial, 12
22 + [   122]   r = 0.
Analogous to the case of safe debt for the switching problem, the value of equity at/after liquidation,
El(x) is given by:
El(x) = f +
1x
r     Dir (2-34)
where f is the constant liquidation value at closure from the operation of the rm, which yields  xt
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per unit instant of time.
Thus we have four unknowns C1d; C2d; x
I , and xLI which we can determine by the boundary
conditions the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. Assuming that debt, Dsw, is safe after
investment I, the value matching conditions,
Ed(x
I)  (Dsw  Dir) = Ec(xI)  I (2-35)
and
Ed(x
LI) = El(x
LI); (2-36)
respectively reect the fact that the value function E(x) should be continuous respectively at the
trigger point for investing, xI , and at the liquidation point, xLI . The additional term, Dsw  Dir on
the LHS of (2-35), reect the fact that at xI , when the rm embarks on the project, it restructures
its debt level to Dsw and consequently the equity holders loose a claim of the amount Dsw  Dir on
the value of the rm. The smooth pasting conditions,
@Ed(x
I)
@x
=
@Ec(x
I)
@x
(2-37)
and
@Ed(x
LI)
@x
=
@El(x
LI)
@x
; (2-38)
respectively reect the fact that the value function should be dierentiable respectively at the switch-
ing point, xI , and at the liquidation point, xLI .
Given the value functions, Ec(x), Ed(x) and El(x), the above boundary conditions, (2-35) to
(2-38), respectively, can be written as
C1d(x
I) + C2d(x
I) +
 xI
r     Dsw = C2c(x
I) +
 xI
r    +
xI
(r   )(+ r   )
  K
+ r
  bx
I
+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw   I (2-39)
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C1d(x
LI) + C2d(x
LI) +
 xLI
r     Dir = f +
1x
LI
r     Dir (2-40)
C1d(x
I) 1 + C2d(xI) 1 +
 
r    = C2c(x
I) 1 +
 
r   +

(r   )(+ r   )  
b
+ r    (2-41)
C1d(x
LI) 1 + C2d(xLI) 1 +
 
r    =
1
r    (2-42)
Since no analytical solution exits for the above set of nonlinear set of equations we have to resort
to numerical techniques to solve them. We solve the above system of equations for dierent values of
f , the degree of tangibility of asset I. Though f does not enter the above system of equations, (2-39)
to (2-42), it does aect the system through the term, C2c, determined in the second stage switching
problem. Figure 2 illustrates xI and xLI obtained from numerical solution for dierent values of f .
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Figure 5.2: Starting the R&D project threshold, xI , and liquidation threshold, xLI , before starting
the project.
For debt level Dir, which is default risk-free before the starting of the R&D and debt level Dsw
that is default risk-free after embarking on the R&D project, xI , the trigger point at which the rm
starts its R&D project and xLI , the trigger point at which the rm closes, both decrease as the
degree of tangibility of I, required to embark upon the R&D project increases. That is, for f 0 > f^ ,
xI(f 0) < xI(f^). This is because if f is high then, if after investment, demand eventually does fall so
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that the rm has to liquidate then the loss, (1  f 0)I, is less than (1   f^)I. Knowing this, the rm
with a higher f would rather embark early than late. Also to be noted is the fact that for f 0 > f^ ,
xLI(f 0) < xLI(f^). This is to be expected, since, given the fact that the probability of success is same
for all f , then stakes are low after investment for rms with R&D project that involve higher degree
of tangibles. Therefore, the rm with R&D project with higher f would be willing to wait more
before eventually liquidating the rm hoping that x the level of exogenous demand might rise in the
near future to the point where it can start the R&D project. However as Figure 2 suggests, the rate
of decrease of xLI with increasing f is very small. For the parameter values in Table 1, our numerical
solution suggests that the dierence between xLI(f = 0) and xLI(f = 0:5) is only of the order of
0.11 percent. This only suggests that, before having started the R&D project if the cash ows of the
rm and the cash ows from the potential R&D project is low, then the rm with an R&D project
that involves a higher degree of tangibles does have an incentive to wait longer before eventually
liquidating the rm, however, this incentive is very small compared to a rm with an R&D project
that involves lesser amount of tangibles.
For a rm that wishes to start the R&D project, assuming that the level of debt, Dsw, remains
default risk-free after embarking on the R&D project, the maximum level of safe debt, DI , before
embarking on the R&D program is dened as DI = f +
1xLI
r  . Given that
@xLI
@f < 0, for R&D
projects involving higher levels of f , the maximum level of default risk-free debt is less compared to
rms with projects that involve lower f or higher amount of intangibles. However, as our numerical
results suggests, the dierence is very small: the dierence between DI(f = 0) and DI(f = :5) is
0.03 percent.
In Figure 3 we plot x, xI , xl, and xLI against f . These trigger threshold were obtained, assuming
that the debt in place is default risk-free for both the starting as well as the switching problem.
We nd that the investment threshold xI is much higher than the mothballing/resuming threshold
x. This is because starting the R&D project involves sinking an initial amount of investment I.
Hence, the rm would begin the R&D program only when it is sure that the cash ows to be reaped
from the project is suciently high. Having invested I, if the cash ows were to subsequently fall,
then the rm mothballs the project at x. Also, the liquidation threshold, xl, after sinking the initial
amount I varies more with f as compared to xLI , and the former increases with f while the later
decreases with f . This, as explained earlier, is due to the fact that having sunk the initial investment,
I, if in the event of liquidation the amount of initial investment I that can be recouped is small, then
the rm would like to wait more { hoping that demand for its product might eventually rise { before
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Figure 5.3: Starting the R&D Project Threshold, xI , and Liquidation Threshold, xLI
nally liquidating the rm. On the other hand prior to sinking I for a rm with higher f the stakes
are low after investing I. Therefore, the rm with R&D project with higher f would be willing to
wait more before eventually liquidating the rm hoping that x the level of exogenous demand might
rise in the near future to the point where it can start the R&D project. The implication of this is
that, in our framework, the maximum level of default risk-free debt that a rm can aord, before
and after starting the R&D project dier. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
Area 4
Area 1
Area 2
Area 3
26
2
26
5
27
0
27
5
28
0
D
eb
t P
rin
cip
al
: D
0 .0565 .1 .2 .25
f
D|{
DI- - -
Figure 5.4: Maximum level of safe debt after starting the R&D project, D, and before starting the
project, DI , as a function of the fraction, f , of the initial investment, I, that can be retained in the
event of liquidation.
The result suggests that there exits an f , such that, for all f > f , (D > DI), and that for f  f ,
(D  DI). In other words, if the asset, I, needed to start the R&D program involves investing
more in tangibles, then ceteris paribus, the rm can borrow more, up to D, after having started the
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R&D project without facing the risk of default. On the other hand, ceteris paribus, if f is low, that
is, if the investment needed to start the project involves large amount of intangible assets, then the
existing debt level which is deemed safe before starting the project, becomes risky upon embarking
on the R&D project. What drives this result is the fact that when f is low, the rm before starting
the R&D project, if it has to liquidate itself, liquidates early, while after having started the R&D
project, if the rm has to liquidate, liquidates itself late. This behavior of the rm can potentially
give rise to agency issues between the rm and the bond holder, where the rm by investing in R&D
can turn existing default risk-free debt into risky debt. As we will see later, assuming that the level
of debt remains the same before and after starting the R&D project, that is if Dsw = Dir = D, and
if the pair (D; f) is such that it lies in Area 4, then the equity holders of the rm invest early, that
is overinvest, turning existing level of safe debt into risky. Analogous to the risk-shifting problem of
Jensen and Meckling (1976), this occurs because, with limited liability, equity holders can transfer
the risk of prematurely starting the R&D project to the bondholders while preserving the upside
potential. However, after having started the R&D project with D now risky the rm faces another
kind of agency issue. Risky debt, as we know imposes costs both by introducing direct bankruptcy
costs and by creating agency-theoretic \underinvestment" problems of the kind discussed by Myers
(1977).
Before we proceed further, we discuss the implication of varying  for the maximum amount of
default risk-free debt that the rm can incur before starting the R&D project and when the project
is operational. We know that higher the intensity , lower is the expected time to completion. Figure
5 below illustrates D and DI for (a)  = 0.8, (b)  = 0.5, and (c)  = 0.2. We nd that as the
expected time to completion, Tp =
1
 , increases, \Area 4" becomes larger. As we can see from Figure
5, f , the critical level of f , below which D < DI , also increases with declining . This suggests
that as the expected time to successful completion of the R&D program increases, intangibility of
asset, I, employed to embark on the R&D program becomes a more pressing concern. Moreover, as
can be evinced from Figure 5, the maximum amount of safe debt prior to starting the R&D project,
DI , increases with decreasing  for all f . This is because if the rm knows that the expected time
to completion is large, and if the cash ows from the existing operation and the potential cash ows
from the outcome of the R&D project are low, then the rm prior to starting the R&D program will
be all too eager to liquidate it self early. With increasing Tp =
1
 , the same is true of D
, however,
since f too increases, the over all eect of declining  is a larger dierence between DI and D for
each value of f below f .
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Figure 5.5: D and DI for (a)  = 0.8, (b)  = 0.5, (c)  = 0.2
A third factor that increases the wedge between DI and D is, 1, the net revenue earned by the
rm as a going concern post liquidation. Figure 6 plots DI and D for 1 = 0:50 and 1 = 0:65. Our
results suggests that for any given f , both @xl@1 > 0 and
@xLI
@1
> 0. This is because if the net revenue
in the liquidation states of the rm as a going concern increases then, given every thing else, the rm
is going to going to liquidate it self early both before and after embarking on the R&D project. This
implies that if the value of the rm as a going concern is high in liquidation states, then the rm
can borrow more to nance itself, yet keeping the debt default risk-free. Also, we nd is that the f
at which xl(f) and x
LI(f) intersect shifts to the right as 1 increases, which implies that the rate at
which xLI increases with 1 is faster than the rate at which xl increases. The net eect of increase
in 1 is that Area 4 shifts up and becomes larger. As the value of the rm as a going concern at
liquidation approaches zero, at 1 = 0, the existing debt levels Dir that are safe prior to starting
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Figure 5.6: D and DI for (a) 1 = 0.5, (b) 1 = 0.65
of the R&D project do not turn risky after embarking on the project, regardless of the fact that
xLI > xl for low values of f . This is because when 1 = 0, the maximum level of default risk-free
debt is equal to the constant liquidation value of the rm: f + fI after starting the R&D project
and f before staring of the R&D project.
The fact that, for 1 > 0, D
 being less than DI for low values of f , may create a problems
for the rms. This is because for certain levels of existing debt levels that are default risk-free prior
to starting of the R&D program, turn risky after, there by reducing the value of debt. With debt
becoming risky, we know that under certain states of nature, bankruptcy and the attendant costs to
be incurred becomes a real possibility. To avoid bankruptcy in some states of nature, the rm may
renegotiate or restructure its debt.
In sum, what we nd is that when 1 > 0, both the expected time to successful completion of the
R&D program and the extent of intangibility of the asset involved in conducting R&D can give rise
to potential agency problem between the equity holders and the bond holders. As we will discuss
in detail in the next section, the agency issue can involve both risk-shifting, of the type discussed
in Jensen and Meckling (1976), and the underinvestment due debt overhang as discussed in Myers
(1977).
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5.4 Valuation when Debt is Risky
5.4.1 Mothballing and Resuming of the R&D Project: The Switching Problem
Debt is risky when Dsw > D
 = 0 + 1xlr  , where D
 is the maximum level of safe debt. For risky
debt the value of the rm at closure is less than the value of debt, that is, 0 +
1xb
r  < Dsw, where
xb is the trigger point at which the rm owners declare bankruptcy. Since at closure the seniority of
claim of the creditors is respected, the creditors in the event of bankruptcy receive
(1  )

0 +
1xb
r   

; (3-1)
where, , (0    1), is the fraction of the rm's value that is destroyed when the rm defaults on
its debt at closure. Being protected by limited liability the share holder's claim, E(x), in the event of
default at closure is given by E(x) = 0. Since the pay o to the shareholders in the event of default
is zero when debt, Dsw, is risky, the optimization problem (2-2) can be written as:
E(xt) = sup
I(s);L(s)2f0;1g;s2(t;T )
EQt
Z T
t
e r(s t)

(1  L(s))

 xs   rDsw   I(s)(a+ bxs)

+L(s)[0]

ds+ e r(T t)E(xT )

: (3-2)
In the above optimization problem, the two decision that the owners of the rm have to take are, (a)
whether to resume operation on R&D by investing a+ bxs at time period s, I(s) = 1, or to suspend
operation, I(s) = 0, and (b) whether to default on the rm's obligation, L(s) = 1, in which case the
equity holders of the rm receive a payo of 0, or to continue L(s) = 0. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation corresponding to the above problem is given by:
1
2
x22Exx(xs) + xEx(xs)  rE(xs)+
sup
I(s);L(s)2f0;1g

(1  L(s))I(s)



[Ea(xs) K]  E(xs)

+  xs   (a+ bxs)  rDsw

+
L(s)[0]

= 0; (3-3)
where Ea(xs) K = (V a(xs) Dsw) K, is the value of the rm's equity after the completion of the
project minus the xed cost (strike price) to implement the project and is equal to the present value
of the perpetual income ow of  xs + xs   rK   rDsw. Let xb be the trigger threshold of demand,
such that, if the exogenous demand, xt falls below xb then rm defaults and bankruptcy is declared.
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Let x^ be the threshold level of exogenous demand such that if xt rises above this level then the rm
resumes operation on the R&D and if xt is below then it mothballs the R&D project. Thus, as in
the case of safe debt, we have the mothball region dened as (xb; x^
), the continuation region dened
as [x^;1), and the region in which the rm is likely to default, [0; xb].
To distinguish the value of equity when debt is risky as compared to the value when debt is
safe, we denote the value of equity in the mothball region as Erm(x) and the value of equity in the
continuation region as Erc (x). When the level of exogenous demand xt is such that, xt lies in the
continuation region region, then it is optimal for the rm to invest a + bxt per instant of time, in
which case I(s) = 1. Given the HJB equation, the value of the rm in the continuation region is
governed by the following dierential equation:
1
2
x22Ercxx(x) + xE
r
cx(x)  rErc (x) + 

x
r     K +
 x
r      E
r
c (x) Dsw

+
 x  (a+ bx)  rDsw = 0 if x  x^: (3-4)
When xt is such that, xt lies in the mothball region region, then optimally I(s) = 0, and given the
HJB equation, the value of the rm in the mothball region is governed by the dierential equation:
1
2
x22Ermxx(x) + xE
r
mx(x)  rErm(x) +  x  rDsw = 0 if xb  x  x^ (3-5)
We know that the solution to the above two dierential equation (3-4) and (3-5) respectively are
given by:
Erc (x) =
~C1cx
 + ~C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw (3-6)
and
Erm(x) = ~C1mx
 + ~C2mx
 +
 x
r     Dsw; (3-7)
where the constants ~C1c, ~C2c, ~C1m, and ~C2m are to be determined. The boundary condition, (2-11),
implies that ~C1c = 0. Hence the value of the rm in the continuation region becomes:
Erc (x) = ~C2cx
 +
 x
r    +
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw:
Thus we are left with ve unknowns, ~C2c, ~C1m, ~C2m and the two threshold levels of exogenous
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demand or the free boundaries xb and x^
. These are determined by the boundary conditions at the
free boundaries xb and x^
.
The boundary conditions at x^ are the value matching, smooth pasting, and the super contact
conditions, which we have discussed earlier. These boundary conditions respectively at x^ are given
by:
Erc (x^
) = Erm(x^
); (3-8)
@Erc (x^
)
@x
=
@Erm(x^
)
@x
; (3-9)
and
@2Erc (x^
)
@x2
=
@2Erm(x^
)
@x2
: (3-10)
The standard boundary conditions, the value matching and smooth pasting conditions respectively
at xb are respectively given by:
Erm(xb) = ~C1mx

b +
~C2mx

b +
 xb
r     Dsw = 0 (3-11)
and
@Erm(xb)
@x
=  ~C1mx
( 1)
b + 
~C2mx
( 1)
b +
 
r    = 0: (3-12)
Given the value functions Erc (x) and E
r
m(x) the above boundary conditions, respectively can be
written as:
~C1mx^
 + ~C2mx^ +
 x^
r     Dsw =
~C2cx^
 +
 x^
r    +
x^
(r   )(+ r   )
  K
+ r
  bx^

+ r     
a
+ r
 Dsw (3-8a)
 ~C1mx^
( 1) +  ~C2mx^( 1) +
 
r    = 
~C2cx
( 1) +
 
r    +

(r   )(+ r   )  
b
+ r   
(3-9a)
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(   1) ~C1mx^( 2) + (   1) ~C2mx^( 2) = (   1) ~C2cx^( 2) (3-10a)
~C1mx

b +
~C2mx

b +
 xb
r     Dsw = 0 (3-11a)
 ~C1mx
( 1)
b + 
~C2mx
( 1)
b
 
r    = 0: (3-12a)
Again, as in the case of safe debt no closed form solution of the above set of equation exits, hence we
have to rely on numerical techniques to obtain the value of equity in the continuation and mothball
region. From our analysis in Section 3, we know that the maximum amount of default risk-free debt
D is a function of f , the fraction of the initial investment, I, that can be retained in the event
of liquidation. Therefore, in order to see the eect of the presence of debt levels higher than the
maximum amount of safe debt sustainable by a rm, we need to x the value of f at some particular
value, say ~f . For our numerical analysis we assume ~f = 0:1, while the other parameters are the
same as in Table 1. In considering the valuation of the rm when debt is risky, we consider the two
cases: (a) when the net revenue of the rm as going concern in the event of liquidation is positive,
1 > 0, and (b) when value of the rm in the event of liquidation is constant, 1 = 0. The results
of the numerical analysis are illustrated in Figure 7. The bold and the thin solid lines respectively
are the motballing/resuming threshold and the liquidation threshold when 1 = 0 and the debt
level, Dsw, is such that it is default risk free. The bold and the thin dotted lines respectively are
the motballing/resuming threshold and the liquidation threshold when 1 = 0:5 and the debt level,
Dsw, is such that it is default risk free. The bold and the thin dashed lines respectively are the
motballing/resuming threshold and the default threshold when debt is risky.
The maximum level of safe debt, D, when 1 = 0 is D( ~f; 1 = 0) = 205:5, and the maximum
level of safe debt when 1 = 0:5 turns out to be D
( ~f; 1 = 0:5) = 268:8. The vertical line in the
gure is drawn at D( ~f; 1 = 0:5) = 268:8. As can be seen from the gure, when 1 increases, both
the mothballing/resuming and the liquidation threshold increases and so does the maximum amount
of default risk-free debt that the rm can borrow. When 1 = 0 is as stated earlier, D
( ~f; 1 = 0) =
f + ~fI. As we increase Dsw above this level, we nd that both x^
(Dsw) and xb(Dsw) increase. That
is, as the level of risky debt in place increase we nd that mothballing/resuming threshold and the
liquidation increases. When 1 > 0, then for all risky debt levels Dsw > D
(f), x^ > x. Thus,
we nd that when the rm is nanced with risky debt, since, x^ > x, in some states of nature,
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Figure 5.7: Mothballing/Resuming threshold and Default threshold for Risky Debt as compared to
Mothballing/Resuming threshold and Liquidation threshold for Safe Debt at a xed value of f .
it passes up valuable investment opportunities which could make a positive net contribution to the
market value of the rm, and since, @x^

@Dsw
> 0, the debt overhang problem becomes more severe as
debt becomes riskier9.
As far as the default threshold is concerned when 1 > 0, as can be evinced from Figure 7, there
exists a risky debt level ~D, ~D > D, such that xb = xl when the risky debt level Dsw = ~D. For
D < Dsw < ~D, xb < xl and for D  ~D, xb  xl. This is due to the fact that the rate at which
liquidation threshold, xl, increases in response to increase in 1 is higher than the rate at which the
default threshold, xb, increases in response to increase in Dsw. This in eect implies that for 1 > 0,
when Dsw increases above D
( ~f; 1 = 0:5) = f + ~fI + 1xlr  , for some levels of debt, the default
threshold, xb, might even be lower than the closure threshold ,xl, when debt is default risk-free. This
result essentially follows from the fact that when debt is risky, in the event of default shareholders
receive nothing, consequently their optimal default threshold is determined by the burden of debt
9It can be shown analytically that @x^

@Dsw
=
 1
( )



x^
xb

 

x^
xb

1
x^

( 1) ~C2c(x^)  rK(r+)  ra(r+)
 > 0 and that @xb
@Dsw
= @x^

@Dsw
xb
x^ .
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service. In doing so the rm ignores the net revenue of the rm as a going concern in liquidation
states. Thus, when the burden of debt services are low, the rm defaults late and when they are
high the rm defaults early.
We now, turn to the valuation of risky debt. Let the value of debt in the mothball region and the
continuation region be denoted respectively by Bm(xt) and Bc(xt). Using Ito's formula and standard
hedging argument we know that the value of debt in the mothball region satises the following
dierential equation:
1
2
x22Bmxx(x) + xBmx(x)  rBm(x) + rDsw = 0, xb  x  x^; (3-13)
while the equation governing the value of debt in the continuation region is given by
1
2
x22Bcxx(x) + xBcx(x)  rBc(x) + rDsw + (Dsw  Bc(x)) = 0 for x  x^: (3-14)
The term (Dsw   Bc(x)) in the above equation is due to the fact that with intensity , the value
of debt in the continuation region jumps from Bc(x) to Dsw. This because we assume that the
rm carries on indenitely after implementation of the successfully completed R&D project, (see
footnote7). Without the risk of closure or default after implementation of the R&D project, the
value of debt is always Dsw.
The solution to equation (3-13) and (3-14) respectively are given by
B1mx
 +B2mx
 +Dsw (3-15)
B1cx
 +B2cx
 +Dsw (3-16)
where  and  are the roots of the characteristic polynomial, 12
22 + [  122]  r = 0, and  and
 are the roots of the characteristic polynomial, 12
22 + [  122]   (r + ) = 0. B1m, B2m, B1c,
and B2c are constants to be determined by the boundary conditions.
The rst boundary condition that we consider is absence of speculative bubbles:
lim
x!1B(x) = Dsw: (3-17)
The condition states that as the value of the underling exogenous demand for the product of the rm
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goes to innity the value of debt converges to Dsw, the debt principal. This is due to the fact that
for high values of x, the rm is easily able to service its debt and hence quite unlikely to default.
However, this boundary condition is only pertinent to the value of debt in the continuation region.
This because, given
B(x) =
8<: Bc(x) if x  x^Bm(x) if xb  x  x^,
the continuation region is bounded below by x^ but is not bounded above, but the mothball region
is bounded below and above by xb and x^
 respectively. The boundary condition (3-17) implies that,
B1c = 0, since B1c is the coecient of x
 and  > 1. Thus the value of debt in the continuation
region is given by
Bc(x) = B2cx
 +Dsw (3-18)
The mothball region, however, being bounded by xb and x^
, and x^ > xb > 0 the value of debt in
the mothball region is given by
Bm(x) = B1mx
 +B2mx
 +Dsw (3-19)
Thus we are left with three constants B1m, B2m, and B2c, which we can determine from the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions at the free boundaries xb and x^
. xb and x^, as we know
were determined earlier as a solution to the system of equations (3-8a)-(3-12a). The value matching
and smooth pasting conditions respectively at xb are the following:
Bm(xb) = B1mx

b +B2mx

b +Dsw = (1  )

0 +
1xb
r   

(3-20)
@Bm(xb)
@x
= B1mx
( 1)
b + B2mx
( 1)
b =
(1  )1
r    : (3-21)
The value matching condition (3-20) states that when the rm defaults at xb, the creditors receive
(1   )

0 +
1xb
r 

, where, , as explained earlier is the fraction of the value of the rm that gets
destroyed during bankruptcy. Since, the above two set of equations, (3-20) and (3-21), are sucient to
determine B1m and B1m, the only remaining constant B2c can be determined by the value matching
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condition at x^, given by:
Bm(x^
) = B1mx^ +B2mx^ +Dsw = B2cx^ +Dsw = Bc(x^): (3-22)
Given xb and x^
, using equation (3-20) and (3-21) to solve for B1m and B2m, we nd
B1m =   1
   

  

Dsw   (1  )

0 +
1xb
(r   )

  (1  )1xb
(r   )

1
xb

and
B2m =   1
   



Dsw   (1  )

0 +
1xb
(r   )

+
(1  )1xb
(r   )

1
xb

Thus we arrive at the value of debt in the mothball region, Bm(x) = Bm(x;Dsw), given by
Bm(x;Dsw) = Dsw 

Dsw   (1  )

0 +
1xb
(r   )


   

x
xb

+

   

x
xb

 

(1  )1xb
(r   )(   )

x
xb

 

x
xb

: (3-23)
It can be easily veried that

Dsw   (1  )

0 +
1xb
(r )


 

x
xb

+  

x
xb

> 0, and that
(1 )1xb
(r )( )

x
xb

 

x
xb

> 0. This implies that when Dsw is risky, the value of debt is less
than the debt principal. Given Bm(x), equation (3-22) yields the value of debt in the continuation
region, Bc(x) = Bc(x;Dsw),
Bc(x;Dsw) = Dsw 

Dsw   (1  )

0 +
1xb
(r   )


   

x
xb

+

   

x
xb

 

(1  )1xb
(r   )(   )

x
xb

 

x
xb
 x
x^

: (3-24)
For risky debt the value of the rm in the mothball region, V rm(x) is given by
V rm(x) = E
r
m(x) +Bm(x;Dsw) = (
~C1m +B1m)x
 + ( ~C2m +B2m)x
 +
 x
r    (3-25)
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and the value of the rm in the continuation region is given by
V rc (x) = E
r
c (x) +Bc(x;Dsw) =

B1mx^
 +B2mxr
x^
+ ~C2c

x +
 x
r    (3-26)
+
x
(r   )(+ r   )  
K
+ r
  bx
+ r     
a
+ r
5.4.2 Starting the R&D Project: The Irreversible Investment Problem
As discussed earlier, depending on f , the fraction of the initial investment, I, recouped in the event
of liquidation, the maximum amount of safe debt sustainable before and after starting the R&D
project dier. Depending on the amount of existing debt in place and f , Figure 4 delineates 4 cases,
represented by Area 1 to Area 4. In this section we assume that Dsw = Dir = D. While it is possible
that the rm can restructure its debt level when the rm embarks on R&D program, this assumes
that the rm is in a favorable position to reduce or increase its debt level. Here we show what
the likely outcomes can be when existing debt levels can not be renegotiated10. We have already
analyzed in detail the outcome for the starting of the R&D project when the level of debt for the
switching problem and the rst stage starting, both, were default risk-free. This leaves us to discuss
the outcomes for the rst stage when f is such that existing levels of debt are (a) safe for the second
stage switching but risky for the rst stage starting of the R&D,(Area 2), (b) risky for the second and
risky for the rst, (Area 3), and (c) safe for the rst stage but risky for the second stage switching,
(Area 4). The subsections to follow discuss these various cases.
Debt is risky when D > DI = f +
1xLI
r  , where D
I as dened earlier is the maximum level of
safe debt for a rm wishing to embark upon an R&D project and xLI is the liquidation threshold
when the level of debt D is default risk-free. For risky debt the value of the rm at closure is less
than the value of debt, that is, f +
1xB
r  < D, where x
B is the trigger point at which the rm
owners declare bankruptcy. Since, at closure the seniority of claim of the creditors is respected, the
creditors in the event of bankruptcy receive
(1  )

f +
1x
B
r   

; (3-27)
where , as dened earlier, is the fraction of the rm's value that is destroyed during bankruptcy.
Since the shareholders receive nothing, the value of equity, El(x), at liquidation is zero.
10At the time of the starting of the R&D project the rm may increase its debt level to nance its R&D project,
the possibility for reduction depends on many factors and is outside the scope of the chapter.
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Debt levels Default Risk-Free for Switching, Risky for Starting
In this section we discuss the implication of having, for a given f , debt level D such that the pair
(D; f) lie in Area 2 of Figure 4. We x f at f = 0:25. Debt level, D, is risky for the rst stage problem
but default risk-free for the second stage switching when D is such that, DI(f) < D  D(f). Now,
for any given f , we know what the switching and liquidation thresholds for the second stage switching
problems are. It remains to nd out the investment, x^I , and the liquidation, x^LI , threshold for the
rst stage, when DI(f) < D  D(f).
From our analysis of the switching and the starting problem with default risk-free debt, we know
that the value of equity in the what we had dened as the decision region takes the form of
Ed(x) = ~C1d(x)
 + ~C2d(x)
 +
 x
r     D if x
B  x  x^I :
Prior to starting of the R&D project or when the rm is in the decision region, with risky debt in
place, if the rm defaults on its obligation we know that at default the rm receives nothing. This
implies that the value of the rm's equity at the boundary xB satises the following value matching
and smooth pasting conditions respectively
Ed(x
B) = ~C1d(x
B) + ~C2d(x
B) +
 xB
r     D = 0 = El(x
B) (3-28)
and
@Ed(x
B)
@x
=  ~C1d(x
B) 1 +  ~C2d(xB) 1 +
 
r    = 0 =
@El(x
B)
@x
: (3-29)
We denote by x^I , the investment threshold when D is risky. Since the rm invests I only when it
is sure that after having invested it will be able to continue with the project, and since after investing,
the existing level of debt turns default risk-free, at the investment threshold x^I , the value of equity
in the decision region is matched with the value of equity in the continuation region, Ec(x). The
value matching and the smooth pasting condition at x^I respectively are:
~C1d(x^
I) + ~C2d(x^
I) +
 x^I
r     D = Ec(x^
I)  I (3-30)
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and
 ~C1d(x^
I) 1 +  ~C2d(x^I) 1 +
 
r    =
@Ec(x^
I)
@x
: (3-31)
Now, from the analysis of the second stage switching problem for safe debt, we know, Ec(x), the value
of equity in the continuation region. Thus, the four unknowns ~C1d, ~C2d, x^
I , and xB are determined
by the above four equations, (3-28) to (3-31).
For a given f , which we assume to be f = 0:25, Figure 8, illustrates the outcomes for the rst
stage for dierent values of D, where DI(f) < D  D(f). The range of D in the gure is bounded
below by DI(f) and above by D(f). Figure 8 (a) compares the trigger demand threshold level, xI ,
for starting of the R&D project when D  DI(f) with the trigger demand threshold level, x^I , for
starting of the R&D project when DI(f) < D  D(f). We know that when D  DI(f), xI(f) is
constant for a given f . When DI(f) < D  D(f), we nd that xI(f) < x^I(f;D) and that x^I(f;D)
increases with D. In other words, we nd that when debt levels are risky prior to starting of the
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Figure 5.8: (a) Investment Threshold when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for Switching and Risky
for Starting as compared to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and Starting,
(b) Liquidation Threshold when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for Switching and Risky for Starting
as compared to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and Starting
R&D project, the trigger threshold level x^I(f;D) at which the rm starts the R&D project becomes
higher. That is, with risky debt in place, the outcome, xI(f) < x^I(f;D), reects the fact that the
rm decides to wait more before investing, I, to start the R&D project, thus foregoing valuable
investment opportunity. This is reects the debt overhang problem due to risky debt in place.
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As far as the default threshold xB(f;D) is concerned, we nd that there is a discrete jump
downwards from xLI(f) as soon as soon asD becomes greater thanDI(f). We also nd that xB(f;D)
increases as D increases. This is due to the fact that with risky debt in place, equity holders of the
rm ignore the net revenue of the rm in liquidation states and the optimal reaction is based only
on the extent of debt burden. For the range of values of D for which D is risky prior to starting
up of the R&D project and default risk-free-after, the the optimal default threshold increases with
higher debt burden, but the burden is not high enough to make the rm default earlier as compared
to xLI , the closure threshold level had the debt, level, D, been such that it was default risk-free.
Thus we nd that when the pair (D; f) is such that, the pair lies in Area 2, then xB(f;D) < xLI(f)
and x^I(f;D) > xI(f).
However, what is interesting here is that if f > f and the level of D is such that it is default
risk-free before having started the R&D project and if it is possible to restructure the debt level at
the time of investing I, then it would be possible for the rm to borrow more, up to D, without
risking default.
To obtain the value of risky debt in place, we know that, by using Ito's formula and standard
hedging argument, the value of debt in the decision region satises the following dierential equation:
1
2
x22Bdxx(x) + xBdx(x)  rBd(x) + rD = 0, xb  x  x^: (3-32)
The solution to the above equation is given by:
B1dx
 +B2dx
 +D; (3-33)
where B1d and B2d are constants to be determined. These can be easily determined by employing
the value matching and smooth pasting conditions either at xB(f;D) or at x^I(f;D).
Debt levels Risky for Switching, Risky for Starting
To solve for the outcomes in Area 3, where the level of existing debt is such that it is risky, both,
prior to starting of the R&D project and after starting the R&D project we solve the following four
equation.
~C1d(x^
I) + ~C2d(x^
I) +
 x^I
r     D = E
r
c (x^
I)  I (3-34)
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 ~C1d(x^
I) 1 +  ~C2d(x^I) 1 +
 
r    =
@Erc (x^
I)
@x
(3-35)
Ed(x
B) = ~C1d(x
B) + ~C2d(x
B) +
 xB
r     D = 0 = El(x
B) (3-36)
@Ed(x
B)
@x
=  ~C1d(x
B) 1 +  ~C2d(xB) 1 +
 
r    = 0 =
@El(x
B)
@x
: (3-37)
Equation (3-34) and (3-35) are respectively the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions
at x^I and (3-36) and (3-37) are respectively the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at
xB. It should be noted here that at x^I , the value of equity in the decision region is equated with
the value of equity in the continuation region Erc (x^
I), which is the value when debt is risky after the
starting of the R&D project. The system of four equations solves for x^I , xB, ~C1d, and ~C2d. Figure
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Figure 5.9: (a) Investment Threshold when Debt levels are Risky for both Switching and Starting as
compared to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and Starting,
(b) Liquidation Threshold when Debt levels are Risky for both Switching and Starting as compared
to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and Starting
9 (a) compares x^I(f;D) to xI(f), where f has been xed at f = 0:25. The range of D in the gure
is D  D. This is because with f = 0:25 > f , D is risky both for the switching and the starting
problem only when D > D. Had we xed f at some value, where f < f , D would be risky for both
the switching and the starting problem for all D > DI . Since xI(f) is only a function of f , and since
f has been xed, xI(f) is constant. As can be seen from the gure, for a given f , as D increases,
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x^I(f;D) increases. That is, with risky debt in place, the rm postpones investment as compared to
xI(f). This is due to debt overhang problem of having excessive debt in place, because of which rms
in some states of nature forego investing in projects which otherwise could have been undertaken to
the benet of the rm.
As far as the default threshold xB(f;D) is concerned, we nd that for certain values of D the
rm defaults late as compared to when debt is default risk-free, and for higher values of D, the rm
defaults earlier as compared to when D is default risk free. The default phenomena for the rst
stage starting of the R&D problem, observed when D is risky for both the rst as well as the second
stage is the same as that for the second stage switching problem. The reasons for observing this
phenomena is essentially the same as that for the switching problem, and are not mentioned here.
However, we do note that when the level of risky debt D is high, above a certain threshold, the debt
overhang problem is also reected in the early default of the rm as compared to the situation when
debt is default risk-free. The value of debt is obtained exactly in the same manner as stated in the
last section.
Debt level Risky for Switching, Default Risk-Free for Starting
We denote by xI the investment threshold and by xLI the liquidation threshold when the pair
(D; f) are such that they lie in Area 4. For any f , below f , in Area 4 where D is such that
D(f) < D  DI(f), debt level that is safe prior to starting of the R&D project become risky after
starting the R&D project. To solve for the outcomes xI and xLI we solve the system of equations:
C1d(x
I) + C2d(x
I) +
 xI
r    = E
r
c (x
I)  I; (3-38)
C1d(x
I) 1 + C2d(xI) 1 +
 
r    =
@Erc (x
I)
@x
; (3-39)
C1d(x
LI) + C2d(x
LI) +
 xLI
r    = f +
1x
LI
r    ; (3-40)
and
C1d(x
LI) 1 + C2d(xLI) 1 +
 
r    =
1
r   : (3-41)
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Equation (3-38) and (3-39) are the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at xI , while (3-40)
and (3-41) are the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at xLI . Note that at xI the value
of the rm's equity in decision region is equated with value of the rm's equity in the continuation
region, Erc (x^
I), which is the value of equity in the continuation region when debt is risky for the
second stage switching problem. Along with xI and xLI we also obtain the values of C1d and C2d.
To solve the above system of equations numerically, we assume 1 = 0:65 and f = 0:05. The results
of the numerical solution are illustrated in Figure 10. For a given f , the gure plots xI(f;D) and
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Figure 5.10: (a) Investment Threshold when Debt levels are Risky for Switching and Default Risk-
Free for Starting as compared to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and
Starting,
(b) Liquidation Threshold when Debt levels are Risky for Switching and Default Risk-Free for Starting
as compared to when Debt levels are Default Risk-Free for both Switching and Starting
xLI(f;D) over the range of D, D(f) < D  DI(f). Figure 10 (a) compares xI(f;D) and xI(f).
We nd that the investment threshold, xI(f;D), is lower than xI(f) and that xI(f;D) decreases
as D decreases. In other words, when the pair (D; f) is such that it lies in Area 4 the equity
holders of the rm overinvest. The incentive of equity holders to exercise the investment option early
relative to the case when D is default risk-free for both the rst and the second stage is explained as
follows. Equity holders have a strong incentive to exercise the investment option quickly and reap the
benets of a successfully implemented R&D project if the project is successfully completed prior to
any liquidation. This incentive is higher for higher levels of D since equity holders are not concerned
about the welfare of bondholders, and are therefore indierent to the increased risk of bankruptcy
resulting from their early exercise decision. Having limited liability, equity holders shift the burden
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of default risk of an early exercise decision on to the bondholders, while simultaneously enjoying a
real possibility of reaping higher cash ows form a successfully implemented R&D output, which can
then reduce their debt burden of a high debt service.
We also nd that xLI(f;D) is lower as compared to when debt is default risk free before and
after investing in R&D and decreases as the level of debt increases. Choosing to liquidate at a later
time is also symptomatic of overinvestment. By waiting longer to liquidate, it could happen that
low realization of cash ows might eventually turn up to the point, xI(f;D), at which the rm can
invest in R&D.
Thus, what is important about Area 4, the region in the f;D plain where f low, is that even
when D is default risk-free prior to starting of the R&D project it turns risky upon embarking on
the R&D project. This implies that after having started the R&D project, unless the rm lowers its
debt level, the value of the existing debt falls. Thus when f is low, unless the existing debt levels
are very low, the rm may not be able to nance its R&D project with additional debt at the time
when it starts the R&D project. Also, in this situation, after having embarked on the R&D project
early, when the rm has to continue with the R&D project, it is beset with the agency problem of
underinvestment with debt overhang.
5.5 Comparison with Scale Expansion
In this section we contrast R&D investment with scale expansion of the rm, where the rm employs
the old existing technology that that yields a revenue of  xt per instant of time, which is less than,
xt, the revenue earned from the successfully implemented R&D project. Equity holders of the rm
can chose to invest in R&D activity or expand the scale of the operation by employing the existing
technology that yields a revenue of  xt every instant of time. R&D activity, as discussed earlier {
because of the intangibility of the assets involved and the uncertainty in developing a new process
or a product { is a risky venture. We emphasize here that, the parameters, the expected time to
completion, Tp =
1
 , and the degree of tangibility, f , are technologically specied and xed
11. That
is, these parameters can not be aected by the rm nor does the economy, at an point in time, has
available many technologies that vary in the parameters mentioned above.
Consider a rm with an option to expand the scale of its operation by employing the existing
technology that yields a cash ow of  xt per instant of time. In expanding the scale of its operation
11It is possible that the economy has available many technologies with dierent cost. However, we do model the
choice of technology here.
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the rm can consider two possibilities: (a) expand the scale of its operation by using the same amount
of investment I = I as needed to start the R&D activity or (b) by employing some level of investment
I to achieve the same level of cash ows, (1+ )xt, as the successfully completed R&D activity yields.
Let us rst consider possibility (a), where the rm expands the scale of its operation by installing
a capital of the amount, I, precisely the amount needed to start the R&D project. The question is
by how much is the scale of operation increased if the rm invests I = I. To answer this question,
we assume that a fraction r of I involves physical capital, while 1   r of I is used up in training,
administrative and adjustment costs. In the event of liquidation a fraction f of rI is lost. On the
other hand, in the event of closure, all of (1 r)I is lost. We also assume that the existing technology,
that yields a prot of  xt per instant of time, is a constant returns to scale technology. That is, if
the existing capital stock is doubled then the prot every instant doubles to 2 xt.
Note that the constant liquidation value of existing operation of the rm that yields a cash ow
of  xt per instant of time is f . If f is the value of physical capital, employed by the rm in
liquidation states, then the value of physical capital when the rm is operating is f=f . Therefore, if
the rm spends an amount, rI = rI, of physical capital for scale expansion, then the scale by which
the existing operation of the rm is expanded12 is given by s =
frI
f
. Hence, having invested I, the
amount by which the cash ows of the rm increases, given constant returns to scale, is given by:
s x =
frI
f
 x. When the rm wants to increase the scale of its production to the point where it
can reap the same cash ows as from a successfully implemented R&D project, the scale to which
it needs to expand the rm can be obtained from the relation: (1 + s) = (1 +  ). Given constant
return to scale, the amount of investment, rI, needed to achieve the scale, s = 1= , can be computed
by employing the relation: s =
frI
f
.
Suppose the rm wants to increase the scale of its operation so as to reap a cash ow of (1+ )xt
per instant of time, then we know that the rm needs to increase its scale of operation by s = 1= .
In order to compute the total amount of investment, I, needed, we need to get an estimate of f
and r. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) use the method of indirect inference to study investment
irreversibility, where rms also disinvest. Assuming that the buying price of capital goods, pb, to be
equal to 1, they compute the resale price of capital goods ps = 0:975. We assume our parameter,
f = ps. That is, of the rI of the physical capital invested, in the event of liquidation, the rm loses
a fraction (1  ps) = (1  f) of rI.
12The implicit assumption here is that capital is perfectly divisible and that output of the rm can be proportionately
increased for a marginal increase in capital. However, this assumption is not binding on the analysis that follows. We
can specify a technology with discrete units of capital to achieve a certain scale, but this does not provide any new
insight as far our analysis is concerned.
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Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) also compute adjustment cost of capital, that includes both
convex and non-convex cost of adjustment. They specify convex cost of adjustment as c = 2

I
K
2
K,
and non-convex cost of adjustment as FK, where I is the amount of capital investment, K is the
amount of existing capital stock, and F , the xed cost of adjustment, which is independent of the
level of activity of the rm, is proportional to the level of capital at the rm. Using the method
of indirect inference, they estimate the adjustment cost parameters  and F as,  = 0:049 and
F = 0:039. Since, s = 1= and f = 0:975 are known, we can compute rI. Now, according to our
assumption the investment in capital, I, is rI and K = ff . Thus (1   r)I, the assumed adjustment
costs incurred during scale expansion, can be computed as:
(1  r)I = 
2

frI
f
2f
f
+ F
f
f
: (4-1)
With rI known, and given the estimate of 1   rI, r and I can be computed. On the other hand, if
only the total investment I is known, then r can be obtained by solving the above quadratic equation.
Thus in the event of liquidation, of the total amount of investment, I, the rm loses (1 r)I+(1 f)rI.
We denote by g = 1  (1 r)I+(1 f)rII = fr, the fraction of the investment, I, that can be regained by
the rm in the event of liquidation.
The problem facing a rm that intends to expand its scale of operation constitutes of essentially
three decisions: (i) when to optimally expand its scale of operation, (ii) when to optimally liquidate
the rm after having increased its size, and (iii) if the expansion has not yet taken place, when to
optimally liquidate itself if the cash ows of the rm happen to fall prior to sinking I. Assume that
the rm has debt, D in place, which is default risk-free before and after scale expansion. Suppose
the rm has not yet expanded its scale of operation, and is earning a prot of  xt per instant of time
and retains the options to expand itself or to liquidate itself. If demand rises and crosses a certain
a limit the rm would expend resources of the amount I to expand the scale of its production. Let
xe be the optimal threshold level, such that if demand crosses xe, then the rm expands its scale of
operation. If however, demand falls below a certain threshold then the rm liquidates itself. Let xlb
be the optimal closure threshold at which rm liquidates itself before having expanded its scale of
operation. After having expanded the scale of its operation, it is quite likely that demand for the
rm's produce falls down. In which case the rm at a certain lower threshold will call for closure.
We denote the optimal closure threshold at which the rm liquidates itself after having expanded it's
scale operation as xla.
For the scale expansion problem, the value of the rm at the closure threshold, xlb, before the
5.5. Comparison with Scale Expansion 127
rm invests, I, to expand the scale of its operation is given by,
El(xlb) = f +
1xlb
r     D  0; (4-2)
where 1xlbr  is the value of the rm as a going concern at the liquidation threshold xlb. At the
liquidation threshold xla, after the rms has expanded the scale of its operation, the value of the
equity is given by:
El(xla) = f + frI+
01xla
r     D  0; (4-3)
where 01 is the net revenue earned by the rm as a going concern in the event of closure after the
scale expansion. The above two equation (4-4) and (4-5) imply that the maximum level of default
risk-free debt, Db, before and, Da, after scale expansion are respectively given by:
Db = f +
1xlb
r   
Da = f + frI+
01xla
r   :
We are now left with computing the value of equity before and after scale expansion. Without
writing the optimization problem of the rm, standard option theoretic argument tells us that the
value of the rm's equity before having expanded the scale of operation, Eb(x), is governed by the
dierential equation,
1
2
x22Ebxx(x) + xEbx(x)  rEb(x) +  x  rD = 0, xlb  x  xe; (4-4)
and the dierential equation governing the value of the rm's equity after the scale expansion is given
by:
1
2
x22Eaxx(x) + xEax(x)  rEb(x) + (1 + s) x  rD = 0, x  xe: (4-5)
We know that the solutions to the above dierential equations, (4-5) and (4-6), are respectively given
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by:
Eb(x) = Ab1x
 +Ab2x
 +
 x
r     D; (4-6)
and
Ea(x) = Aa1x
 +Aa2x
 +
(s+ 1) x
r     D; (4-7)
where  < 0 and  > 1 are of the roots of the characteristic equation, 12
22 + [   122]   r = 0.
The constants Ab1, Ab2, Aa1 and Aa2 are determined using boundary conditions. The rst boundary
condition that we consider is one stated in (2-11):
lim
x!1Ea(x) / x; (4-8)
the explanation for which has been provided earlier. This implies that, since  > 1, Aa1 = 0. Thus
we are left with three constants: Ab1, Ab2, and Aa2, which can be determined by the boundary
conditions, the value matching and the smooth pasting, at the free boundaries xe, xla, and xlb. The
value matching and smooth pasting conditions respectively at xe are given by equations (4-9) and
(4-10). The same conditions at xlb and xla respectively are given by equations (4-11)-(4-12) and
(4-13)-(4-14).
Ab1x

e +Ab2x

e +
 xe
r     D = Aa2x

e   I+
(s+ 1) xe
r     D (4-9)
Ab1x
 1
e + Ab2x
 1
e +
 
r    = Aa2x
 1
e +
(s+ 1) 
r    (4-10)
Ab1x

lb +Ab2x

lb +
 xlb
r     D = f +
1xlb
r     D (4-11)
Ab1x
 1
lb + Ab2x
 1
lb +
 
r    =
1
r    (4-12)
f + frI+
01xla
r     D = Aa2x

la +
(s+ 1) xla
r     D (4-13)
5.5. Comparison with Scale Expansion 129
01
r    = Aa2x
 1
la +
(s+ 1) 
r    (4-14)
Since no analytical solutions for the above system of equations exists, we resort to numerical
solution. While all the parameters remain the same as in Table 1, for the scale expansion problem,
there are ve additional parameters: 01, s, r, f , and I. Assume that the rm by spending some
amount I, wants to expand the scale of operation so as to reap the same amount of cash ows from a
successfully completed R&D. For such a case we know that s = 1= , where  is given in Table 1. We
assume f = 0:975, the relative resale price of capital goods as estimated in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006). Given s and f , as discussed earlier we can compute rI, the amount of capital investment
needed for scale expansion. As it turns out, the amount of capital investment rI needed to achieve
the same amount cash ows as from a successfully completed R&D project is rI = 256:4. In order
to compute the total gross investment, I, needed we have to compute the amount of adjustment
costs (1   r)I needed to install rI of capital. Given (4-1),  = 0:049 and F = 0:039, it turns out
that (1   r)I = 15:852 and g = fr = 0:92 = g. Given our assumptions about the scale expansion
parameters, it turns out that the total amount of investment needed for R&D, I +K, to achieve a
cash ow of ( + 1)xt per instant of time is about 63% of the total investment, I, needed to achieve
the same cash ows through scale expansion.
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Figure 5.11: Scale expansion threshold, xe, liquidation threshold before investing in scale expansion,
xlb, and liquidation threshold after investing in scale expansion, xlb.
While we could determine s, r, f , and I, for 01 we need to assume a value. Given 1 = 0:5,
Figure 11 plots xe, xlb, and xla as a function of 
0
1. We nd that as 
0
1 increases xe(1 = 0:5; 
0
1)
decreases and asymptotes downwards at some higher value of 01. That is to say, if the rm perceives
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that post scale expansion the net revenue of the rm as a going concern will be high, then the rm
will be only too eager to expand the scale of its operation. This is because having increased the
scale of its operation, if the net revenue of the rm in liquidation states is high and if the fraction,
g, of the initial investment, I, that can be retained is high, then in the event of liquidation equity
holders of the rm obtain a higher value for the rm13. Thus, if 01 is high then the incentive to
expand the scale of its operation is high too. We also nd that the liquidation threshold, xla, post
scale expansion, increases with 01, while the liquidation threshold, xlb, prior to expansion decreases
with 01. Post scale expansion, if the cash ows of the rm does fall down and if 01 is high, then the
value received by the rm at liquidation will be high. Therefore, with 01 being high, the gains to be
made by liquidating early are higher than continuing. The importance of net revenue, 01, earned by
the rm as going concern in liquidation states, post scale expansion, is also reected by the fact that
the liquidation threshold, xlb, prior to scale expansion decreases as 
0
1 increases. This is because, if
the rm knows today that after scale expansion the liquidation value of the rm will be high, then it
would rather wait longer to liquidate today when it has not yet expanded the scale of its operation.
Figure 12 compares the optimal trigger threshold level of demand at which the rm expands its
scale of operation xe(g = g; 
0
1) and the trigger threshold at which the rm embarks on the R&D
program, xI(f). While the xI(f) is computed for all values of f , g, the fraction of investment I
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Figure 5.12: Scale Expansion threshold, xe, and Starting of R&D Project threshold, x
I .
retained in the event of liquidation has been xed at g = 0:92 = g and 01 is varied. We nd that
for any given f , xI(f) is smaller that xe(
0
1) for most values of 
0
1, and that for any given f , the
13As g declines we nd that xe(1 = 0:5; g; 
0
1) asymptotically decreases at higher value of 
0
1.
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dierence between xe(
0
1) and x
I(f) narrows down as 01 becomes larger. For any given 01 the
dierence between xe(
0
1) and x
I(f) becomes smaller as f decreases. This suggests that for a given
f , R&D investment is more desirable when 01 is low. This is because when 01 is low, the level of
exogenous demand needed to trigger scale expansion, xe, is higher than x
I . Figure 12 also suggests
that for any given f , there exists a 01 such that xe(01) = xI(f). Let fa and fb be two levels of
fraction f that can be retained of the initial investment I required to start the R&D program, such
that, fa < fb. Then as Figure 12 suggests, 
0
1a <
01b , where xe(
01a) = x
I(fa) and xe(
0
1b
) = xI(fb).
This implies that if there is a situation, such that, f = fa and 
0
1 =
01b , then at these values of f
and 01, the rm will chose to expand its scale of operation rather than invest in R&D. Since, for
these values of f and 01, xe(01b) < x
I(fa).
As discussed earlier, for any given f , there exists a 01 such that xe(01) = xI(f) at which a rm
is indierent between investing or expanding the scale of operation. For a given f , if 01 is lower that
01, we nd that the trigger threshold level of exogenous demand, xe(g; 01), at which the rm opts
to expand the scale of operation is higher than xI(f), the optimal trigger threshold level of demand
at which the rm embarks on the R&D project. This is due to the fact that scale expansion involves
using an inecient technology as compared to the outcome of an R&D endeavor. Thus, unless
demand for the rm's produce is high enough, the rm is does not expand the scale of operation.
On the other hand by investing a lower amount, I, where I < I, if the rm successfully completes
the R&D project, the rm is able to capture the same amount of cash ows as from expanding
the scale of its operation. For any given f , as stated earlier, as 01 increases the higher incentive of
receiving a higher value for the rm at liquidation post scale expansion, starts overriding the eciency
concern14. Also, ceteris paribus, if the fraction, f , of initial investment that can be retained in the
event of liquidation is high, then the rm embarks upon the R&D project even earlier. This is due
to the fact that with higher f the costs associated with starting the R&D project is low, and the
extent of tangibility involved in starting the R&D project is high, making the R&D undertaking a
less risky endeavor.
As stated earlier, xlb is the optimal closure threshold of a rm that has the option to expand the
scale of operation but has not expanded the scale as yet. Figure 13 (a) below illustrates the optimal
closure threshold of demand for such a rm before scale expansion and the optimal closure threshold,
xLI , of the rm that is contemplating to conduct R&D but has not embarked on the project as yet.
14Note, in all the analysis we have kept 1, the net revenue of the rm as a going concern at liquidation prior to
scale expansion or R&D investment, xed at 1 = 0:5. Changing 1 shifts both the curves xe(
0
1) and x
I(f) upwards
or downwards. However, since the shifts are almost in the same proportion, the dierence between xe(
0
1) and x
I(f)
remains almost the same.
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We nd that the optimal closure threshold of the rm with an option to do R&D, that has not been
exercised as yet, is lower as compared to the closure threshold of the rm with an option to expand
the scale of operation. We obtain this result even when the constant liquidation value in liquidation
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Figure 5.13: (a) Liquidation threshold before scale expansion, xlb(g; 
0
1), and before starting the R&D
project, xLI . (b) Liquidation threshold after scale expansion, xla(g; 
0
1), and after starting the R&D
project, xl(f).
states is same for both the rms. This can only be possible if at xlb(g; 
0
1), for any given 
0
1, the
value of equity to continue without liquidating, Ed(xlb(g; 
0
1)), of the rm that seeks to engage in
R&D is higher than the liquidation value of the same rm at xlb(g; 
0
1). In other words, at xlb(g; 
0
1)
the value of the rm to continue without liquidating and maintain the value of the option to start
the R&D project is higher than the value the rm could have earned by liquidating itself. This in
a way conrms the importance of R&D activity: at the level of exogenous demand, xlb(g; 
0
1), when
a rm is likely to give up its option to expand the scale of its operation, the value of the option to
start R&D for a rm that seeks to invest in R&D is still valuable enough, so as not to seek closure
and wait longer. This again is due to the fact that, with a certain degree of uncertainty, a rm with
relatively low investment in R&D is able to reap higher prots15.
Figure 13 (b), illustrates the optimal trigger threshold, xla(g; 
0
1), at which a rm that has already
expanded the scale of its operation liquidates itself, and xl(f), the trigger threshold at which a rm
15This result is however conditional on the choice of , the intensity with which the R&D project can be completed.
We nd that when  is low then it is possible that the closure threshold for the R&D project, xLI , prior to starting
the R&D project, lies above the closure threshold for the scale expansion program, xlb. In other words, for low values
of  the value of the option to invest in R&D may not be high enough to continue at some low level of demand. As 
falls down, we also nd that xI increases, which implies that the dierence between the starting threshold for the scale
expansion program and the starting threshold for the R&D project narrows down.
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that has embarked on the R&D program liquidates itself. As can be seen from the gure, whether
the liquidation thresholds xla(g; 
0
1) and xl(f) are higher or lower compared to each other depends
on the particular combination of 01 and f . Let us rst consider 01 = 0. For 01 = 0, as can be
evinced from the gure that there exists a f0, such that xla(g; 
0
1 = 0) = xl(f0). For all f greater
than f0, the rm that invests in R&D liquidates earlier than the rm that has expanded the scale
of its operation and whose net revenue as a going concern at liquidation, post scale expansion, is 0.
On the other hand, for all f less than f0, the rm that invests in R&D liquidates it self earlier than
the rm that expanded the scale of its operation, even when the only value that it receives happens
to be the constant liquidation value. Now consider the maximum value of f = fm. For f = fm, as
the gure suggests, there exists a 01 = 01m , such that, xla(g; 
0
1m) = xl(fm). For all 
0
1 > 
0
1m , the
liquidation threshold of the rm that expands the scale of its operation is higher than the rm that
invests in R&D for all values of f .
For all values of f 2 (f0; fm), there exists a ~01, such that, xl(f) = xla(g; ~01). For that particular
value of f , at all 01 lower that ~01 the rm that has expanded the scale of operation liquidates itself
late as compared to the rm that invests in R&D, and for all values of 01 greater that ~01 the rm
that expands the scale of its operation liquidates it self early than the rm that invests in R&D. To
cut the long story short, when f is low, f < f0, for all values of 
0
1, the rms that has expanded
the scale of its operation closes much earlier than the rm that has expended resources to start the
R&D program. This is due to the fact that on one hand, the rm that expands it's scale of operation
invests largely in physical assets, whose resale value is high as compared to an R&D performing rm
that invests I to start the R&D project, but loses almost all of I, f < f0, at liquidation prior to
successfully completing the R&D. To put in other words, when f is low then the fraction of the
initial investment, I, retained in the event of liquidation is low, which implies that the degree of
investment irreversibility associated with investing in R&D is high. Therefore when f is low, the
rm waits longer, during which demand may rise so that it may resume on with the R&D activity,
or eventually liquidate at a lower value of x. On the other hand, as 01, the net revenue of the rm as
a going concern at liquidation, post scale expansion, increases, the incentive of the rm to liquidate
the rm at higher levels of exogenous demand becomes larger, to the extent that when 01 > 01m ,
the rm that has expanded the scale of its operation liquidates early compared to a rm that invests
in R&D, no matter how large f is.
Early liquidation for the rm that has expanded the scale of its operation could also be due to
the fact that, after having expanded the scale of its operation, the rm has no further option to
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invest. On the other hand the rm that has invested in R&D, since R&D eorts leads to higher cash
ows with lower investment, at xla(g; 
0
1), at which the rm with an R&D project has mothballed
the project, the value of the rm's option to resume investing and continue with R&D is high enough
so as not to call for closure.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
262
263
264
265
266
267
f , Φ
1
¢
D
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
300
400
500
600
f , Φ
1
¢
D
(b)
Db|{
DI- - -
Da|{
D- - -
Figure 5.14: (a) Maximum amount of risk-free debt before scale expansion, Db, and before investing
in R&D, DI . (b) Maximum amount of risk-free debt after scale expansion, Da, and D
, the maximum
amount of safe debt after having invested I to start the R&D project.
The implication of various closure thresholds, before and after investment, either for scale ex-
pansion or R&D, on the maximum amount of risk-free assets are shown in Figure 14. Figure 14 (a)
illustrates the maximum amount of default risk-free debt that can be incurred before either scale
expansion or starting up of the R&D project. Before scale expansion or starting of the R&D project,
the constant liquidation value of the rm as well as the value of the rm as a going concern is same
for both type of rms. The dierence between the two is only explained by the respective dierence
in the optimal closure thresholds. As explained earlier, since R&D achieves the same amount of cash
ows as the scale expansion with a lesser investment, the rm that maintains the option to invest in
R&D nds the option valuable enough to maintain it for a longer period of time before eventually
liquidating. However, this also implies a lower debt capacity if the equity holders of the rm wish to
avoid bankruptcy.
Figure 14 (b) illustrates the maximum level of default risk-free debt that the two types of rm
can sustain after scale expansion and after investing in R&D. We nd that the maximum amount of
default risk-free debt that the rm that expands the scale of its operation can sustain is higher than
the maximum that the rm that invests in R&D can. As can be seen from the gure, the dierence is
higher when f is low and when 01 is high. Part of the dierence is due to the fact that the constant
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liquidation value of the rm that expands the scale of its operation is higher than that of R&D:
f +frI > f +fI. The dierence is also due to the fact that closure threshold after scale expansion
and after investing in R&D dier. As explained earlier, for any given f , when 01 is greater than a
certain threshold, the rm that has expanded the scale of its operation liquidates earlier than the
rm that has invested in R&D.
In order to see only the eect of the dierences in the liquidation thresholds, xla(g; 
0
1) and
xl(f), on the maximum amount of safe debt for the scale expansion and the R&D program, we set
I = I. Given our assumption, this implies that the extent to which the scale is expanded is less than
(1 +  )xt, the revenue generated from a successful R&D program. Given our assumptions, when
I = I, the scale by which the equity holders expand the scale of operation is about s = 0:20. Now,
the maximum amount of risk-free debt after scale expansion, Da, is given by Da = f + gI +
01xla
r  ,
and that after starting the R&D project is given by D = f + fI + 1xlr  . We have already xed g
and 1, therefore for any given f , as Figure 15 (c) suggests, we can nd a 
0
1, such that Da = D
.
For all 01 > 01, we nd that Da > D. What essentially drives this result is the kind of incentive
the rm that expands its scale of operation and the rm that invests in R&D face. When 01 is high,
then the incentive to liquidate early for the rm that expands is higher, and when f is low, for a rm
that invests in R&D, it has a higher incentive to liquidate late than early.
Now let us assume that the both the type of rms, the rm with an option to embark on the
R&D program and the rm with an option to expand the scale of its operation, can restructure their
debt at the time of starting the R&D project or at the time of expanding the scale of its operation.
Let us also assume that I = I and the net revenue of the rm as a going concern at liquidation
after scale expansion is the same as the net revenue of the rm as a going concern at liquidation
for the R&D, i.e., when 01 = 1 = 0:5. Given our assumption about constant returns to scale
and divisibility of capital we nd that when I = I the scale, s, by which the rm expands its scale
of operation is, s = 0:20. At these values, as is evident from Figure 15 (a), the threshold level of
demand, xe(g; 
0
1 = 0:5), needed to start scale expansion is much higher as compared to the threshold
level of demand needed to start the R&D program xI for almost all values of f . The liquidation
threshold, xla(g; 
0
1 = 0:5), for the scale expansion program is also greater than xl(f). The same is
true of Da(
0
1 = 0:5) as compared to D
. Thus we nd that even when the option to invest in R&D
in more valuable, the amount of default risk-free debt that it can borrow is less than the rm with
an scale expansion program. As I increases, since the fraction of I that can be retained in the event
of liquidation is high, Da, becomes even larger { compare Figure 15 (c) and 14 (b). At the debt
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Figure 5.15: (a) Scale Expansion threshold, xe, and starting of R&D Project threshold, x
I . (b)
Liquidation threshold after scale expansion, xla(g; 
0
1), and after starting the R&D project, xl(f).
(c) Maximum amount of risk-free debt after scale expansion, Da, and D
, the maximum amount of
safe debt after having invested I to start the R&D project.
restructuring point, when the rm embarks on the R&D program if it incurs any debt higher than
D, the debt becomes risky and bondholders lose their claim on the rm, hence lenders are reluctant
to lend to the rms with R&D program as compared to rms that expand their scale of operation.
Our result thus corroborates with the many empirical papers that nd that R&D intensive rms are
less leveraged than non R&D performing rms.
Thus, the main result of the comparison can be summarized as follows: Unless the value of the
rm in its second best use, post scale expansion, is high, the growth option related to R&D activity
is more valuable. This is because a successfully completed R&D activity yields higher cash ows with
lower investment as compared to scale expansion. On the other hand since R&D activity mainly
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involves investment in intangible assets, whose value in the event of liquidation is low, the optimal
reaction of the rm, when demand falls after having started the R&D project, is to wait longer before
eventually liquidating itself. Both the facts, lower value of the initial investment, I, that can be
retained in the event of liquidation and lower liquidation threshold imply that the maximum level of
default risk-free debt is lower for R&D as compared to scale expansion program.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we study the implication of risk associated with R&D investment for agency conict
between bond holders and equity holders of the rm. The riskiness for R&D investment is primarily
derived from the intangibility of assets employed in conducting R&D, which is lost in the event of
liquidation, and the technical uncertainty associated with successful completion of the project. We
have found that when intangibility of assets involved is high and the intensity with which R&D can
be completed is low the equity holders of the rm in maximizing their claim overinvest, thus shifting
the burden of risk on to the bondholders. To our knowledge, we have not seen any paper that explore
the agency problem between dierent class of claimants over R&D investment policy of the rm.
However, the result presented only indicates the existence of the potential agency problem that can
arise between the bond holders and the owners of the rm. We are currently working on quantifying
the amount of agency cost due to the risk involved in R&D project and its implication for loan
commitment.
We also recognize that a richer model for R&D, incorporating learning, an option to abandon the
R&D project prior to liquidation, and accumulation of intellectual capital stock over time could have
some bearing on the results we report. For our future work we intend to incorporate such features
into our model.
The chapter also compares scale expansion program to that of R&D investment. We nd that
under quite reasonable circumstance R&D investment to nd a more ecient technology is more
desirable than scale expansion and yet might be dicult to nance with debt. Our model for scale
expansion, however, does not incorporate time to build. It would be interesting to compare R&D
and scale expansion with additional features of scale expansion and R&D included. There is also a
larger question of agency issue over investment decision where the rm irreversibly opts either for
the scale expansion program or R&D investment. We leave these for future research.
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5.7 Appendix
5.A Derivation of the Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi Equation: The Switch-
ing Problem
After having started the R&D project when the rm has still not liquidated itself, that is when
L(s) = 0, Ito^'s Lemma imply that
e r(T t)E(xT ) = E(xt) +
Z T
t
e r(s t)

DE(xs)  rE(xs)

dsZ T
t
e r(s t)

Ex(xs)dws

+
Z T
t
e r(s t)

Eb(xs) +maxf0; Ep(xs) Kg   E(xs)

dqs; (A-1)
where E(xs), as stated earlier, is the value of the rm's equity, E
b(xs) and E
p(xs)  K have been
dened in the main text above. qt denotes a jump process that jumps on success and its intensity is
given by I(s) and
DE(x) = 1
2
x22Exx(x) + xEx(x):
Taking expectations (under the risk neutral measure) on both sides of the equation (A-1) and af-
ter some rearrangement with the observation that the project always ends up in the money, i.e.,
maxf0; Ep(xs) Kg = Ep(xs) K, and
EQt
Z T
t
e r(s t)Ex(xs)dws

= 0
we obtain
E(xt) = EQt

e r(T t)E(xT ) 
Z T
t
e r(s t)

D(xs; n)  rE(xs) + I(s)

Ea(xs) K   E(xs)

ds

;
(A-2)
where Ea(xs) = E
b(xs) + E
p(xs) . Comparing equation (A-1) and equation (2-2) we obtain the
H-B-J equation
 xs   I(s)(a+ bxs)  rD =  

DE(xs)  rE(xs) + I(s)

Ea(xs) K   E(xs)

: (A-3)
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For L(s) = 1, Ito^'s lemma implies that
e r(T t)E(xT ) = E(xt) +
Z T
t
e r(s t)

DE(xs)  rE(xs)

ds
Z T
t
e r(s t)

Ex(xs)dws

: (A-4)
Since after liquidation the rm has lost the option to invest or continue with the R&D project the
term that accounts for the jump in value of the rm's equity upon success is absent. Again taking
expectations with respect to the risk neutral measure we obtain
E(xt) = EQt

e r(T t)E(xT ) 
Z T
t
e r(s t)

D(xs; n)  rE(xs)

ds

: (A-5)
Comparing equation (A-5) and equation (2-2) for L(s) = 1 and for safe debt, i.e. when maxf0; (r0+
1xs   rD)g = (r0 + 1xs   rD), we obtain the H-B-J equation
r0 + 1xs   rD =  

DE(xs)  rE(xs)

: (A-6)

6Financial Constraints, Capital Structure and Innovation:
An Empirical Investigation
6.1 Introduction
Empirically, the study of the eect of nancing frictions on investment has broadly followed two
approaches. One approach is to ad hoc classify rms into those that are nancially constrained and
those that are not, see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and
specify a reduced form accelerator type model for the constrained and unconstrained rms. The
extent of nancing frictions, controlling for the investment opportunity, is judged by the sensitivity
of investment to cash ows, where cash ows realized is taken as measure of internal wealth. An-
other approach, which is more structural, is to construct an index of nancial constraints based on
a standard intertemporal investment model augmented to account for nancial frictions, where ex-
ternal nancing constraints aect the intertemporal substitution of investment today for investment
tomorrow, via the shadow value of scarce external funds, Whited and Wu (2005) . The approach
relies on specifying a smooth functional form for adjustment costs of adjusting capital, and specifying
the shadow value of external funds as a function of nancial state variables. The small number of
empirical studies on nancing frictions and R&D investment, documented in an excellent review by
Hall and Lerner (2010), broadly speaking, follow the two above mentioned approaches.
In this chapter we assess the impact of nancial constraints on R&D expenditure, and what
rm characteristics are associated with a rm being nancially constrained, where rms themselves
report if they are nancially constrained or not with respect to R&D activity. Using rm's assessment
of being nancially constrained avoids the need to construct an index of nancial constraint. This
implies that we do not know whether these rms are constrained due to high cost of external nance or
feel constrained because their access to funds is less than what is needed to nance their investment,
which a priori classication usually imply: see Moyen (2004) and Hennessy and Whited (2007).
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However, this also implies that using rm's assessment of being nancially constrained allows us
to test how important are the classication criteria that distinguish rms as constrained and not
constrained.
Secondly, since the test of nancing frictions relies on assessing the impact of nancial constraints
on R&D expenditure, ours is a departure from the reduced form accelerator type models, where the
extent of nancing frictions is measured by the sensitivity of investment to cash ows for constrained
and unconstrained rms, and about which questions have been raised as to whether such a procedure
can indeed identify the extent of nancing frictions: see for example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997),
Gomes (2001), and Hennessy and Whited (2007). In other words, in contrast to reduced form models,
ours is a more structural approach, where conditional on rm characteristics, R&D investment is
determined by nancing frictions and the future expected protability from R&D investment. The
nancing frictions as summarized by the reported nancial constraints faced by the rms could be
either due to high cost of external sources of funds or due to the fact that the access to funds is less
than what is needed to nance their investment. We nd that the impact of nancial constraints can
be substantial, reducing the R&D intensity, measured by R&D expenditure to capital asset ratio, of
an average rm by more than half. Thirdly, using the information on nancial constraint as reported
by rms, not only allows us to assess the eect of nancing frictions on R&D investment, but also,
using the framework of switching regression model, allows us to investigate how rms with dierent
characteristics such as maturity and degree of monopoly, behave with respect to innovation and R&D
investment under nancial constraints and under no nancial constraints.
Moreover, papers that a priori classify rms as constrained and unconstrained, take the nancial
constraints faced by rms as exogenous to investment decisions. However, we know that nancial
constraints and investment expenditures are determined simultaneously, see Section 6.3 for a detailed
discussion. Using information on nancial constraints, which are a function of nancial state variables
and rm characteristics, as reported by rms, allows us to endogenize nancial constraints while
explaining R&D investment. We do this by specifying a nancial constraint equation, whose error
term is correlated with the error term of the R&D equation, and by allowing a common time invariant
individual eect to aect both the nancial constraints faced by the rm and its decision on how
much to invest in R&D.
R&D expenditure in our data, however, is observed only for rms that are classied as innovators.
Hence, we have to confront the problem of endogenous sample selection. To control for the bias
that arises when estimating the R&D equation, due to endogenous sample selection, we specify a
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selection/innovation equation, the idiosyncratic component of which is correlated with those of the
nancial constraint and the R&D investment equation. Estimating the innovation equation allows
us to test, which type of rms, given their characteristics, are more likely to take up R&D activity.
Also, since the decision to innovate and the constraints faced are determined simultaneously, joint
estimation of the decision to innovate and the nancial constraint faced allows us investigate the
implication of nancing frictions for a rm's decision to innovate.
Debt, as we know, is an important source of external nancing, but given the existence of nancing
friction, is costly. Given the nature of R&D, discussed in Section 6.2, debt might even be costlier when
it comes to nancing R&D. Hence, choosing to be an innovator can have an important implication
for its choice of capital structure. Consequently leverage, dened as the ratio of long-term debt to
capital asset, will have a bearing on both the nancial constraint faced by the rm as well as the
decision to innovate. However, since there is simultaneity in the nancing policy and investment
decision of the rm, from a modeling perspective, endogeneity of debt has to be taken into account.
Our empirical strategy which is a three step procedure takes into account the endogeneity of the
long-term debt while estimating the structural equations relating to the decision to innovate, the
nancial constraint with respect to R&D that the rm faces, and its R&D expenditure, all of which,
again, are endogenously determined.
Costly external nance has important consequences for the dynamics of the rm subject to
technological and idiosyncratic shocks, that aect rms with dierent characteristics dierently: see
Cooley and Quadrini (2001). Hence we expect to see nancing and investment/innovation policies
to vary along the distribution of rms, for example, based on size, age, leverage and degree of
nancial constraints. Apart from assessing the impact of constraints on R&D expenditure this
chapter attempts to explore the implication of nancing frictions on the choice of capital structure
and the decision to innovate and how such choices or the propensity to innovate with respect to
leverage vary over the distribution of rms characteristics such as maturity, size and leverage. Our
results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a rm is less inclined to innovate if it is highly leveraged. The
marginal propensity to innovate with respect to leverage diers when a rm is nancially constrained
and when it is not. We nd that when a rm is not nancially constrained with respect to R&D
and if it is highly leveraged, then it is more likely that it is not an innovator as compared to a
rm that is nancially constrained. Moreover, if the rm is not nancially constrained the marginal
propensity to innovate is almost constant, while the propensity to innovate with respect to leverage,
when nancial constraints bind, varies over the distribution of rm characteristics such as age, size
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and leverage. While there have been many papers that have studied nancing and innovation policy
of rms, see Section 6.2, none to our knowledge, has investigated the behavior of such rms when
rms are nancially constrained and when they are not, and how their nancing and innovation
policies vary with the distribution of rm characteristics1.
To summarize, in this chapter we model a rm's behavior, where its choice of capital structure, the
decision to innovate, the nancial constraint faced, and the amount spent on R&D related activities
are determined simultaneously. By doing so, we are able to assess the implication of nancing decision
on, controlling for other factors, the rm's decision to innovate, the nancial constraints faced by
the rm, and subsequently the eect of nancial constraints on R&D investment. We do this by
specifying a system of four equations: (a) an R&D intensity equation (a switching regression model),
(b) a nancial constraint equation, (c) a selection/innovation equation, and (d) a leverage or long-
term debt to asset ratio equation. While (a), (b), and (c) are structural equations, we write (d)
in reduced form. The simultaneity in all the four above is captured through the correlation of the
idiosyncratic terms in each of the four equations and a common time invariant individual eect that
appears in all the equations.
To estimate the above system of four equations, we employ the method of control function, see
Blundell and Powell (2003), in which the estimated residuals from the rst stage reduced form are
used to control for the endogeneity of the debt to asset ratio in the structural equations. However, due
to the presence of unobserved time invariant individual eects, of which the residuals are a function
of, the residuals are not identied. To this eect, we substitute the expected a posteriori values of the
individual eects based on the rst stage estimates. The chapter provides the theoretical foundations
for such a procedure. Before we end our introductory section, we introduce the remaining sections
that follow. Section 6.2 discusses the nature of R&D activity from an economic point of view and
its implication for the choice of capital structure. The section also discusses how these innovation
and nancing policies can vary over the distribution of rm characteristics. In Section 6.3 we briey
review some of the theories of costly external sources of nance, and given the nature of R&D activity,
discuss the implications for nancial constraint a rm engaging in R&D might face. The rest of the
chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.4 discusses the data and the construction of the variables,
Section 6.5 discusses the empirical strategy employed, Section 6.6 discusses the results and nally
1A likely exception is a recent paper by Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009). These authors separate their sample
based on age, where they argue that young rms are more likely to face nancial distress than large rms. For the
subsamples of mature and young rms, they t an Euler equation augmented with nancial state variables. They nd
that the nancial variables indeed matter for young rms, thereby supporting their claim that nancial constraints are
binding for young rms.
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Section 6.7 concludes. The details of the econometric methodology are provided in Appendix A, B,
and C.
6.2 Innovation, Capital Structure, and Firm Dynamics
From the perspective of investment theory, R&D has a number of characteristics that make it dierent
from ordinary investment. Holmstrom (1989) indicates that innovation, and by extension R&D, has
ve unique characteristics, it is long-term in nature, high risk in terms of the probability of failure,
unpredictable in outcome, labor intensive and idiosyncratic. Hall and Lerner (2010) point out that
in practice fty per cent or more of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of highly educated
scientists and engineers, and that their eorts create an intangible asset, the rm's knowledge base,
from which prots in future years will be generated. To the extent that this knowledge is tacit rather
than codied, it is embedded in the human capital of the rm's employees, and is therefore lost if
they leave or are red. These characteristics, as we discuss, are potential sources of agency issues
that can arise between creditors and borrowers.
The high risk involved and unpredictability of outcomes are potential sources of asymmetric
information that give rise to agency issues in which the inventor frequently has better information
about the likelihood of success and the nature of the contemplated innovation project than the
potential investors. Therefore, the marketplace for nancing the development of innovative ideas
looks like the \lemons" market modelled by Akerlof (1970), and accordingly a higher premium might
be charged on the external funds oered. In case of R&D, given its nature, the adverse selection
problem can even be more severe, and accordingly, the \lemons" premium for R&D can be higher
than that for ordinary investment. This is because investors have more diculty distinguishing
good or low risk projects from bad ones when they are long-term in nature than when they are
more short-term (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Due to the ease of imitation of inventive ideas, reducing
information asymmetry via fuller disclosure is of limited eectiveness. Firms are reluctant to reveal
their innovative ideas to the marketplace and the fact that there could be a substantial cost to
revealing information to their competitors reduces the quality of the signal they can make about a
potential project: Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) and Anton and Yao (1998). Thus the implication
of asymmetric information coupled with the costliness of mitigating the problem is that rms and
inventors will face a higher cost of external than internal capital for R&D due to the \lemons"
premium.
Hall (1993,1994), Opler and Titman (1993, 1994), Blass and Yosha (2001), and Alderson and
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Betker (1996) are some of the papers that provide empirical evidence that R&D intensive rms are
less leveraged than those that are not. More recently, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009), nd
similar evidence for a panel of R&D performing US rms. Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) draw
out a nancing hierarchy for R&D intensive rms, where equity might be preferred to debt as a means
of nancing R&D, especially for young rms. Although leverage may be a useful tool for reducing
agency costs within a rm, it is of limited value for R&D-intensive rms. Because the knowledge
asset created by R&D investment is intangible, partly embedded in human capital, and ordinarily
very specialized to the particular rm in which it resides, the capital structure of R&D-intensive rms
customarily exhibits considerably less leverage than that of other rms. Williamson (1988), points out
that \redeployable" assets (that is, assets whose value in an alternative use is almost as high as in their
current use) are more suited to the governance structures associated with debt. Titman and Wessels
(1988) report that having \unique" assets is associated with lower debt levels. The logic is, rst, that
consumers will only buy unique products if they are condent that the rm will survive to provide
after-sales service. Second, the lack of a secondary market for R&D and the non-collaterability of
R&D activity mitigates against debt-nanced R&D activity. Also, as Aboody and Lev (2000) argue,
the extent of information asymmetry associated with R&D, however, is larger than that associated
with tangible (e.g., property, plant, and equipment) and nancial investments because of the relative
uniqueness (idiosyncrasy) of R&D. Thus, for example, a failure of a drug under development to pass
Phase I clinical tests is a unique event not shared by other pharmaceutical companies. In contrast,
a downturn in demand for commercial property for example, will exert a strong common eect on
the property values of all real estate companies operating in a given geographical region. Similarly,
interest-rate changes will aect systematically the values of bond and stock portfolios of companies.
Thus, the relative uniqueness of R&D investments makes it dicult for outsiders to learn about the
productivity and value of a given rm's R&D from the performance and products of other rms in
the industry, thereby contributing to information asymmetry. Shi (2003) nds evidence that R&D
activity, which increases the market value of equity, also increases bond default risk and debt risk
premia. Bond holders, ceteris paribus, may be unwilling to hold the risks associated with greater
R&D activity.
Given the nature of R&D activity, the capital structure of a rm (debt to asset ratio) amongst
other things also contains information on the type of activity a rm is engaged in. After controlling for
various factors, such as size, age, degree of monopoly, protability of the rm and other determinants
of capital structure related to corporate governance or reasons related to tax consideration, we would
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expect that more levered rms, for reasons stated above, are less likely to engage in R&D related
activity.
The above discussion relating asymmetric information pertinent to the nature of R&D activity
and leverage holds for any given rm. Since, empirically there exists certain regularities in the
nancial characteristics of rms that are related to their size and age, Cooley and Quadrini (2001)
point out that it is important to link patterns of rm growth with their nancial decisions. They
introduce nancial frictions in a standard model of industry dynamics that generates results which
match the empirical ndings. Some of the results related to growth and nancing are that small
and young rms (a) experience higher growth and volatility of growth, (b) invest relatively more
and exhibit higher risk taking behavior, (c) take on more debt and pay less dividends. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) explain, that in order to understand these phenomena, one has to consider the
trade-o that rms face in deciding the optimal amount of debt. On the one hand, more debt allows
them to expand the production scale and increase their expected prots; on the other, the expansion
of the production scale implies a higher volatility of prots and a higher probability of failure. Given
that a large fraction of prots is reinvested, and the rm's future value, by their assumption, is a
concave function of equity, the rm's objective is a concave function of prots. This implies that
the volatility of prots has a negative impact on the rm's value. Therefore, in deciding whether to
expand the scale of production by borrowing more, the rm compares the marginal increase in the
expected prots with the marginal increase in its volatility (and therefore, in the volatility of next
period equity). Due to diminishing returns, as the rm increases its equity and implements larger
production plans, the marginal expected prots from further increasing the production scale decrease.
The rm becomes more concerned about the volatility of prots and borrows less in proportion to its
equity. Consequently, as the rm grows, the composition of the sources of nance changes in favor
of internal sources. As a consequence of higher borrowing, small rms face a higher probability of
default. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) model heterogeneity as dierence in productivity level. For
rms with higher productivity level, the marginal expected prot is higher for each production scale.
Consequently, the rm is willing to face higher risk by borrowing more, and expands the scale of
production. However, the essential trade o between prots and volatility is still faced.
Our ndings that, (i) mature rms are less likely to be innovators, (ii) younger rms are more
nancially constrained, (iii) marginal propensity to innovate with respect to leverage declines with
age, (iv) under binding nancial constraints the propensity to innovate with respect to leverage varies
with the distribution of rm characteristics such as age, size, and leverage, and (v) that large and
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mature rms are less R&D intensive, suggest that decisions to innovate, nancing choices, and rm
dynamics are not independent. Though we do not study nancing choices along the distribution
of rm characteristics, some of our ndings, for example, small and young rms being more R&D
intensive, match the empirical regularities of the Cooley and Quadrini (2001) study. However, R&D
investment is dierent from scale expansion, in the sense that R&D activity is both risky and the
productivity increasing. Therefore it might be interesting to incorporate R&D investment in Cooley
and Quadarini's (2001) model. For example, suppose a large rm is as R&D intensive as a small rm,
and there are decreasing returns to R&D capital, which is quite plausible, then the large rm will be
at a proportionately higher risk than the small rm, since not only is it more subject to exogenous
shocks, given an undiversied scale of its operation, which increases the volatility of prots, but also,
since it has tied up more capital in risky R&D ventures, it becomes more default prone. Thus, being
an innovator could also aect the amount of debt it can procure for its scale expansion activity.
On the other hand, for small and young rms, entry, survival and subsequent growth depends
on how innovative they are. Recent research on industry evolution has shown that entry and exit
in any given industry are typically high, that new rms start on a very small scale but also that
they are not able to remain small forever, and that survival depends on heterogeneous mechanisms
which include crucial innovation and growth: see, Audretsch (1995) and Huergo and Jaumandreu
(2004). Literature on industrial organization treat entry of rms as the way in which rms explore
the value of new ideas in an uncertain context. Entry, the likelihood of survival, and subsequent
growth are determined by barriers to survival. In this framework, entry is innovative and increases
with uncertainty, the likelihood of survival is lower the higher the risk is, and the growth subsequent
to successful innovation is higher the higher barriers to survival are.
6.3 R&D Investment and Financial Constraints
Firms are nancially constrained when they face a shortage of internal funds needed for their invest-
ment and are forced to resort to external sources of nancing, which simply may not be available or
may be costly in the sense that rms are required to pay a high premium on external nance due
to capital market imperfections. These capital market imperfections can be a due to a variety of
agency and information asymmetry problems, some of which, related to R&D investment, have been
discussed above.
Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), have pointed
out that raising equity externally may be costly due to the kind of adverse selection problem identied
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by Akerlof (1970). Inability to raise new equity would not be a problem if rms could frictionlessly
raise unlimited amounts of debt to nance their investment. However, a variety of theories suggest
that this is unlikely to be the case. Now, since at any given interest rate managers will be more likely
to borrow if their private information suggests that they are relatively prone to default, hence the
market for debt could also be subject to the adverse selection problem that aicts equity market. It
is also possible that there can be moral hazard problems, whereby those managers who borrow have
an increased incentive to take risks that lead to default. These considerations, as has been shown by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) can lead to credit rationing, whereby rms are unable to obtain all
the debt nancing they would like at the prevailing market interest rate.
Debt overhang as Myers (1977) points out can limit debt nance. Large debt can be a burden on a
rm's balance sheet, which can discourage further new investment, particularly if this new investment
is nanced by issuing claims that are junior to the existing debt. This is because if the existing debt
is trading at less than face value, it acts as a tax on the proceeds of the new investment: part of any
increase in value generated by the new investment goes to the existing lenders, they being the rst
claimants, and therefore is unavailable to repay those claimants who put up the new money. Debt
overhang models can have two dierent implications: ex post (once the debt burden is in place) they
suggest that highly leveraged rms will be particularly prone to underinvestment. Ex ante, they oer
a reason why even more modestly-levered rms, particularly those with attractive future investment
opportunities, may be reluctant to raise much debt in the rst place, even if this means foregoing
some current investment projects. Jensen and Meckling (1976) oer another reason why rms might
be unwilling to take on too much debt ex ante: the so-called asset substitution eect, whereby an
excessive debt burden can create incentives for managers, acting on behalf of shareholders, to take
on risky negative-NPV projects at the expense of lenders.
The above-discussed models of debt and equity nance take the existence of these types of nancial
claims as given, and then go on to derive implications for investment, capital structure, etc. Another
branch of the literature seeks to endogenize the nancial contract, typically by positing some specic
agency problem (e.g., managers penchant for diverting the rms cashow to themselves) and asking
what sort of claim represents an optimal response to this agency problem. These agency issues as
discussed earlier are likely to be even more acute for R&D nancing. In much of this work, the
optimal contract that emerges resembles a standard debt contract, and there is no outside equity
nancing. Early examples include Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), who assume that
outside investors can only verify a rm's cash ows by paying some xed auditing cost. As long as
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the manager turns over the stipulated debt payments, there is no audit, and the manager gets to
keep the rest of the rm's cashow. However, if the manager/entrepreneur defaults on its obligation,
the lender audits, and keeps everything he nds; this can be interpreted as costly bankruptcy. The
implications for investment is that, the less wealth the manager/entrepreneur is able to put up, the
more he must borrow, and hence the greater is the likelihood of the auditing/bankruptcy cost being
incurred. The default cost increases the cost of borrowing. This is because, for a given value of equity,
the probability of default increases when the rm borrows more, because then it is more vulnerable
to idiosyncratic shocks. This increases the expected default cost and the nancial intermediary will,
accordingly, demand a higher interest rate.
However, in the above mentioned papers, the borrowing constraints faced by the rms when
deriving the optimal contract is specied exogenously. More recent papers seek to endogenize the
borrowing constraints faced by the rms. Examples include Hart and Moore (1994), Almeida and
Campello (2002), and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). In Hart and Moore (1994) the threat
of repudiation by the entrepreneur sets an upper bound on the value of debt and debt payments
are subject to a cash-ow constraint. In Almeida and Campello (2002), borrowing constraints are
endogenized by conditioning on the rm's ability to raise external nance on its investment spending,
while in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), the borrowing constraints are endogenously derived
from limited enforceability problems.
The notion of nancial constraint that we employ is one of borrowing constraints, that is, rms are
nancially constrained when they reach their debt capacity. Depending on the amount of internally
available funds, the degree of market imperfection it faces, and the amount of existing debt it services,
a rm may or may not have reached its debt capacity. Given the nature of R&D, such as the
intangibility and uniqueness of assets and the unpredictability of outcomes, the degree of market
imperfections for R&D activity is expected to be even higher. This would imply that external
sources of nance could be even more costly when it comes to R&D related activity. Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn's (2004) analysis indicates that riskier projects could face tighter constraints. Secondly,
due to intangibility and uniqueness of assets, there is a lack of a secondary market for R&D activity
and therefore R&D activity and its assets are generally not pledgeable, this naturally reduces the
borrowing capacity of an R&D intensive rm. Also, given the uncertainty involved with respect to
successfully inventing a new product or idea, the market may not respond favorably at the initial
stages of the development of the product. Thus, lower valuation of the rm at initial stages of the
development of the project, may also lower the borrowing capacity of the rm.
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In general, as some of the above mentioned theories on investment and costly external nance
imply, we would expect that, given everything else, a more leveraged rm and a rm with a lower
level of internally available funds to be more nancially constrained. Opler and Titman (1994) too
nd that rms with specialized products are especially vulnerable to nancial distress, and that
highly leveraged rms that engage in R&D suer most in economically distressed periods. Here we
test, given everything else, whether the presence of higher leverage causes a rm to be nancially
constrained, whether internal sources of nancing relax the borrowing constraint, and how higher
cost of external nance, as summarized by the reported nancial constraints, aects R&D related
expenditures.
6.4 Data and Construction of Variables
As stated earlier, to assess the impact of nancial constraints on R&D expenditure and to assess
the impact of the evolution of nancial state variables on a rm being nancially constrained with
respect to R&D activities, we have to merge two data sets for those years for which information on
R&D is available. The data on information related to R&D is obtained from the Dutch Community
Innovation Surveys which are conducted every two years. The Innovation Survey data are collected
at the enterprise level. A combination of a census and a stratied random sampling is used to collect
the data. First, the frame population for the innovation surveys are determined. For enterprises
employing 50 persons or more, a census is used. For enterprises employing 10 to 50 persons, a sample
is drawn from the general business register. A census of large (250 or more employees) enterprises,
and stratied random sample for small and medium sized enterprises from the frame population is
used to construct the data set for every survey. The stratum variables are the economic activity
and the size of an enterprise, where the economic activity is given by the Dutch standard industrial
classication. For our empirical analysis we use three waves of innovation survey data: CIS2.5, CIS3,
and CIS3.5 pertaining respectively to the years 1996-98, 1998-2000, and 2000-02.
Information related to nancial status of the rms is available at the rm level, which could
be constituted of many enterprises consolidated within the rm. The nancial data is from the
balance sheet of the SFGO (Financial Statistics for Large) and SFKO (Financial Statistics for Small
{ reported assets less than 23 million Euros { Companies) rms. The data for the SFGO rms are
collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics through a questionnaire, consequently the SFGO data
is more detailed than the SFKO data, which are compiled from the information sent to the Tax
Collectors Oce.
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However, the SFGO and SFKO data, which are at the company/rm level do not have any
information on R&D activity. As mentioned earlier information related to R&D are obtained from
the Innovation Surveys. For any given year, our problem here is to infer the size of the relevant R&D
variables for a rm when not all enterprises belonging to the rm have been surveyed. To achieve
this end, we use the information on the sampling design for the stratied random sampling done by
the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) of The Netherlands. Below we outline the procedure.
For any given year, let NT be the total population of the enterprises in the Netherlands and let
N be the population of R&D performing enterprises. CBS determines N based on, (a) size class and
(b) activity class. Outside N , or the Frame Population, as is referred to by the CBS, any enterprise
is hardly likely to indulge in any R&D activity. From this frame population a stratied random
sampling is done. These strata are again based on size and the activity class. Let S be the total
number of strata, and each stratum is indexed by s = 1; 2;    ; S. Then, PSs=1Ns = N , where Ns is
the population size of R&D performing enterprise belonging to stratum s. Let ns be the sample size
of each stratum and let s = f1; 2;    ; i;    ; isg be the set of enterprises for the sth stratum, that
is jsj = ns.
Let x be the variable of interest and xi the value of x for the i
th observation in the sth stratum.
The mean value of x for an enterprise belonging to the sth stratum is xs = (
P
i2s xi)=ns. Now
consider a rm f . Let Nfs be the number of enterprises belonging to the rm f and stratum s and
nfs be the number of enterprises belonging to the rm f and stratum s that have been surveyed.
Then the estimated value of x for the rm f , x^f is given by
x^f =
SX
s=1
(Nfs   nfs)xs +
SX
s=1
nfsX
k=1
xfsk; (1)
where xfsk is the value of x for the k
th enterprise belonging to the sth stratum and rm f that has
been surveyed and Nfs nfs are the number of enterprise of the f th rm in stratum s that have not
been surveyed. It can be shown under appropriate conditions that x^f is an unbiased estimator of the
expected value of x for rm f2. Table 6.1 below gives, based on size class and 2 digit Dutch Standard
Industry Classication (SBI), the number of strata, between which the enterprises surveyed in the
2Proof:
The proof is based on the assumption that the distribution of x in terms of its expected value is the same for each
enterprise in a particular stratum. Let xf the population mean of x for the rm f and let xs the population mean
of x for an enterprise belonging to stratum s. Given our assumption, we know that xs is an unbiased estimator of xs,
that xf =
PS
s=1Nfsxs, and that the expected value of
PS
s=1
Pnfs
k=1 xfsk, the second term on the RHS of equation (1),
is
PS
s=1 nfsxs. Taking expectations in (1) and substituting the expected value of E(
PS
s=1
Pnfs
k=1 xfsk) =
PS
s=1 nfsxs
and noting that E(
PS
s=1 nfsxs) =
PS
s=1 nfsxs, we get E(x^f ) = xf =
PS
s=1Nfsxs.
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CIS surveys were divided.
Table 6.1: Number of Enterprises and Number of Strata
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
Total no. of enterprises 13465 10750 10533
Total no. of strata 240 249 280
These gures are from the original/raw data set.
The sample of rms used in the estimation are only those for which at least one R&D performing
enterprise is present in the innovation surveys. Also, those R&D performing enterprises for whom no
rm information was available { rms not present in the SFGO and SFKO data { had to be dropped.
Table 6. 8 in Appendix E tabulates, for the sample of rms used in estimation, Nf =
PS
s=1Nfs
for each of the three waves, Nf being the total number of potentially R&D performing enterprises
belonging to the rm f . The table also shows for each Nf , the number of rms for which, Nf = nf ,
where nf is the total number enterprise belonging to the rm f that were surveyed. It also shows
the number of rms for which, (Nf   nf ) > 0. This tells us the number of rms for which the
above procedure was used to get an estimate of the relevant variables for the rm. Here, we would
like to point out that the information on Nf was obtained form the Frame Population constructed
by the CBS and of course the information on nf from the CIS surveys. As can be seen from the
table, for the sample of rms used for estimation, for 18.06 percent of the total number of rms in
CIS2.5, equation (1) was used to get the estimates of the relevant variables for the rms, while these
percentages for CIS3 and CIS3.5 were 24.62 and 23.75 respectively. The table also shows that the
majority of the rms happen to be single R&D performing enterprises. At least for these rms the
above procedure, summarized by equation (1), is not applicable. For our sample, the percentage
of R&D rms with single R&D performing enterprise are 78.97, 74.01, and 73.87 respectively for
CIS2.5, CIS3, and CIS3.5.
The two R&D variables of interest for which the above procedure was used to get an estimate
at the rm level are the R&D expenditure and the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the
enterprise. Here we would like to mention that we do not have any information on R&D expenditure
of those rms that have been categorized as non-innovator, while the share of innovative sales by
denition does not exist for non-innovating rms. In order to estimate xs for R&D expenditure, for
each stratum s, we have assumed that the R&D expenditure is zero for those enterprises that have
been classied as non innovators in the survey 3.
3This assumption could possibly lead to a bias in the estimates of R&D expenditure for those rms, for which not
all enterprises have been surveyed.
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While R&D expenditure and the share of innovative sales are continuous variables, we also had
to infer about two binary variables for the rm, given the information about these for the enterprises
constituting the rm. The two categorical variables happen to be (1) a dummy variable on the
enterprise being nancially constrained with respect to R&D activities and (2) a dummy variable on
the decision for an enterprise to be an innovator. Characterizing a rm to be nancially constrained
was straight forward { a rm is nancially constrained if any one of the enterprise is nancially
constrained with respect to the R&D activities.
Before we discuss the criterion that characterizes a rm as being an innovator or a non-innovator
using information on the constituent enterprises being a innovator or a non-innovator, we briey
mention the survey criteria that classify an enterprise as an innovating or non-innovating enterprise.
An enterprise is innovating if it satises one of the following criteria: (a) If the enterprise has
introduced a new product to the market, (b) If the enterprise has introduced a new process to the
market, (c) If the enterprise has some unnished R&D project and (d) If the enterprise, began on a
R&D project, and abandoned it during the time period that the survey covers. To characterize a rm
as an innovator or a non-innovator the following criterion was used. If all the enterprises of a rm
have been surveyed and if all the enterprises report themselves to be a non-innovator then the rm
is classied as being a non-innovator. If the number of enterprises present in a rm are more than
the number of enterprises that have been surveyed, that is, if Nf > nf , and if one the enterprises
surveyed, reports that it has engaged in R&D activities, then we classify this rm to be an innovator.
However, if Nf > nf , and if none of the enterprises sampled reported to be an innovator, then if any
one of the remaining enterprises that have not been surveyed is to be found in a stratum that, based
on the CIS survey, has been classied as an innovating stratum, then the rm has been classied as
an innovator.
The total number of employees as a measure of the size of the rm was also constructed using
information from the CIS data and the General Business Register. As far as the number of employees
in a rm is concerned, if all the enterprises belonging to a rm are surveyed, that is if Nf = nf ,
then we simply add up the number employees of each of the constituent enterprises. However, when
Nf > nf , for those enterprise/s that has/have not been surveyed we take the mid point of the size
class of those enterprises that have not been surveyed. The size class to which an enterprise belongs
to is available from the General Business Register for every year.
Table 6.2 below shows the number of innovators and number of non-innovators for each of the
6.4. Data and Construction of Variables 155
three waves, and the number rms that are nancially constrained with respect to R&D activities4.
We would also like to point out that most of the information contained in the Innovation Surveys,
Table 6.2: Total number Innovating Firms, Non-Innovating Firms, and Financially Con-
strained Firms
CIS2.5 CIS3 CIS3.5
No. of Non-Innovators 2,405 1,495 2,221
No. of Innovators 2,987 1,933 2,011
No. of Financially Constrained rms 536 416 188
These gures are for the Data Set used in Estimation
cover three time periods. For example, if any enterprise present in CIS3.5, classies itself to being an
innovator, then this implies that over the course of the three years 2000-02, the enterprise carried out
any of the R&D related activities that are necessary for it to be classied as an innovator. The same
is true of nancial constraint, that is, an enterprise if it reports that it is nancially constrained, then
it is true that in either of the three years, covered by the survey, the enterprise found itself being
nancially constrained in the proper implementation of any of its R&D projects. This implies that
there is an overlapping year between every CIS survey. Hence, if the reporting has to be consistent,
then an enterprise reporting itself to be nancially constrained, say in CIS3, covering years 1998-2000,
should also report itself as being nancially constrained in CIS3.5, covering the years 2000-2002, the
year 2000 being the overlapping year. However, we do not nd this to be the case. Therefore we
proceed as if that the CIS surveys cover two time periods, that is, say for CIS3.5, the time period
covered are from the end of 2000 till the end of 2002, covering the years 2001 and 2002. Thus, if a
rm reports itself as being innovative or being nancially constrained, then we assume that it has
been innovating or has been nancially constrained for two time periods. The share of innovative
sales in the total sales of the enterprise also covers two time periods. However, the gures on R&D
expenditure are only for the last year of the two years covered by any of the innovation surveys.
Thus, given the nature of the data, we make the assumption that the last year of the two years
covered by any of the innovation surveys, is period t and the year preceding it is period t   1 and
that without knowing in which of the two periods it was an innovator and which of the two periods it
was nancially constrained, we make the assumption that the enterprise had been innovating in both
periods and that it was nancially constrained in both periods. Also, that the share of innovative
sales in the total sales of the enterprise had been the same for the two time periods. The gure
below elucidates the above discussion and the time line along which the stock and ow variables are
4For CIS2.5 information on nancial constraint is available only for the innovators.
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realized5. The vertical lines, at t   1, t, and t + 1, indicate the beginning of the respective time
periods. Having drawn the time line and given the fact that R&D expenditure is reported only for
the last year of the two periods that any CIS covers, then according to the time line dened, this
implies that if the last two periods in our data is indexed T and T   1, the R&D expenditure is
observed for time periods, T , but not period T   1, for time period T   2 but not for T   3 and so
on.
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R&D expenditure, the constructed dummy variable on a rm being nancially constrained, and
the constructed dummy variable indicating whether the rm is an innovator or not, are three among
the four endogenous variables. Our fourth endogenous variable is long-term debt, about which we
learn from the SFGO and SFKO data set, which as mentioned earlier is available at the rm level.
We discuss the set of our assumed exogenous variables in the text following this.
6.5 Empirical Strategy
6.5.1 R&D Investment, Endogenous Financial Constraint and Endogenous Se-
lection with Endogenous Long-Term Debt: A Three step Procedure
To study the choice of capital structure of R&D intensive rms, the eect of nancial constraints
on R&D expenditure and to account for the features of the data, where R&D expenditure is known
only for rms that opt to innovate and we consider a four equation system
rit = z
r0
it + SINSits + i
+ fitf + (fit  CFit)c1 + ((1  fit) CFit)c0
+ (fit DIVit)D1 + ((1  fit)DIVit)D0 + it; (2)
5While the number of employees of a rm is a stock variable, the enterprises reported the gures on it for the
accounting period, hence the gures on employment are the year end values on the number of employees.
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fit = z
f 0
it'+ dit'd + i + it; (3)
sit = z
s0
it + ditd + i + it; (4)
dit = z
0
it + i + it; (5)
where rit in equation (2) is the ratio of total R&D expenditure to total capital, (tangible + intangible),
assets of the rm and zrit, is vector of strictly exogenous variables. We term equation (2) as the R&D
equation. fit, a binary variable that indicates, with value 1, if the rm is nancially constrained with
respect to innovation or R&D activities in period t and t   1. CFit is the cash ows of the rm in
period t and DIVit is a dummy variable for positive dividends. We interact, CFit and DIVit with the
dummy variables fit and 1  fit. SINSit is the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm
i, for the period t  1 and period t. A detailed discussion of the specication for the R&D equation
is carried out later when we discuss the third stage estimation.
fit is the latent variable underlying fit, that is fit takes value 1 if f

it crosses a certain threshold.
We term, equation (3) as the nancial constraint equation. zfit is a vector of strictly exogenous
variables in equation (3). The specication for nancial constraint includes the ratio of outstanding
long term debt to book value of capital (tangible + intangible) asset, dit, which is endogenous since
the choice of leverage and the nancial constraint facing the rm, if we interpret the underlying
latent variable fit as the shadow price of debt, are determined simultaneously. As we have mentioned
above, R&D investment is observed only for the innovators. To rule out possible sample selection
bias that could arise because some component (observed or unobserved) of the decision to innovate
also determines the outcome { here R&D expenditure { we specify a selection equation, equation
(4), where the idiosyncratic error term appearing in the selection equation is correlated with the
idiosyncratic error terms appearing in the R&D equation and the nancial constraint equations. sit
is the latent variable underlying the decision to innovate, sit, which takes value 1 if the rm decides
to innovate and 0 otherwise. sit takes value 1 if s

it crosses a certain threshold, which could be 0. z
s
i ,
is a vector of strictly exogenous variables. The specication for the selection equation includes the
endogenous variable, dit. Equation (5) species the reduced form for debt to capital ratio, where zit
is a vector of exogenous variables appearing in (5).
Our discussion on R&D investment, nancial constraints and debt limits, and the discussion on
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the decision to innovate and choice of capital structure in the preceding two sections imply that R&D
investment, nancial constraints, the decision to innovate and leverage are determined simultaneously.
Here we also mention that the specication for the nancial constraint equation and the selection
equation include the stock of liquid assets, LQit, dummy for dividend payout, DIVit, and share of
innovative sales. While these variables could possibly be endogenous or predetermined to the system
of equations,(2), (3), (4), and (5), here we assume them to be exogenously given. Hence, subsequently
we will assume zrit, z
f
it, z
s
it, and zit to include LQit, DIVit, and SINSit
6.
Let Zit be the union of the exogenous variables appearing in z
r
it, z
f
it, z
s
it, and zit and Zi =
(Z 0i1 : : : Z
0
iTi
)0. i is the unobserved individual eect, which we model as a random eect that is
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance , is assumed to be independent of Zi and is also
assumed to be mean independent of it, it, it and it. Now, it is possible that the unobserved
individual specic eect aecting leverage, that is, the choice of capital structure also aects the
decision to innovate, the rm's realization that it is nancially constrained with respect to R&D
activity, and how much R&D expenditure to incur. The factor loadings, ,  and  allow for such a
possibility.
The endogeneity of the nancial constraint, long-term debt and selection are captured through
the following error structure, where conditional on Zi,0BBBBBB@
it
it
it
it
1CCCCCCA  N
26666664
0BBBBBB@
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
2   
2  
2 
2
1CCCCCCA
37777775 :
We also assume that, each of the error terms, it, it, it, and it are independently and identically
distributed.
We extend the model for R&D expenditure, equation (2), to that of endogenous switching re-
gression model. In this model a switching equation, here the nancial constraint equation, sorts the
rms over two dierent regimes, depending on whether Ifit>0, with only one regime observed. Ifit>0
is an indicator variable, that takes value 1 if fit > 0. Thus, we have
r1it = z
r0
it + f + CFitc1 +DIVitD1 + SINSits + i + 1it; (2a)
6As an extension of this work we intend to endogenize dividends, share of innovative sales and liquidity by specifying
a reduced form for all these variables along with long term debt and condition the idiosyncratic error term of the
structural equations (2), (3), and (4) on the vector of reduced form idiosyncratic error term which are correlated to
those of the structural form.
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if fit > 0, and
r0it = z
r0
it + CFitc0 +DIVitD0 + SINSits + i + 0it; (2b)
if fit  0, where 1it denotes the idiosyncratic term in regime 1, when the rm is nancially con-
strained and 0it denotes the idiosyncratic term when the rm is not, regime 0. Thus, we have
rit = fitr1it + (1  fit)r0it
= zr0it + fitf + fit1(:) + (1  fit)0(:) + i + fit1it + (1  fit)0it; (6)
where 1(:) = (CFitc1+DIVitD1) and 0(:) = (CFitc0+DIVitD0) and SINSit has been subsumed
into zr0it .
The distribution of the error terms of the system of equations (2a), (2b), (3), (4), and (5) is now
given by:
0BBBBBBBBB@
1it
0it
it
it
it
1CCCCCCCCCA
 N
26666666664
0BBBBBBBBB@
0
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBBBB@
21 1010 11 11 11
20 00 00 00
2  
2 
2
1CCCCCCCCCA
37777777775
:
We note here that 10 is not identied, since we do not observe the pair (r1it; r0it) together, but
only either one of them. We also restrict 2 and 
2
 to be 1.
To estimate the above model, given by equation (2a), (2b), (3), (4), and (5), we use a three
step estimation procedure as an extension of Heckman's classical two step estimation to multivariate
selection problems. Heckman (1979) corrects the bias caused by the sample selection using the control
function approach, namely, by adding the inverse Mills ratio to main regression equation, obtained
from the rst stage selection equation. Here we are dealing with two selection problems. One is the
endogenous switching and the other one is the sample selection, not to mention, also, the endogeneity
of long term debt. To consistently estimate the parameters of equations (2a) and (2b), in Appendix
B, we derive the three correction terms. The rst term corrects for the bias due to the endogeneity of
long-term debt, while the other two correct for the bias due to endogenous switching and the bias due
to endogenous sample selection. These correction terms are obtained for each rm-year observation.
Adding these correction terms for each observation, we obtain consistent estimates for the structural
equations, (2a) and (2b), using corresponding subsamples.
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To dene these correction terms, we rst consider the conditional distribution of rit, f

it and s

it
given it. Since 1it, 0it, it, it and it follow a joint normal distribution, the linear projections of
1it, 0it, it and it in error form, given it are given by
1it = 1
1

it + 1it; 0it = 0
0

it + 0it; it = 
it

+ it; it = 
it

+ it; (7)
where 0BBBBBB@
1it
0it
it
it
1CCCCCCA  N
26666664
0BBBBBB@
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
21 1010 11 11
20  00  00
2 
2
1CCCCCCA
37777775 ;
and are independent of Zi di and i
7.
The above then implies that the distribution of r1it, r0it, f

it and s

it given it is then given by
r1it = z
r0
it + f + 1(:) + i + 1
1

it + 1it; (8)
if fit > 0,
r0it = z
r0
it + 0(:) + i + 0
0

it + 0it (9)
if fit  0, and
fit = z
f 0
it'+ dit'd + i + 
it

+ it = '(z
f 0
it ; dit; i) + 
it

+ it; (10)
and
sit = z
s0
it + ditd + i + 
it

+ it = (z
s0
it; dit; i) + 
it

+ it: (11)
Conditioning the endogenous variables of interest on it allows us to control for the endogeneity
of dit, the long-term debt to asset ratio. To estimate the above system of equation, the standard
technique is to replace it by the residuals from the rst stage reduced form regression, here equation
7Given the joint distribution of 1it, 0it, it, it and it, the conditional variance covariance matrix of 1it, 0it, it,
and it, given it can be computed. However, as we will see later the elements of this conditional variance covariance
matrix are not estimated.
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(5). However, since E(itjdi; Zi; i) = dit   z0it   i, the residuals from the rst stage regression are
not identied, this is because the i's remain unobserved, even though  and  can be consistently
estimated. To estimate the above system of equations, we show in Appendix A that
E(r1itjdi; Zi) =
Z
E(r1itjdi; Zi; i)f(ijdi; Zi)di = zr0it + f + 1(:) + ^i + 1
1

^it
= E(r1itjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it) (8a)
if fit > 0, and
E(r0itjdi; Zi) =
Z
E(r0itjdi; Zi; i)f(ijdi; Zi)di = zr0it + 0(:) + ^i + 0
0

^it
= E(r0itjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it) (9a)
if fit  0.
E(fitjdi; Zi) =
Z
E(fitjdi; Zi; i)f(ijdi; Zi)di = '(zf 0it ; dit; ^i) + 
^it

= E(fitjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it); (10a)
and
E(sitjdi; Zi) =
Z
E(sitjdi; Zi; i)f(ijdi; Zi)di = (zs0it; dit; ^i) + 
^it

= E(sitjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it); (11a)
where ^it = (dit  z0it  ^i) and ^i  ^i(di; Zi; ; ; ) is the expected a posteriori value of i, that
are based on the results of the rst stage estimation, which we discuss in a later section. To estimate
the expected values of r1it, r0it, f

it and s

it given di and Zi we write the linear projection of r1it, r0it,
fit and s

it in error form given di and Zi respectively as:
rit = fitr1it + (1  fit)r0it; (12)
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where
r1it = z
r0
it + f + 1(:) + ^i + 1
1

^it + 1it; (12a)
if fit > 0,
r0it = z
r0
it + 0(:) + ^i + 0
0

^it + 0it; (12b)
if fit  0.
fit = '(z
f 0
it ; dit; ^i) + 
^it

+ 
it
; (13)
and
sit = (z
s0
it; dit; ^i) + 
^it

+ it; (14)
where 
1it
, 
0it

it
and it have been dened in Appendix A. The variance covariance matrix of the
error component in (12) to (14) is given by,
0BBBBBB@

1it

0it

it
it
1CCCCCCA  N
26666664
0BBBBBB@
0
0
0
0
1CCCCCCA
0BBBBBB@
2
1

1

0

1

0

1

1
 
1

1

2
0
00
 00

2 
2
1CCCCCCA
37777775 ;
where the respective elements of the matrix have been stated in Appendix A. Again as stated earlier,

1

0
, cannot be identied since a rm cannot be at the same time in either of the two regimes. We
also note here that, having specied the conditional distribution of r1it, r0it, f

it and s

it given di and
Zi, we can no longer estimate the error structure for 1it, 0it, it and it, though the parameters of
interest appearing in equations (12)-(14) can be identied.
To dene the correction terms, consider the following conditional mean, E(ritjfit; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it):
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E(ritjfit; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it) = E(fitr1it + (1  fit)r0itjfit; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)
= zr0it + fitf + fit

1(:) + 1
1

^it

+ (1  fit)

0(:) + 0
0

^it

+ ^i
+ fitE(1itjfit > 0; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it) + (1  fit)E(0itjfit  0; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it) (15)
We know that
E(
1it
jfit > 0; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it) = E[1itjit >  '(z
f 0
it ; dit; ^i)  
^it

; it >  (zs0it; dit; ^i)  
^it

];
and that
E(
0it
jfit  0; sit > 0; Zi; di; ^i; ^it) = E[0itjit   '(z
f 0
it ; dit; ^i)  
^it

; it >  (zs0it; dit; ^i)  
^it

];
Dene ^ = 
^it

and ^ = 
^it

. It has been shown in Appendix B that
E[
1it
j
it
>  '(zf 0it ; dit; ^i)  ^ ; it >  (zs0it; dit; ^i)  ^] =

1

1


'(:) + ^

((:)+^    '(:)+^ )=q1  2

2

'(:)+^

; (:)+^ ; 

+
1

1


(:) + ^

('(:)+^    (:)+^ )=q1  2

2

'(:)+^

; (:)+^ ; 
 (16)
and
E[
0it
j
it
  '(zf 0it ; dit; ^i)  ^ ; it >  (zs0it; dit; ^i)  ^] =
 
0

0


'(:) + ^

((:)+^    '(:)+^ )=q1  2

2

  '(:)+^ ;
(:)+^

; 

+
0

0


(:) + ^

( '(:)+^ +  (:)+^ )=q1  2

2

  '(:)+^ ;
(:)+^

; 
 ; (17)
where , , and 2, respectively denote the density function of a standard normal distribution, the
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cumulative distribution function of a standard normal, and the cumulative distribution function of
a standard bivariate normal.
Dene the correction terms C11(:)it, C12(:)it, C13(:)it, C01(:)it, C02(:)it, and C03(:)it respectively
as
C11(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  fit ^it

= fit
1

(dit   z0it   ^i); (18)
C12(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  fit

'(:) + ^

((:)+^    '(:)+^ )=q1  2
2

'(:)+^

; (:)+^ ; 
 ; (19)
C13(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  fit

(:) + ^

('(:)+^    (:)+^ )=q1  2
2

'(:)+^

; (:)+^ ; 
 ; (20)
C01(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  (1  fit) ^it

= (1  fit) 1

(dit   z0it   ^i); (21)
C02(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  (1  fit)

'(:) + ^

((:)+^    '(:)+^ )=q1  2
2

  '(:)+^ ;
(:)+^

; 
 ; (22)
and
C03(; Zi; di; ^i; ^it)it  (1  fit)

(:) + ^

( '(:)+ ^it +  (:)+^ )=q1  2
2

  '(:)+^ ;
(:)+^

; 
 : (23)
With the correction terms dened, we can now write the R&D switching equation (12), conditional
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on fit, s

it > 0, Zi, di, ^i, ^it as
rit = z
r0
it + fitf + fit1(:) + (1  fit)0(:) + ^i
+ fit

11C11(:)it + 1

1
C12(:)it + 
1

1
C13(:)it

+ (1  fit)

00C01(:)it + 0

0
C02(:)it + 
0

0
C03(:)it

+ ~it; (24)
where ~it conditional on f

it, s

it, Zi and di is distributed with mean zero. The rst and second
stage of the empirical strategy, gives us estimates of , for constructing the correction terms ,
where  = (' 1 ;
'd

;  ; 
1

; d ;


; ; ;


;  ; ). Plugging these correction terms and ^i in the
R&D equation, (24), gives consistent estimates of the parameters of the switching model for R&D
investment. These parameters can be obtained by running a simple pooled OLS for the sample of
selected or innovating rms. C11(; :)it and C01(; :)it corrects for the potential bias that can arise
due to endogeneity of long-term debt when estimating equation (24). While C11(; :)it corrects for
the bias in the subsample of rms belonging to the regime that is nancially constrained, C01(:; )it
corrects for the bias in the subsample of rms that are not constrained. C12(; :)it and C13(; :)it
corrects for the bias that could arise due endogenous switching and endogenous selection while
estimating the R&D equation for the rms that are nancially constrained, while C02(; :)it and
C03(; :)it corrects for the bias that could arise due endogenous switching and endogenous selection
for the subsample of rms that are not nancially constrained.
Apart from the parameters appearing in the R&D switching equation, (12a) and (12b), the other
parameters that are estimated while estimating equation (24), are the coecients of the correction
terms. These coecients are the estimates of the correlation between the unobserved factors aecting
R&D expenditure in the two regimes and the unobserved factors that aect the chances of a rm to be
nancially constrained (
1

1
 , 
0

0
), the correlation between the unobserved factors aecting
R&D expenditure and the unobserved factors aecting the choice of the rm to be an innovator
(
1

1
, 
0

0
), and of course, the correlation between the unobserved factors aecting R&D
expenditure and the unobserved factors aecting the choice of capital structure, that is, the extent
of leverage measured by long-term debt to capital asset ratio (00 , 11).
We estimate the parameters in  in the rst and second stage, which we discuss in detail below.
In the rst stage we estimate equation (5), the reduced form long-term debt equation. Using the
estimates from the rst stage regression, we jointly estimate equations (13) and (14), which are our
conditional nancial constraint equation and conditional selection equation. To estimate equations
166 CHAPTER 6
(13) and (14), we use the method of Maximum Likelihood. While such a procedure is quite common
for cross sectional data analysis, in panel data we have to account for an unobserved rm specic
individual eect, i, which is correlated with endogenous regressors and appears in each of the
equations, (2a), (2b), (3), (4) and (5). With ^i in place, the unobserved time individual eect is
controlled for and the factor loadings, , , and  are estimated. The details for estimating the
expected a posteriori values of i are outlined in Appendix A.
The First Stage: Reduced Form for Long-term Debt
In the rst stage of our econometric methodology we estimate equation (5), the reduced form equation
for long-term debt.
dit = z
0
it + i + it (5)
The vector of exogenous variables included in z0it are: (1) the ratio of cash ows of the rm in period
t to the capital assets (tangible +intangible) of the rm at the beginning of period t (CFt), (2) the
market share of the rm measured by the ratio of the total sales of the rm to the industry total
sales in period t (MKSHt), (3) the logarithm of the number of people employed (SIZEt), (4) the
age of the rm (AGE), (5) the ratio of cash holdings of the rm to total capital assets (LQt), (6) a
dummy for positive dividends (DIVt), (7) a dummy if a rm is a multi-enterprise rm (DMULTIt),
(8) a dummy for negative realization of cash ows (DNFCt), (9) the share of innovative sales in the
total sales of the rms,(SINSt), (10) industry or sectoral dummies and nally (11) year dummies.
We can get the estimates of the parameters of the reduced form model, equation (5), we can either
use the simple random eects model or maximize the marginal likelihood function. The marginal
likelihood function for individual i for the rst stage estimation of the reduced form for the debt
equation is given by
Li(; ; ) =
Z 1
 1
TiY
t=1
1

p
2
expf(dit   z
0
it   ~i)2
22
g(~i)d~i; (25)
where ~i =
i

and  is the standard normal density function. The estimates of the rst stage
estimation, thus gives us the estimate of ,  and , which we can use to get the estimates of the
expected a posteriori values of i, ^i, given di and zi, that would be subsequently used for the second
and the third stage estimation.
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The Second Stage: Financial Constraint and Selection with Endogenous Long-term
Debt
In the second stage we jointly estimate the parameters of nancial constraint equation (13) and the
selection equation (14). The two equations, assuming liquidity, dividends, and the share of innovative
sales to be exogenous, are stated below. While equation (5), the debt equation, has been written
as a reduced form, the nancial constraint equation and the selection equation are both structural
equations.
fit = '(z
f 0
it ; dit; ^i) + 
^it

+ 
it
; (13)
sit = (z
s0
it; dit; ^i) + 
^it

+ it; (14)
where ^it = (dit   z0it   ^i) and ^i  ^i(di; Zi; ; ; ) is the expected a posteriori value of i
dened at the population parameters. Given the joint distribution of 
1it
, 
0it
, 
it
, it, conditional
on di and Zi, the marginal distribution of it and it, follows a bivariate normal given by:0@it
it
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240@0
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1A0@2 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Thus,
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
; (26)
where 2 is the cumulative distribution function of a standard bivariate normal. Also,
Pr(fit = 0; sit = 1jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = 2
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168 CHAPTER 6
and
Pr(fit = 0; sit = 0jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = 2

  '(:) + 
^it


; (:) + 
^it


; 

: (29)
However for CIS2.5 we do not observe whether fit is 1 or 0 when sit = 0, by integrating out it, we
get
Pr(sit = 0jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = 
 (zs0it + ditd + ^i +  ^it )


: (30)
The conditional log likelihood function for individual i in period t given di, Zi, if the time period
t corresponds to CIS3 and CIS3.5, is given by
Lit(';'d; ; ;  ; ; d; ; ; ; jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = fsPr(f = 1; s = 1)
+ (1  f)sPr(f = 0; s = 1) + f(1  s) Pr(f = 1; s = 0) + (1  f)(1  s) Pr(f = 0; s = 0)
and
Lit(';'d; ; ;  ; ; d; ; ; ; jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = fsPr(f = 1; s = 1) + (1  f)sPr(f = 0; s = 1)
+ (1  s) Pr(s = 0);
if the time period t corresponds to CIS2.5. Given that error components in (13) and (14) are i.i.d.,
the log likelihood for an individual i, is thus given by
Li(';'d; ; ;  ; ; d; ; ; ; jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) =
TiX
t=1
Lit(:jdiZi; ^it; ^i): (31)
Now, we know that for probit models, the variance of the idiosyncratic components,  and ,
are not identied and that the coecients or the parameters of the model are estimated only up to
a scale. Therefore, we can write the Log Likelihood function for an individual i as Li('
1

, 'd ,


,


;  1 ,
d

,  ,


; jdi; Zi, ^it; ^i).
As mentioned earlier, the main objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of nancial
constraints on R&D expenditure and to determine what causes nancial constraint. We interpret
nancial constraints as high cost or price of external nance that a rm would be required to pay for
a variety of reasons, discussed in Section 6.2 and 6.3, relating to lack of internal funds or information
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asymmetry. To this eect, fit, the latent variable underlying fit, can reect the shadow price of
external funds, dit, the ratio of long-term debt to capital assets. Controlling for other factors, a rm
is likely to be more nancially constrained or more likely to have reached its debt capacity, the higher
the debt asset ratio is, and consequently face a binding borrowing constraint in optimally deciding its
investment and nancial policy. However, it quite possible that a rm may be nancially constrained
not only because of high cost of external funds, but also due to high need for funds. Quantity
constraints, due to credit rationing, can be as important as cost of external nance. Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) use a classication scheme that a priori distinguishes between rms that are not
nancially constrained, rms that are likely to be nancially constrained due to high need of funds,
and rms that are indeed nancially constrained. The rms that are not constrained are those
that have liquidity reserves more than what would be needed to nance their investment or have
initiated paying dividends. Firms that are likely to be nancially constrained because of need for
high funds mention having diculties in obtaining nancing. For example, they include rm-year
observations in which rm's postpone an equity or convertible debt oering due to adverse market
conditions, or claim that they need equity capital but are waiting for improved market conditions.
Generally these rms are prevented from paying dividends and have little cash available. Firms that
cut dividends are more likely to fall in this category. Finally, in their classication scheme rms that
are indeed nancially constrained are rms that are in violation of debt covenants, have been cut
out of their usual sources of credit, are renegotiating debt payments and have declared that they are
forced to reduce investment because of liquidity problems. Here, we would like to mention that the
information that is available with us is not as detailed as is for the rms that Kaplan and Zingales
analyze. Consequently, we do not have a rich specication for the nancial constraint equation that
can also account for nancial constraint that arises from high need of funds, and indeed, test if such
variables do indicate whether rms are nancially constrained on account of high need of funds.
However, our specication does include variables like cash reserve and dividend payout which, to an
extent, can control for the fact that rms are nancially constrained due to high need for funds.
The list of exogenous variables included in zf 0it are: (1) the share of innovative sales in the total
sales of the rm in period t  1; t(SINS), (2) the ratio of cash ows of the rm to the book value of
capital assets (tangible +intangible) of the rm in period t (CF ), (3) the ratio of liquidity holdings
to the book value of capital assets of the rm in period t (LQ), (4) a dummy for positive dividends in
period t (DIV ), (5) market share of the rm in period t(MKSH), (6) the logarithm of the number
of people employed in period t(SIZE), (7) a dummy for negative cash ows in period t, (DNCF ),
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(8) the ratio of intangible assets to the total capital asset of the rm in period t (RAINT ) 8, (9) the
age of the rm (AGE), (10) industry dummies and (11) year dummies.
In the specication for the nancial constraint equation, we need to control for future expected
protability of the R&D related activity. This is because, if a rm nds that the R&D project for
the product or the process that it is willing to undertake will reap higher prots in future, then its
need for R&D expenditure today would be high. However, if its internal funds are not suciently
high and if capital market imperfections facing the rm are acute, then with a higher need for R&D
expenditure, the rm would nd it self more likely to be facing nancial constraint. We include the
share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm, (SINS), as a proxy for the future expected
protability of the rm, protability, which is related to R&D activities. The share of innovative
sales, (SINS), measures of how important R&D activity is to a rm. Assuming, that there is a time
lag between starting of an R&D project, successful realization of the product, and incurring some
xed cost to implement or produce the new process or product, share of innovative sales in the total
sales, (SINS), is a result of past innovative activity, and therefore, at most predetermined, if not
strictly exogenous. This implies that the variation in (SINS) will be a result of past R&D endeavors
as well as due to high or low demand for the newly introduced product to the market. Therefore,
(SINS) can potentially signal demand for R&D related activity and investment. In other words
higher percentage of innovative sales can trigger a high demand for R&D investment, which in turn
implies, given every thing else, a rm is more likely to nd itself reporting nancial constraints.
The specication for the nancial constraint equation includes cash ows, (CF ), and liquidity,
(LQ), holdings of the rm. Healthy realization of cash ows can be benecial for rms that are nan-
cially constrained on the margin. The realized cash ows for rms that are nancially constrained
could be used as a source of internal equity, thus easing the constraint faced by the rm. On the
other hand, since cash ows are repositories of demand signals, realized cash ows can also trigger
demand for R&D capital. Thus, increases in cash ows can also indicate a high demand for R&D
expenditures, which ceteris paribus, can lead a rm to be reporting it self as nancially constrained.
Hall and Lerner (2010) and Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) point out that most of the
R&D spending is in form of payments to highly skilled workers, who often require a great deal of
rm-specic knowledge and training. The eort of the skilled workers create the knowledge base
of the rm, and is therefore embedded in the human capital of the rms. This knowledge base
8This variable too is likely to be predetermined if not endogenous. However, as mentioned earlier we intend to
endogenize the potentially endogenous variables by specifying a system of reduced form equations for them and estimate
it as system of seemingly unrelated regression.
6.5. Empirical Strategy 171
is lost once workers get laid o. The implication of this is that rms choose to smooth their R&D
spending, if only to avoid laying o their knowledge workers. This in turn implies that R&D intensive
rms behave as if they have large adjustment cost. Thus, when faced with high adjustment costs,
and when it is not sure about a steady supply of positive cash ows, an R&D intensive rm is
likely to practice precautionary savings to reduce its risks of being nancially constrained at any
given time. This argument implies that among the R&D intensive rms, those that maintain a
liquidity reserve (LQ) are less likely to be nancially constrained. We include a dummy variable for
dividends paid out (DIV ) since it is likely that cash distributions to shareholders are evidence of
the availability of internally generated funds. Therefore, it is more likely that a rm that pays out
dividends is unlikely to be aected by costly external nance and that at least some rms that do
not distribute dividends are aected. Fama and French (2000) found the ratio of dividends to total
assets to be a good predictor of protability of the rm. Also, Fama and French (2002) point out that
since it is expensive to nance investment with new risky securities, dividends are less attractive for
rms with less protable assets in place, large current and expected investments, and high leverage.
Thus, controlling for other eects, more protable rms pay out more of their earnings as dividends,
indicating that such rms are less likely to be nancially constrained.
We include size of the rm (SIZE) since it might be that large rms have more internal funds
at their disposal to carry out R&D related activities, and that small rms may be typically young
and less well known, hence more vulnerable to capital market imperfections. Hennessey and Whited
(2007) nd large dierences between the cost of external funds for small and large rms. Large
rms behave as if they face small indirect costs of external nance, and small rms behave as if
they face large indirect costs of external nance. Market share (MKSH) of the rm is included
in the specication, since it may be possible that rms enjoying a higher degree of monopoly to
have a better access to capital markets. While size is often correlated with market share, it may
that, for certain products, relatively smaller rms enjoy a higher degree of monopoly. Now, since
the secondary market for intangible asset is fraught with more frictions and generally does not exist,
rms with higher percentage of intangible assets have less amount of pledgeable support to borrow.
It could also be possible that such rms face higher bankruptcy costs. Thus it seems likely that rms
with high ratio of intangible asset to total capital asset (RAINT ) are more likely to be nancially
constrained. The age of the rm (AGE) has been an important determinant of nancial constraint
as suggested by many studies: for an example, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009). Old rms,
given that they have survived, have probably build reputation over the years that allow them to have
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better access to capital markets and are thus less likely to be nancially constrained, given every
thing else.
The specication for the selection equation includes dit, the long-term debt to capital asset ratio.
The idea, as discussed earlier, is to test if highly leveraged rms are innovative or not. The variables
that we include in zs0it, for the selection equation are: (1) the ratio of liquidity holdings to the capital
assets of the rm (LQ), (2) a dummy for positive dividends (DIV ), (3) the market share of the rm
(MKSH), (4) the logarithm of the number of people employed (SIZE), (5) a dummy that takes
value 1 if the number of enterprises consolidated within a rm is more than one, (DMULTI), (6)
the age of the rm (AGE), (7) the ratio of intangible assets to total (tangible +intangible) assets
(RAINT ), (8) industry dummies, and (9) year dummies.
The liquidity holdings of the rm (LQ) are included in the specication for the selection equation.
For reasons related the nature of R&D activity, R&D intensive rms have to bear high cost of external
nance, and also, as discussed earlier, to avoid high adjustment cost related to hiring and ring its
knowledge workers, R&D intensive rms tend to smooth their investment spending over time. This
necessitates them to maintain large amounts of cash reserves. Including (LQ) in the specication
allows us to test whether this is indeed true or not. Again, for reasons related to capital market
imperfections faced by R&D activity, it might be less attractive for rms indulging in R&D activity
to distribute cash as dividends (DIV ). We include (RAINT ) in the selection/innovation equation,
since for any two rms that have the same capital base, the one with more intangible asset in its
capital base is more likely to be an innovator. This is because a large part of the capital of an R&D
intensive rm resides in the knowledge base of the rm which is intangible. Though, it might seem
that the percentage of intangible assets in the total asset base of a rm is more of an outcome of
a rm's decision to innovate rather than its having any bearing on the innovation decision of the
rm. However, we know that there is persistence in innovation activity of a rm, see Wladimir et al.
(2009), or in other words, innovation decision exhibits a certain degree of path dependency. RAINT
being the outcome of past innovation activity, captures the persistence in the innovation decision of
the the rm.
In the Schumpeterian tradition, it makes sense to include size (SIZE) as an explanatory variable
in the selection equation. It can also be argued that if there are xed costs of investing, then as Cohen
and Klepper (1996) argue, large rms have a higher incentive to engage in innovative activities because
they can amortize these costs by selling more units of output. Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) nd
strong statistical evidence of this relationship, including much greater incidences of zero investments
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in small versus large plants. They attribute this relevance of plant size, to the presence of xed costs
and to potential indivisibilities in investment. As stated earlier the market share (MKSH) is a proxy
for concentration or the degree of monopoly. We include this variable in the selection equation, since
in the Schumpeterian tradition it has been argued that rms that enjoy monopoly position are more
incited to innovate, if only to prevent entry of potential rivals. We also include age (AGE) of the
rm in the selection equation, since it is likely that young rms, in order to survive, have a larger
incentive to innovate new products. Also see Section 6.2 for a detailed discussion on maturity and
innovation practices of rms.
The Third Stage: R&D Investment
In the third and the nal stage we estimate the R&D equation, equation (24), which is a switching
model with the added correction terms, C11(; :)it, C12(; :)it, C13(; :)it, C01(; :)it, C02(; :)it, and
C03(; :)it, which control for the bias that can arise due to endogeneity of debt, nancial constraint
and selection.
rit = z
r0
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 + fitf + fit1(:) + (1  fit)0(:) + ^i
+ fit

11C11(:)it + 1

1
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1

1
C13(:)it

+ (1  fit)
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
0
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0
C03(:)it

+ ~it; (24)
To control for the individual eects, i, we substitute the expected a posteriori values, ^i(:),
computed from the rst stage reduced form estimation. With ^i(:) in place to control for time
invariant individual specic eect, a simple pooled OLS, of equation (24), for the subsample of
innovating rms leads to consistent estimates of the parameters.
As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of this chapter is to assess the impact of nancial constraint
on R&D investment. Interpreting fit as the shadow price of external funds, implies that a rm in
question nds itself being nancially constrained, fit = 1, if the price that it is required is high or
if it exceeds a certain threshold. Interpreting the latent variable fit as the price of external funds,
underlying fit, allows us test whether the plethora of reasons, discussed earlier, does indeed make
external nancing costly and if such high cost does indeed impact R&D activity adversely.
Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), many studies have concluded that rms, a priori
classied as nancially more constrained, have higher investment-cash ow sensitivities. Empirically,
the existence of nancial frictions for innovative rms has been investigated, either by examining
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the sensitivity of R&D investment to nancial factors, including measures of internal nance such as
cash ows, that uses reduced form of accelerator type models of investment as in Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988), or by using the structural framework of Euler equations as in Bond and Meghir
(1994), see Hall and Lerner (2010) for a survey. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Kaplan
and Zingales (2000) and Cleary (1999) have provided evidence that cash ow sensitivity need not
identify liquidity constrained rms, that is, sensitivity is not monotonic in the degree of constraints.
Cash ows provide information about future investment opportunities, hence, investment cash ow
sensitivity may equally occur because rms are sensitive to demand signals. On the theoretical side,
Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) simulate dynamic investment models, demonstrating that signicant
cash ow coecients are not necessarily generated by nancing frictions. Conversely, Gomes (2001)
shows that nancing frictions are not sucient to generate signicant coecients on cash ow.
The distinguishing feature of our model is the switching regression model for R&D expenditure
that allows us endogenize nancial constraint with respect to R&D related activity, which as men-
tioned earlier, is an information that the rms themselves report. Second, though cash ows are
included in the specication and have dierent coecients in the two dierent regimes, a test for the
existence of nancial frictions does not rest on the sensitivity of R&D investment to cash ows for the
nancially constrained and unconstrained rms, but rather through the test of the eect of reported
nancial constraints on R&D investment, and as mentioned in the last section, its implications for
the decision to innovate.
Here, we would like to emphasize that in order to see the eect of rm's reportage of nancial
constraints on R&D investment, we would like to x the rm's investment opportunity. Since, we do
not have any information on the market valuation of the rms, we can not construct average \q" for
our rms or for that matter, any such measure related to the rm's R&D investment. To this end,
in our specication we include cash ows and share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm
(SINS) which can be indicative of demand signals. Moyen (2004), simulates series from dynamic
models of constrained and unconstrained rms, and pools them together to represent a theoretical
sample. She does this to investigate whether some of the empirical results relating to investment
cash ow sensitivity, can be replicated in her theoretical sample. Among other things, she nds
that Tobin's \q" is a poor proxy for investment opportunities, cash ow is an excellent proxy, and
that cash ow is an increasing function of the income shock. Since, it is quite likely that the cash
ows of the rm is correlated with, or constitutes of the cash ows that emanates from R&D related
activity, accordingly, in our model the role of cash ows, (CF ), is to control for the R&D investment
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opportunity of rms.
Now, the realized cash ows of the rm are not only the rm's R&D activity. A measure to
control for the investment opportunity for R&D related activity should be based on a measure such
as Tobin's \q" for R&D related activity or cash ows that result from R&D output. However, in
the absence of any such measure, we use the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm
(SINS), which as explained in the discussion of the second stage specication, can potentially signal
demand for R&D related activity.
In our results, we do obtain dierent eects of changes in cash ows on R&D investment for
rms that are nancially constrained and rms that are not. This could be because cash ows are
correlated with investment opportunity set and observables such as (SINS), which we include in
the specication to control for future expected protability, cannot perfectly control for the rm's
investment opportunity related to future expected protability. Other reasons why the sensitivity
of cash ows across constrained and unconstrained rms might dier, could be due to the nature of
costs related to issuing new equity and cost of borrowing and how well proxies that classify rms
as constrained or otherwise are reective of these costs. However, within the framework of our
model, we cannot test for the exact mechanism that drives the results on R&D investment-cash
ow sensitivity across constrained and unconstrained rms. For a detailed discussion on investment-
cashow sensitivity, we refer to Moyen (2004), Hennessey and Whited (2007), Whited (2008), Alti
(2003), and Gomes (2001) and the references therein9.
The specication for the R&D equation does not include any nancial stock variables such as
long-term debt to asset ratio or cash reserves to asset ratio. This is because in the structural model
for R&D investment, R&D expenditures are determined only by the degree of constraints a rm
faces and the expected protability from R&D investment. Therefore, it seems unlikely that leverage
and cash holdings will have an independent eect, other than through nancial constraints aecting
the rm. However, to investigate the behavior of R&D spending for rms paying out dividends, we
do include a dummy for dividend payout (DIV ) during the period in which R&D expenditure was
incurred. The other variables that are included in the specication are: size of the rm (SIZE)
market share (MKSH) and the age of the rm (AGE). The rationale, for including these variables
is essentially the same as for the selection equation. However, among the set of innovating rms, it
can be possible that smaller rms invest relatively more in R&D than larger rms. This is because,
9Though, these papers do not specically model R&D investment, the results in these papers can have relevance
in explaining R&D investment-cash ow coecients, or the models in these papers could be augmented to allow for
features of R&D investment.
176 CHAPTER 6
as has been argued, smaller rms have a higher marginal \q" than large rms, which can even be true
of R&D capital. Smaller rms also experience higher growth rates than large rms and more likely
to take risk than larger rms, see Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Gomes (2001) and the discussion
in Section 6.2. The specication for the third stage also includes a dummy (DMULTI) that takes
value 1 if the number of enterprises consolidated within a rm is more than one.
6.5.2 Identication and Estimation of Average Partial Eects
Estimation of average partial eects (APE) in presence of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity
has recently been of concern in the econometric literature, see Wooldridge (2004, 2005). Our empir-
ical strategy allows us to take into account the enodogeneity of the explanatory variables as well as
unobserved heterogeneity. We do this by conditioning the endogenous variable of interest on the id-
iosyncratic component of the reduced form equation of the endogenous explanatory variable, thereby
controlling for the endogeneity of our endogenous regressor. Estimation of the structural parameters,
as we know requires substitution of the idiosyncratic component of the reduced form equation in the
structural equations by their conditional expected value, the residuals from the reduced form esti-
mation. However, the residuals, E(itjdi; Zi; i), from the rst stage reduced form equation are not
identied due to presence of time invariant individual eects, which are not observed. In Appendix
A however, we have shown that even though E(itjdi; Zi; i) is not identied, E(itjdi; Zi) is. This
allows us to replace i with their expected a posterior values ^i(di; Zi; ^; ^; ^), which helps us in
identifying the parameters of interest. The details are provided in Appendix A. In this section we
only state the functional form of the APE of a typical variable, continuous or categorical, for the
second and the third stage estimation.
Average Partial Eects for the Second Stage
Suppose, we are interested in changes in the probability of a rm being nancially constrained for
small changes in dit or zkit where zk is any of the exogenous regressors that appear in the nancial
constraint equation. From the result on identication of parameters, discussed in Appendix A, we
know that
Pr(fit = 1jdi; Zi; ^it; ^i) = 

zf 0it ~'+ dit ~'d + ~^i + ~
^it


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where ~' = ' 1 , ~'d =
'd

, ~ =  , ~ =


. The APE of the change in zkit from zk to zk +  on the
probability of being nancially constrained given dit = d and z
f
it k = z
f
 k as shown in Appendix A is
given by
Pr(fit = 1jzk; Z k; d)
zk
=
R


zk + ; z
f
 k; d; ^; ^

dG(^; ^)  R zk; zf k; d; ^; ^dG(^; ^)

: (32)
In the limit when zk =  goes to zero, since the integrand is a smooth function of its arguments
we can change the order of dierentiation and integration, to get
@ Pr(fit = 1jzk; Z k; d)
@zk
=
Z


zk; z
f
 k; d; ^; ^

'kdG(^; ^): (33)
The sample analog of the RHS of the above equation can be computed as follows:
1PN
i=1 Ti
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1


zk; z
f
 k; d; ^i; ^it

'k: (34)
Suppose, zk is an exogenous dummy variable D taking values 0 and 1, then the APE of change
of Dit from 0 to 1 on the probability of a rm being nancially constrained, given other covariates,
is given by
Z


D = 1; zf k; d; ^; ^

dG(^; ^) 
Z


D = 0; zf k; d; ^; ^

dG(^; ^); (35)
whose sample analog, given (34), can be computed in the same way.
We may also be interested in the APE of a variable on the conditional probability of an event or
compare the APE of a variable on the probability of an event conditional on two mutually exclusive
events. For example, we may be interested in the marginal eect of long-term debt to asset ratio on
the probability of rm being an innovator, conditional on being nancially constrained as compared
to the marginal eect of long-term debt on the probability of being innovator, conditional on the rm
not being nancially constrained. For the above mentioned example, the APE of changing long-term
debt from dit = d to dit = d+ on the probability of a rm being nancially constrained, conditional
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on being a innovator and given Zi = Z, is given by
Pr(sit = 1jfit = 1; d; Z)
d
=
 Z 
2( '( d+ ; :); ( d+ ; :); )
( '( d+ ; :))

dG(^; ^)
 
Z 
2( '( d; :); ( d; :); )
( '( d; :))

dG(^; ^)

=; (36)
where '(:) =
'(:)+
^it


and (:) =
(:)+
^it


. The sample analog of which can be constructed by
averaging the integrand over ^i and ^it. However, in the limit as  tends to zero, since the integrand
is a smooth function of its argument, we can change the order of dierentiation and integration to
obtain the APE as
@ Pr(sit = 1jfit = 1; d; Z)
@d
=
Z
@
@d

2( '(:); (:); )
( '(:))

dG(^; ^); (37)
The right-hand side of the above involves taking derivative of cumulative distribution function of a
standard bivariate normal with respect to '(:) and (:). If we want to compare the APE of increase
in leverage on the probability of being nancially constrained, conditional on being a non-innovator,
then we have
@ Pr(sit = 1jfit = 0; d; Z)
@d
=
Z
@
@d

2( '(:); (:); )
1  ( '(:))

dG(^; ^): (38)
The derivative of the 2( '(:); (:); ) and 2( '(:); (:); ) with respect to '(:) and (:) are
stated in Greene (2003).
Average Partial Eects for the Third Stage
The average eect of nancial constraint on R&D intensity, for any individual, i, in time period, t,
is computed as the dierence in the expected R&D expenditure between the two regimes, nancially
constrained and non-nancially constrained, averaged over ^ and ^:
E(ritjZi; di) =
Z
E(r1itjZi; di; ^; ^)dG(^; ^)
 
Z
E(r0itjZi; di; ^; ^)dG(^; ^): (39)
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From equations (8a) and (9a) we know that
E(r1itjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it) = zr0it + f + 1(:) + ^i + 1
1

^it
if fit > 0, and
E(r0itjdi; Zi; ^i; ^it) = zr0it + 0(:) + ^i + 0
0

^it
if fit  0. Given the above, the average eect of nancial constraint on R&D intensity, for an
individual, i, in time period t, is given by:
E(ritjZi; di) = f + 1(:)  0(:) +
Z 
1
1

^it   0
0

^it

dG(^; ^): (40)
Since we assume that the time invariant individual eects have the same eect in both the regimes,
the ^ term drops out. The sample analog of the above can be obtained by taking the average over
^it for given Zi = Z and di = d.
The APE of the other variables on R&D intensity will be dierent for the two regimes, dened as
nancially constrained and not nancially constrained. The APE's are composite of the direct eect
on R&D intensity, if the variable is included in the specication for R&D intensity, and its eect
through the correction terms, that are dierent for the two regimes. Including the indirect eect,
that comes through the correction terms, implies that APE's obtained are conditional APE's, that is,
conditional on being selected. Without the indirect eect that comes through the correction terms,
that correct for the bias due to sample selection, the unconditional APE's are simply the coecient
estimates.
Given the R&D equation (24), with added correction terms, the APE, conditional on being
selected, of a change in exogenous variable, zkit, from zk to zk + , given Zi k =
Z k and di = d, on
R&D intensity for a rm, i, that is nancially constrained in time period t is given by:

zk
E(r1jf > 0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d) = 1k
+
R 
E(
1
jf > 0; s > 0; zk + ; Z k; d; ^; ^)  E(1jf > 0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d; ^; ^)

dG(^; ^)

:
(41)
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That is,

zk
E(r1jf > 0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d) = 1k
+
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
1
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1

1
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
1


dG(^; ^)

=; (42)
where 1k in the above two equations is the direct eect of zk on the R&D intensity, and the remaining
term the indirect eect. The sample analog of the RHS of (42) is given by:

zk
E(r1jf > 0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d) = 1k
+

1PN
i=1 Ti
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
sit

C12(:; zk + ; ^; ^)
1

1
 + C13(:; zk + ; ^; ^)
1

1


  1PN
i=1 Ti
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
sit

C12(:; zk; ^; ^)
1

1
 + C13(:; zk; ^; ^)
1
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=:
Replacing the 1's in the subscripts with 0's in the RHS of the equation gives APE of zkit on R&D
intensity for a rm that belongs to the regime that is not nancially constrained. Thus, we have

zk
E(rjf; s > 0; zk; Z k; d) =
f

zk
E(r1jf > 0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d) + (1  f) 
zk
E(r0jf  0; s > 0; zk; Z k; d): (43)
If zk happens to be a binary variable, D, taking values 0 and 1, then we simply replace zk +  with
D = 1 and zk with D = 0 in equations (41-42). For a continuous variable, zk, in the limit when  goes
to 0, given functional form of the correction terms, which are smooth functions of their arguments,
we can again change the order of integration and dierentiation in (41-42) to obtain the APE.
6.6 Results
We discuss the results of our structural model under two subsections. In the rst subsection we
discuss the results of the Second Stage, in which we jointly estimate the nancial constraint and
sample selection equation. In the second subsection we discuss the results of the R&D switching
regression model.
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6.6.1 Second Stage
Table 6.3 illustrates the results of the joint estimation of the nancial constraint equation and the
selection equation. We present the results of three specication of the joint estimation, in which the
specication for the selection or the innovation equation remains the same, but the specication for
the nancial constraint equation is varied. For reasons which we discuss later, our most preferred
specication is the parsimonious specication presented in columns (C0) and (C1). Table 6.4
presents the APE's of the respective variables for the specication illustrated in columns (C0) and
(C1). To compute the APE's, the values of all the covariates were xed at the mean value, the
mean taken over all the rms and the years. We also note here that many of the covariates are
dummy variables taking values 0's and 1's, therefore, the mean of these variables will be fractions
lying between 0 and 1.
Our results suggest that controlling for other factors, highly leveraged rms are unlikely to in-
novate. This validates the claim about the risky nature of R&D related activities, which in general
involves assets and products that are both highly intangible in nature, and bank-based institutional
lenders being more averse to provide nance to new and high risk investments. This only implies
that R&D intensive rms have a preference for equity based nancing, which can be outside equity
or retained earnings. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that in economies that better manage asymmetric
information problems R&D intensive rms tend to be more valuable. Also, market-based nancial
systems are more likely to encourage R&D activity and consequently will value R&D more highly
than bank-based economies. Market-based nancial systems have well developed information dis-
tribution mechanisms and are able to allocate capital to activities even when investors hold diverse
views on the value of the investment. This corroborates the ndings of Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen
(2009), who also nd a preference for equity based nancing for high-tech rms and in particular
rms that are young among them.
We nd a signicant negative coecient for dummy for dividends, (DIV ). This suggests that
rms that pay out dividends are less likely to innovate. Now, given the nature of R&D activity,
which makes borrowing costly, internal funds may be more preferable. Therefore, innovative rms
are less likely to distribute cash as dividends. Again, for reasons related to high adjustment costs,
that compels R&D intensive rms to smooth out investment spending, and of course, the need to
avert costly borrowing, we wanted to test if innovative rms maintain high cash reserves to nance
a foreseeable R&D investment project in the future during which it may or may not be nancially
constrained. Our results suggests that innovative rms are very likely to hold cash reserves (LQ).
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We nd that younger rms are more innovative. This corroborates the ndings of other studies
that nd that young rms in their bid to survive take up more innovative activity. Entry, typically in
the literature on industrial organization, see Audretsch (1995) and Huergo and Jaumandreu (2004), is
envisaged as the way in which rms explore the value of new ideas in an uncertain context. Entry, the
likelihood of survival and subsequent conditional growth are determined by barriers to survival, which
dier by industries according to technological opportunities. In this framework, entry is innovative
and increases with uncertainty, the likelihood of survival is lower the higher the risk is, and the
growth subsequent to successful innovation is higher the higher barriers to survival are.
Our ndings also suggests that large rms are more probable to innovate. This nding, is consis-
tent with the idea that large rms have a higher incentive to engage in innovative activities because
they can amortize the large xed costs of investing costs by selling more units of output. Moreover,
larger rms can be expected to have a larger stock of knowledge base, and therefore are expected to
produce more innovation than small rms. We nd that rms with large market share are more in-
novative. This result conrms the fact that a rm is more incited to innovate if it enjoys a monopoly
position to prevent entry of potential rivals. We also nd that rms that have many enterprises
consolidated within them, (DMULTI), are more likely to be innovative. Now, these enterprises are
more or less independent entities, working under a parent rm or a company. It has been found that
rms that have many enterprises consolidated within them, are more likely to be globally engaged
and have better networks of customers and suppliers. Such rms are also multinational in nature.
These rms are also large both in terms of employment and sales. These considerations make multi
enterprise rms more likely to have better access to knowledge and also hold a larger stock of knowl-
edge, hence such rms are more likely to be innovative. A signicant positive coecient on RAINT
stress the fact that, given everything else, a rm with a higher ratio of intangible assets in the total
asset base of the rm is more likely to be innovative. Now, to the extent that this ratio is a result of
past innovation decisions, it captures the fact that there is persistence in the innovation decisions of
the rms.
We nd that the scaled correlation between it, the unobserved idiosyncratic component of the
selection equation and it the idiosyncratic component of the reduced form debt equation,


, to
be high and signicant, suggesting strong simultaneity in the decision to innovate and the choice of
leverage. In addition we also nd that, , the factor loading in the selection equation to be signicant,
suggesting that the unobserved individual specic term that inuences the choice of capital structure
also aect the decision to innovate. We nd the 2 test for  to be signicant, suggesting a
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strong simultaneity in the decision to innovate and the nancial constraint with respect to innovative
activity that the rm faces. This could be because the rm's ability to access outside nancing
may be conditional on its innovative activity. For example, suppose there is a rm that has not been
innovative in the past, but now has an R&D project that with certain degree of success, has a positive
net worth. However, since the capital employed by the rm to embark on the R&D project can be
highly intangible, its value, in the event of default, in the second hand market might be signicantly
low. Since lenders can not observe or verify the progress or the importance of R&D project, they
are only willing to lend up to the value of the new investment at liquidation. Thus, the decision to
innovate can have a bearing on the rm's ability to raise external means of nancing if its wealth
is not suciently high. While the above might be an extreme example, innovative rms with new
R&D projects can face similar situations.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the plots of APE of long-term debt to asset ratio on the unconditional
probability of innovation or selection against age, size, and leverage. We nd that the APE of
leverage on the probability of innovation to be negative and decreasing in the age of the rm. This
suggests that once we condition on size and other covariates, older rms are more averse to engage in
R&D activity with higher debt in their capital structure as compared to young rms. This nding in
a way conrms some of the ndings, both theoretical and empirical, that younger rms borrow more,
face higher probability of default, grow faster, and in general display risky behavior. Figure 6.1(b)
plots the APE of long-term debt to asset ratio against size. We nd that the eect is decreasing in
absolute terms with size. This is due to the fact that large rms anyway have a higher propensity
to innovate, hence a marginal increase in leverage is not as eective in aecting innovation of large
rms as compared to small or intermediate sized rms. We also nd that, as Figure 6.1(c) attests,
the partial eect of leverage on the propensity to innovate is negative and decreasing in the size of
leverage.
As stated earlier, Table 6.3 presents three specications for the nancial constraint equation.
The specication in column (A0) has cash ows (CF ) and RAINT , the ratio of intangible to total
(tangible + intangible) assets. The specication in column (B0) does not include RAINT , while
the specication in column (C0), has neither of them. We included RAINT in the specication
for nancial constraint, since secondary markets for intangible asset is fraught with more frictions
and generally does not exist, hence rms with a higher percentage of intangible asset have a lower
amount of pledgeable support to borrow, and thus can be expected to be more nancially constrained.
However, we do not nd it to be signicantly explaining nancial constraints that a rm faces with
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respect to R&D related activity. Moving from the specication in column (A0) to (A1), we nd no
change in the sign or the signicance of the rest of the variables.
We had included CF as measures of change in the internal networth of a rm. An increase in
the cash ows of the rm was expected to ease the nancial constraints faced by a rm. Instead,
what we nd is that cash ows, CF , has a signicant positive sign. This can be explained by the fact
that the cash ows of the rms are correlated with, or are derived from the product or the process
the rm endeavors to improve or nd a better substitute for. Since the cash ows realized contains
signals about the demand for the rms's product, cash ows are correlated with the R&D investment
opportunity set. This in turn implies that an increase in the cash ows signals a higher demand for
R&D investment, thus ceteris paribus, an increase in cash ows can lead to a rm reporting itself
being nancially constrained, especially since we control for negative realization of cash ows.
Though cash ows can signal demand for investment needs of a rm, a measure of how impor-
tant R&D activity is to a rm, as explained when discussing the specication of the second stage
estimation, is the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm (SINS), which can signal
demand for R&D related activity and investment. In other words, a higher percentage of innovative
sales can be indicative of a high demand for R&D investment, which in turn implies, given every
thing else, a rm is more likely to nd itself reporting nancial constraints. Also, since SINS is
positive only for innovators, its inclusion in the nancial constraint equation controls for the fact
that it is the innovators who are the ones who mostly report nancial constraints with respect to
R&D10. Since the dummy for negative cash ows, DNCF , is derived from the realized cash ows,
removing cash ows from the specication results in a signicant coecient for DNCF . That is, we
nd that negative realization of cash ows, leads to a signicant increase in the probability of a rm
being nancially constrained. We also tried a specication where we removed DNCF . This resulted
in cash ows being marginally signicant with a positive sign.
Now, we began with the question whether \shifts" in the supply of internal equity nance, that
is, whether changes in the cash ows realized, can aect the nancing constraints faced by the rms.
Instead, what we nd is that realized cash ows proxies shifts in demand for investment, which given
everything else, leads a rm to report it self as nancially constrained. However, given the fact
that negative realization of cash ows leads a rm to report itself as more nancially constrained, it
seems that the dummy for negative cash ows does a better job in accounting for shifts in supply
of internal nance than cash ows. This is because, while on the margin a small positive income
10Not including (SINS) in specication for the nancial constraint equation resulted in some of the variable turning
insignicant and some becoming marginally signicant.
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shock can turn negative realization of cash ows into positive realization, on the average a very large
income shock, which is an extreme event, will be need to turn negative realization of cash ows into
positive realization. The point, therefore, is that dummy variable DNCF is by and large purged of
the demand signals, and hence performs as a better variable in accounting for shifts in the supply
of internal equity nance. To the extent that the share of innovative sales (SINS) can control for
the demand signals and DNCF can account for the shifts in supply of internal funds, our preferred
specication for the second stage is the one in columns (C0) and (C1).
Though it is true that innovative rms are averse to debt nancing, it may be that it does not
have the requisite amount of internal nance to nance their R&D activity. In such a situation a
rm has to resort to external sources of nancing. Borrowing, as we know, is a prevalent means
of nancing investment, but is costly due to capital market imperfections. Given the nature of
R&D, such as the intangibility and uniqueness of assets and the unpredictability of outcomes, the
degree of market imperfection related R&D is expected to be even higher, implying that external
sources of nance could be even more costly when it comes to R&D related activity. The notion
of nancial constraint that we employ is one of borrowing constraints, that is, rms are nancially
constrained when they reach their debt capacity. Depending on the amount of internally available
funds, the degree of market imperfection it faces, and the amount of existing debt it services, a rm
may or may not have reached its debt capacity. As stated earlier, we assume the latent variable fit,
underlying fit, as the shadow price of debt. This implies that if borrowing constraints for R&D rms
are indeed binding, then controlling for other factors, fit will be high. Now, controlling for other
factors, a rm with higher leverage is more likely to have reached its debt limit, which makes the
borrowing constraints more binding. Our results suggests that this is indeed the case, that is, we nd
a highly leveraged rm more likely to be nancially constrained. We nd that the scaled correlation
between it, the unobserved idiosyncratic component of the nancial constraint equation, and it, the
idiosyncratic component of the reduced form debt equation,


, to be signicant, suggesting a strong
simultaneity in the choice of leverage/capital structure and the nancial constraint with respect to
R&D investment. This should not be surprising, since after all, we are talking about the shadow
price of external nance related to endogenous borrowing constraints in the rm's optimal nancing
and real decisions.
We also nd that rms that maintain a higher amount of liquidity reserve are less nancially
constrained. In anticipation of nancing needs and the need to avoid costly external means of
nance, rms do practice precautionary savings. Given that nature of R&D, as discussed earlier,
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the need to nance R&D investment, through retained earnings might even be higher. However, it
is also possible that high cash holdings simply reect the fact that these rms are protable rms
with holdings in excess of their nancing needs for real investment. We also nd that rms that
pay dividends are signicantly less constrained, indicating that such rms are protable rms with
internally generated funds more than the nancing needs of the rm.
In our specication for nancial constraint equation we also included market share, size and age of
the rm as a proxy for degree of informational asymmetry, which we would like to control for. Firms
that are large, mature and enjoy a high degree of monopoly are generally well placed to mitigate
informational asymmetry problems such as adverse selection. Hennessey and Whited (2007) nd that
large rms face small cost of external nance as compared to small rms. However, what we nd is
that size has a signicant positive sign, indicating that large rms are more nancially constrained.
Here we would like to point out that it is mostly the innovators who answer to the questions relating
to nancial constraints: 100% for CIS2.5, 82% for CIS3, and 83% for CIS3.5. Therefore, somehow
we need to control for the fact that the information on being nancially constrained reported is the
constraint with respect to R&D, which only the innovators are more likely to answer. The strong
positive sign for size in the nancial constraint equation is due to the fact that size of the rm, to
a large extent explains the innovation decision of the rm, and is therefore able to control for the
fact that it is the innovators who mostly report on being nancially constrained. To conrm this,
we drop size, not reported here. Since size and age of rms are positively correlated, dropping size,
results in age being signicantly positive.
Our results suggests that rms with a large market share are less nancially constrained with
respect to R&D. Higher degree of monopoly implies that demand for its product will be more inelastic,
which in turn can enable the rm to be more protable by exercising discretionary pricing. Also,
rms enjoying a higher degree of monopoly could have a better access to capital markets. We also
nd that matured rms are less nancially constrained. This is for the simple reason that old rms
having survived through time have built reputation over the years, and are therefore less likely to
face adverse information asymmetry problems, as compared to young rms.
Finally, we discuss a result that pertains to Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2 plots the average partial eect of
leverage on the propensity to innovate conditional on being nancially constrained and conditional
being nancially unconstrained. We plot the APE of leverage against size, age and leverage. We
nd that conditional on not being nancially constrained, the APE of leverage on innovation to
be negative and almost constant over the distribution of size, age and leverage. In contrast, the
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APE of leverage on innovation conditional on being nancially constrained varies widely over the
distribution of age, size and leverage, and is less in absolute terms when compared to the APE of
leverage on innovation conditional on not being nancially constrained. This indicates that under no
nancial constraints innovative rms, regardless of size, maturity, and existing level of debt, would
uniformly, given the nature of R&D related activity, be less inclined to nance themselves with debt.
In other words, when borrowing constraints do not bind and debt is accessible on easier terms, and
if for some reason the rm has to nance itself with debt, then it is very unlikely that it will do it
for innovation purposes or it is unlikely that it is an innovating rm. The following scenario might
explain this: suppose there is a protable rm, that has a substantial amount of cash holdings, that
it can distribute to its share holders. Being protable, it is likely that it has a rather large debt
capacity and suppose its existing debt levels are such that it has not reached its debt capacity. In
such a situation, the rm can distribute cash and borrow more to nance its investment. However, if
it decides to innovate or spend more on R&D related activity, then as our results suggests, it would
be less inclined to distribute cash as dividends, be more inclined to maintain a high cash reserves
and not borrow more, in other words, nance itself with retained earnings.
When nancial constraints set in, innovating rms, though still averse to debt nancing, do bor-
row as is reected in the relatively higher marginal propensity to innovate with respect to marginal
increase in leverage as compared to the marginal propensity to innovate of the unconstrained rms.
Now, under nancial constraints, as Lambrecht and Myers (2008) explain, there can be two possibil-
ities: (a) postpone investment or (b) borrow more to invest. Given the fact that most of the rms
that report being nancially constrained are innovators, it is true that these rms have not entirely
abandoned innovative activity. Therefore, given our result that under constraint, the propensity to
innovate with respect to leverage is relatively higher than under no nancial constraints, it suggests
that some projects might have been valuable enough to pursue by borrowing, even if that implied
a higher cost. However, what we nd is that the marginal propensity to innovate with respect to
leverage varies with the distribution of size, age and leverage conditional on being constrained. This
is because under nancial constraints, the relative cost of external nancing perceived by the rm
depends on its age, size and the existing levels of debt. Take for example, the age of the rm, now
even though we nd that younger rms are more nancially constrained, it is the young rms that
are more innovative. This is because for younger rms survival and subsequent growth depends on
their innovation. Hence, under nancial constraints young rms are more willing to borrow than
matured rms. Consequently, we nd the marginal propensity to innovate with respect to leverage,
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though negative, is higher compared to a matured rm. Another line of reasoning supporting this
nding is that of Cooley and Quadrini (2001), who argue that young rms typically operate on a
smaller scale compared to mature rms, and therefore younger rm's prot are less susceptible to
exogenous shocks as compared to mature rms. Given that a rm's objective function is concave in
prots, higher volatility in prots imply a lower valuation of the rm, which makes further borrowing
by matured rms operating on larger scale more problematic.
Conditional on being nancially constrained, the marginal or the partial propensity to innovate
with respect to marginal increase in leverage, asymptotes to zero as size of the rm increases. This is
because, conditional on other covariates, as the size of the rm increases, for reasons discussed earlier,
a rm becomes more certain to innovate and consequently nancial constraints and marginal increase
in leverage have little eect on the marginal propensity to innovate. In other words as the size of
the rm increases, the eect of size dominates. However, under constraint small and medium sized
rms, are still quite unlikely to engage in R&D activity with higher debt in their capital structure.
6.6.2 Third Stage: R&D Switching Regression
In this section we discuss the structural estimates of the R&D equation switching model. The
obtained coecients are shown in Table 6.5 and the APE's of the variables in Table 6. As explained
earlier, the switching regression model is augmented with correction terms, obtained after rst and
second stage estimation. The correction terms correct for the bias arising due to endogeneity of
the choice of leverage, nancial constraints faced and the decision to innovate. The correction terms
constructed are on the basis of rst stage reduced form regression, discussed earlier, and second stage
specication, columns (C0) and (C1) reported in Table 6.3.
We nd that nancial constraints do adversely and signicantly aect R&D expenditure of rms.
Given our interpretation of fit as shadow price of external nance, faced with borrowing constraints,
the result suggests that costly external sources of nance do have a bearing on R&D activity. Table
6.5 also shows that for nancially constrained rms R&D investment is more sensitive to cash ows
as compared to the rms that are not nancially constrained. The sensitivity of R&D investment
to cash ows is signicant for the constrained rms but not for the unconstrained rms. However,
as stressed in an earlier discussion, the test for the impact of nancing frictions on investment
expenditure in our model does not rely on the comparison of sensitivity of investment to cash ows
for the constrained and unconstrained rms. Such dierences in the sensitivity of investment to cash
ows can arise, since, as Gomes (2001) argues constrained rms have a higher marginal productivity
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of capital and invest more than those unconstrained. They also have a higher value of Tobin's \q"
on average. Also, as Hennessy and Whited (2007) point out, the inability of proxies, in our model
the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rms, SINS, to perfectly control for investment
opportunity can give predictive power to cash ows in investment regression equations, when cash
ows are correlated to the investment opportunity set of the rms. Therefore, instead of interpreting
the higher and signicant coecient of cash ows for nancially constrained rms, it should be
interpreted as controlling for investment opportunity for constrained rms.
We nd that rms whose current share of innovative sales are high, are more likely to be R&D
intensive. Not including SINS in the specication, not reported here, resulted in a larger coecient
for cash ow, insignicant positive sign for fit, and insignicant coecients for some of the correction
terms. This suggests that the share of innovative sales in the total sales of the rm (SINS) among
others, is a also a function of demand signals or income shocks11.
We also nd that rms that payout dividends invest less in R&D. This seems to be more true
for rms that are nancially constrained with respect to R&D related activity. This corroborates
the result of the negative relation between dividend payout and innovation obtained in the second
stage. The prime reason for the negative correlation being that innovation is a risky venture, and
therefore lenders demand a premium on loans oered. Consequently, R&D intensive rms prefer
internal source of nancing, which makes them much less likely to distribute cash. The argument, it
seems is strengthened by the fact that rms that are nancially constrained with respect to innovative
activity, and if for some reasons are distributing cash, then such rms are even less up R&D intensive.
We also nd that rms with a large market share invest more in R&D, if only to maintain their
monopoly position in the market. However, as suggested by the APE's in column (b) of Table 6.6,
under nancial constraints rms enjoying monopoly power could also be less R&D intensive. We
nd that large rms are less R&D intensive, even though as the second stage results suggest, they
are more likely to be innovators. This should not be surprising, since smaller rms are the ones that
are more protable and experience higher growth. In their bid to grow, they exhibit risky behavior
both in terms of investment and borrowing, and consequently also experience higher volatility of
growth. Also, for larger rms, investing as-much-as or proportionately more would imply subjecting
themselves to higher risk. Since large rms operate on a larger scale and are therefore more subject
to exogenous shocks, investing as-much-as or proportionately more than small rms would imply,
tying up more capital in some risky venture, when they already are more subject to exigencies of
11We also estimated the system of equations with SINSit;t+1, reducing the number of observations to about half,
however, the results remained qualitatively the same.
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nature. Our ndings also suggests that young rms are more R&D intensive, corroborating the result
of the second stage, where we found them to more innovative. The arguments presented earlier in the
discussion of the second stage results, for young rms being more innovative, also apply here. Firms
that have a number of enterprises consolidated within them, DMULTI, are more likely to be R&D
intensive. Now, such rms can be large, but as stated earlier, the various enterprises constituting
the rm are more or less legal entities, with a certain degree of autonomy. These enterprises can
have their innovation own policy. Thus, such rms are expected to be engaged in diverse activity
and products. Hence, such rms, even if large, are found to be more R&D intensive. However, as
the APE's in column (b) of Table 6.6 suggests, the DMULTI rms, under nancial constraints, can
behave otherwise.
In our analysis we also nd that the various correlation term as 11 , 1

1
 , 
1

1
, 00 ,

0

0
 , and 
0

0
 are signicant, suggesting strong simultaneity in the decision to innovate, the
choice of capital structure and the amount of R&D expenditure. The signicance of , the factor
loading in the switching model also suggests that time invariant individual eect that aects the
decision to innovate and the choice of capital structure also aects the decision on the amount of
R&D expenditure.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented an empirical strategy for modelling a rm that chooses to be an innovator,
decides on the extent leverage, and how much it wants to spend on R&D, where all these decisions
are determined endogenously. In its decision to innovate and in deciding how much to spend on R&D
activity, the rm faces endogenous nancial constraints. The strategy entails estimating a system of
four simultaneous equations, estimated in three steps. The rst step being, estimation of the reduced
form leverage equation. The second step involves, conditional on rst step estimates, joint estimation
of the structural equations relating to the decision to innovate and the nancial constraints faced.
Finally, in the third stage we estimate a switching regression model for R&D investment, conditional
on being an innovator and the rst and second stage estimates. While such a multi-step procedure is
not uncommon for cross sectional data, in panel data one has to account for common time invariant
individual eect that aects all of the rm's decisions and the nancial constraints it faces. Our
approach, in which we replace the time invariant individual eect in the structural equations by its
expected a posteriori value, obtained from the rst stage estimates, allows us to consistently estimate
the parameters of the subsequent stages.
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Econometric methodology aside, the aim of the chapter has been to study what rm characteristics
are associated with a rm's decision to innovate and the nancial constraints it faces with respect to
R&D activity and how nancial constraints aect R&D investment. Among other rm characteristics,
the chapter investigates, how rm's leverage is related to the rms's decision to innovate and the
nancial constraints it faces with respect to R&D activity. We nd that a highly leveraged rm is
less likely to be an innovator and more likely to be nancially constrained. We nd that nancial
constraints adversely aects a rm's R&D expenditure, reducing the R&D expenditure by almost
two thirds, for an average rm.
We nd that large, young and rms enjoying a higher degree of monopoly are more likely to be
innovators. Also, rms that have many enterprises consolidated within them are more likely to be
innovators. We also nd that young rms are more likely to be facing nancial constraints, while
rms that enjoy a monopoly position are less constrained. As far a R&D investment is concerned, we
nd that it is the small and young rms that are more R&D intensive than large and mature rms
and that rms with large market share and multi-enterprise rms are more R&D intensive.
Also, the behavior of rms, conditional on being nancially constrained and conditional on be-
ing unconstrained, with regard to innovation and R&D intensity can be characteristically dierent.
Under no nancial constraints, the propensity to innovate with respect to leverage is negative and
lower as compared to a situation in which rms nd them selves nancially constrained. Also, the
propensity to innovate under no nancial constraints, barely varies with rm characteristics such as
maturity, size and leverage, while under nancial constraints, the propensity to innovate with respect
to leverage varies with the distribution of rm characteristics. As far as R&D intensity is concerned,
while unconditionally multi-enterprise and rms enjoying monopoly power are likely to be highly
R&D intensive, under constraints the R&D intensity of such rms decreases. The results help us in
understanding how incentives to innovate and capital market imperfections, with respect to nancing
R&D activity, facing the rms interact, and how these are distributed across rm characteristics.
Finally, given our results that nancial constraints adversely aect R&D investment, and the
fact that we have utilized almost a third of the CIS data, it seems to us that the eect of nancial
constraints for aggregate R&D investment for the economy can be considerable, which in turn can
impediment aggregate growth.
For future research, within the econometric technique we have developed, we seek to endogenize
some of the variables that could be potentially endogenous and compute the standard errors of the
APE.
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6.8 Appendix
6.A Identication of Structural Parameters with
Expected a Posteriori Values of Individual Eects
In this section we discuss the identication of the parameters for the second stage. Though the
second stage estimation involves a joint estimation of the probability of a rm being nancially
constrained and the probability of the rm being an innovator, here we discuss identication only for
the parameters that are pertinent to the nancial constraint equation. The arguments carry over to
the joint estimation of the nancial constraint and the selection equations and the third stage R&D
switching regression model.
Suppose, we are interested only in the nancial constraint aecting R&D, where the rm's lever-
age explains the nancial constraint the rm faces. To obtain the structural estimates for nancial
constraint, consider the nancial constraint equation, equation (3), and the reduced form debt equa-
tion, equation (5),
fit = z
f 0
it'+ dit'd + i + it (3)
dit = z
0
it + i + it: (5)
Since leverage is endogenous to the nancial constraint that the rm faces, the idiosyncratic com-
ponents it and it are correlated. To obtain the structural estimates of the nancial constraint
equation, a two step procedure can be employed, in which consistent estimates of the reduced form
parameters obtained in the rst stage can be used to obtain parameters of the structural equation
in the second stage by conditional likelihood or any other method of moment.
Now, given that it and it follow a normal distribution with correlation , we can write the linear
projection of it on it in error form as it = 
it

+ it. Then conditional on di = fdi1; : : : ; diTig0,
Zi = fZ 0i1; : : : ; Z 0iTig0, it and i the projection of fit, can be written as
fit = z
f 0
it'+ dit'd + i + 
it

+ it; (A-1)
where it is independent of di, Zi, it, and i, and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
(1  2)12. The probability of a rm being nancially constrained in period t, conditional on di, Zi,
12This essentially implies that conditional on it, it is independent of dit.
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i, and it, is then given by
Pr(fit = 1jdi; Zi; i; it) = 

zf 0it'+ dit'd + i + 
it
q
(1  2)

= 

zf 0it'+ dit'd + i + (
dit z0it i

)q
(1  2)

; (A-2)
where  is cumulative density function of a standard normal. The log likelihood function of a rm
being nancially constrained in period t is given by
Litf (';'d; ; ; ; jdi; Zi; i; it) = fit ln Pr(fit = 1jdi; Zi; i; it)
+ (1  fit) lnPr(fit = 0jdi; Zi; i; it):
The parameters, ', 'd, ,  in (A-2), could have been identied if we knew i, ,  and , where
 the standard deviation of the marginal distribution of i . Such a two step procedure is quite
standard in models for cross sectional data, where estimates of the rst stage errors are employed
to control for the endogeneity of the endogenous regressors. The problem, however, with models for
panel data is that the estimates of E(itjdi; Zi; i) = dit   z0it   i remain unidentied since we do
not observe i, even though ,  and  can be consistently estimated from the rst stage reduced
form estimation of equation (5). Here we show that using a two step procedure, where ,  and 
are estimated in the rst stage, E(itjdi; Zi) can still be identied, which can then be used for the
identication of the structural parameters.
Before we discuss identication for our non-linear model, we rst consider identication for a
linear model. Let f(ijdi; Zi) be the conditional distribution of time invariant individual eect i
conditional on di and Zi. Assume for the moment that f

it is some observed continuous variable.
Now, since di, Zi, and i are in the conditioning set, of which it is a function of, we can suppress it,
while writing the conditional expectation of fit. Thus we have E(f

itjdi; Zi; it; i) = E(fitjdi; Zi; i),
which is given by
E(fitjdi; Zi; i) = zf 0it'+ dit'd + i + 
it

+ E(itjdi; Zi; i)
= zf 0it'+ dit'd + i + 
(dit   z0it   i)

= zf 0it'+ dit'd + 
(dit   z0it)

+ (  

)i (A-3)
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For any individual, i, taking expectation of the above with respect to the conditional distribution of
, f(jd; Z) we obtain
E(ft jd; Z) =
Z
E(ft jd; Z; )f(jd; Z)d() = zf 0t '+ dt'd + 
(dt   z0t)

+ (  

)
Z
f(jd; Z)d(): (A-4)
Using Bayes rule we can write f(jd; Z) as
f(jd; Z) = f(d; Zj)g()
h(d; Z)
; (A-5)
where g and h are density functions. The above can be written as
f(jd; Z) = f(djZ;)p(Zj)g()
h(djZ)p(Z) ;
Since by our assumption the time invariant individual eects, i, are independent of the exogenous
variables Zi, hence p(Zj) = p(Z), that is,
f(jd; Z) = f(djZ)g()
h(djZ) =
f(djZ;)g()R
f(djZ;)g()d; (A-6)
Hence,
Z
f(jd; Z)d() =
Z
f(djZ;)g()dR
f(djZ;)g()d
=
R

QT
t=1 f(dtjZ;)g()dR QT
t=1 f(dtjZ;)g()d
=
R

QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t 

)g()dR QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t 

)g()d
=
R
~
QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t  ~

)(~)d~R QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t  ~

)(~)d~
; (A-7)
where the second and the third equality follow from the fact that conditional on Z and , each of
the dt, dt 2 fd1; : : : ; dT g are independently normally distributed with mean z0t +  and standard
deviation . g() by our assumption is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
 and
~ =  follows a standard normal distribution. Given that  is a smooth exponential function of
its argument and denominator of the right hand side of equation (A-8) is the estimated marginal
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maximum likelihood, which converges to its true value on the LHS, it can be shown that
R
~
QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t  ~

)(~)d~R QT
t=1
1

(
dt z0t  ~

)(~)d~
asy
R
^~
QT
t=1
1
^
(
dt z0t^ ^ ~
^
)(~)d~R QT
t=1
1
^
(
dt z0t^ ^ ~
^
)(~)d~
: (A-8)
The right hand side of (A-8) is the estimated expected a posteriori value of , ^(d; Z; ^; ^; ^). To
estimate the RHS of equation (A-8), numerical integration with respect to ~i can be carried out
using Gauss-Hermite quadratures. Therefore under asymptotic equivalence we can write (A-4) as
Z
E(ft jd; Z; )f(jd; Z)d()
asy zf 0t '+ dt'd + 
(dt   z0t)

+ (  

)^(d; Z; ^; ^; ^); (A-9)
and since
dt   z0t   ^i

asy dt   z
0
t^   ^i
^
;
hence
Z
E(ft jd; Z; )f(jd; Z)d()
asy zf 0t '+ dt'd + ^+ (
dt   z0t^   ^
^
): (A-10)
Therefore, if population parameters, ,  and  were known, the above implies that we could write
the linear predictor of ft , given d and Z in error form as
ft = z
f 0
t '+ dt'd + 
(dt   z0t   ^)

+ ^+ ~t
= zf 0t '+ dt'd + 
^t

+ ^+ ~t; (A-11)
where ^t = dt z0t  ^ = E(tjd; Z), which is identied, as claimed earlier. Conditional of d and Z, ~t
is i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2~ and ^ in the above equation is dened
at population parameters. For liner models, say if ft was observed and continuous, the parameters
of interest, ', 'd and , can be consistently estimated by running a pooled OLS regression, with
estimated a posteriori values, ^ substituted for  and consistent rst step estimates ^ and ^ for 
and  respectively. The test of exogeneity of dt can be carried out by testing the signicance of the
estimates of  and . The average partial eect of any exogenous variable zkt and endogenous dt
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are respectively given by
@E(ft jd; Z)
@zkt
='k and
@E(ft jd; Z)
@dt
= 'd: (A-12)
Now let us consider our non-linear model, where ft , is a latent variable underlying ft which takes
value 0 or 1. It follows from (A-11) and the fact that in probit models the parameters are identied
only up to a scale, that the probability of being nancially constrained, given di and Zi, is given by
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^t; ^) = Pr(ft > 0jd; Z; ^t; ^)
= 

zf 0t '
1
~
+ dt
'd
~
+

~
^+

~
^t


: (A-13)
However, Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^t; ^) 6= Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; t; ), and for any individual i, the mean eect or
the average partial eect (APE) of changing a variable say zk in time period t from zkt to zkt +  is
given by
Pr(ft = 1)
zkt
=
 Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z k; zk t ; (zkt + ); ; t)dg(; t)
 
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z k; zk t ; zkt; ; t)dg(; t)

=; (A-14)
where g(; t) is the distribution function of  and t. Hence, to recover the above measure in (A-14),
like Chamberlain (1984), we assume a distribution for i conditional on di and Zi:
i = 	(di; Zi) + i; (A-15)
where i is normally distributed with mean 0, variance 
2
 and is independent of everything else.
However, for any individual i, we have shown above that,
E(jd; Z) =
Z
f(jd; Z)d() = 	(d; Z) = ^(d; Z; ; ; ):
The above implies that conditionally on d and Z, t is distributed as
t = dt   z0t   ^   = ^t   :
Hence, under the assumption about the conditional distribution of i, we can write the linear pro-
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jection of ft as
ft = z
f 0
t '+ dt'd + ^+ 
^t

+ (  

)+ t; (A-16)
with the composite error term (   )i+ it = it, which is uncorrelated with any of the covariates
and is normally distributed with mean zero and variance (    )22 + 2 = 2 . Therefore, the
above assumption about the conditional distribution of i implies that,
Pr(fit = 1jdi; Zi) = 

zf 0it'
1

+ dit
'd

+


^i +


^it


: (A-17)
Since  in (A-16) remain unidentied, the parameters of interest can only be identied up to a scale.
Now, having assumed the conditional distribution of i, for any individual i, we now have
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ; t) = Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t; )
and
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t; )dF (^(:); ^t; ) =
Z Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t; )dG(^(:); ^t)h()d;
where F (^(:); ^t; ) is the joint distribution function of the arguments and G(^(:); ^t) is the joint
distribution of ^(:) and ^t. The equality above follows, since ^(:) and ^t by our assumption are
independent of . Also, since  is independent of d and Z, we can write the above as
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t; )dF (^(:); ^t; )
=
Z Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t; )h(jd; Z; ^(:); ^t)ddG(^(:); ^t)
=
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t)dG(^(:); ^t): (A-18)
Thus we have shown that
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ; t)dg(; t) =
Z
Pr(ft = 1jd; Z; ^(:); ^t)dG(^(:); ^t) (A-19)
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To obtain the sample analog of RHS of (A-19), for xed d = d and Z = Z, we can compute
1PN
i=1 Ti
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
Pr(fit = 1j d; Z; ^i(:); ^it): (A-20)
With (A-19) we can now compute (A-14), the mean eect of changing a variable say zk from zk to
zk +  given d = d and Z k = Z k.
Now consider the selection equation. The projection of st , the latent variable underlying selection,
in error form conditional on t is given by
st = z
s0
t  + dtd + + 
t

+ t:
By the same logic that we used to arrive at equation (A-16) for the nancial constraint equation, we
can write the selection equation as
st = z
s0
t  + dtd + ^+ 
^t

+ t; (A-21)
where t = (   )i+t which is uncorrelated with any of the covariates and is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance (    )22 + 2 = 2. However, t and t are correlated, with the
correlation coecient being
 =
(   )(  


)2 + 

:
Having assumed a conditional distribution for i, the R&D equations for the R&D switching
regression model can now be written as
r1t = z
r0
t  + f + 1(:) + ^+ 1
1

^t + 1t; (A-21a)
if fit > 0,
r0t = z
r0
t  + 0(:) + ^+ 0
0

^t + 0t; (A-21b)
if ft  0. The error terms 1it and 0it are respectively given by 1it = (  
1

)i + 1it and

0it
= (  0 )i+0it, which by assumption, are normally distributed with mean zero and variances
2
1
= (  1 )22 + 21 and 20 = ( 
0

)22 + 
2
0 respectively. We nally note that 1it and
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
0it
are correlated with 
it
and it. The correlation between 1it and it and between 1it and it
are respectively given by

1
 =
(  1 )( 


)2 + 1

1

and 
1
 =
(  1 )(  


)2 + 1

1

:
Replacing the 1's above with 0's we get the correlation between 
0it
and 
it
and between 
0it
and it
respectively.
6.B Derivation of the Correction Terms
To avoid complicating the notations, we denote the error components, 
1
, 
0
,  and  of equations (12a),
(12b), (13) and (14) respectively as 1, 0,  and . We know that the conditional expectation of , where 
is either 1 or 0, given  and , E[j; ], is given by
E[j; ] =  + (   )(   )
(1  2)
+
(   )(   )
(1  2)
:
Since,  =  =  = 0 we have,
E[j; ] = (   )()
(1  2)
+
(   )()
(1  2)
:
Dene,  =  and  =


, then
E[j; ] = (   )

(1  2)
+
(   )
(1  2)
;
which can be written as
E[j; ] = 
(1  2)
(   ) + 
(1  2)
(    ): (B-1)
Hence,
E[j >  a;  >  b] = E[j >  a

;  >
 b

] =
R1
 b

R1
 a

E[j; ]2(; ; )dd
2

a

; b ; 

=
1
2

a

; b ; 
 
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

(   )2(; ; )dd
+
1
2

a

; b ; 
 
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

(    )2(; ; )dd; (B-2)
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where, 2 and 2 denote respectively the density and cumulative density function function of a standard
bivariate normal. Now, consider the expression
R1
 b

R1
 a

(   )2(; ; )dd, of the RHS in (B-2).
Given that 2(; ; ) = ()
1p
(1 2)


  p
(1 2)

, the concerned expression can be written as
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

(   )() 1q
(1  2)


    q
(1  2)

dd =
Z 1
 a

()

1  
  b

   q
(1  2)

d   
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

()
1q
(1  2)


    q
(1  2)

dd: (B-3)
Now, let y =
  p
(1 2)
, then dy = dp
(1 2)
. Having dened y, the right hand side of (B-3) can now be written
as
Z 1
 a

()

1  
  b

   q
(1  2)

d   
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

(y
q
(1  2) +  )()(y)ddy
=
Z 1
 a

()

1  
  b

   q
(1  2)

d
 
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

y
q
(1  2)()(y)ddy   2
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

()(y)ddy (B-4)
= (1  2)
Z 1
 a

()

1  
  b

   q
(1  2)

d   
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

y()(y)ddy
= (1  2)
Z 1
 a

()
 b

+  q
(1  2)

d   
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

y()(y)ddy: (B-5)
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Now, note that ()d =  d() and () = ( ), hence using integration by parts, the rst part of the
last equation of (B-5) can now be written as
(1  2)
Z 1
 a

()
 b

+  q
(1  2)

d = (1  2)
Z 1
 a

 d()
 b

+  q
(1  2)

=  (1  2)()
 b

+  q
(1  2)
1 a

+ 
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 a

()
 b

+  q
(1  2)

d
= (1  2)(
a

)
 b

   aq
(1  2)

+ 
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 a

()
 b

+  q
(1  2)

d: (B-6)
The second expression of the last line in equation (B-5) can be written as
 
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
Z 1
 a

y()(y)ddy = 
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 a

Z 1
 b

  p
(1 2

)
d(y)()d
= 
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 a

(y)
1 b

  p
(1 2

)
()d =  
q
(1  2)
Z 1
 a


 b

+  q
(1  2)

()d: (B-7)
Plugging the results obtained in (B-6) and (B-7) into (B-4), we obtain
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

(   )2(; ; )dd = (1  2)(
a

)
 b

   aq
(1  2)

:
Similarly, it can be shown that
Z 1
 b

Z 1
 a

(    )2(; ; )dd = (1  2)(
b

)
 a

   bq
(1  2)

:
Hence,
E[j >  a

;  >
 b

] =
(
a

)
2

a

; b ; 
 b    aq
(1  2)

+
(
b

)
2

a

; b ; 
 a    bq
(1  2)

: (B-8)
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Now, consider
E[j   a;  >  b] = E[j   a

;  >
 b

] =
R1
 b

R  a
 1 E[j; ]2(; ; )dd
2

 a

; b ; 

=
1
2

 a

; b ; 
 
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

Z  a

 1
(   )2(; ; )dd
+
1
2

 a

; b ; 
 
(1  2)
Z 1
 b

Z  a

 1
(    )2(; ; )dd: (B-9)
By a method analogous to that used in deriving (B-8), it can be shown that
E[j   a

;  >
 b

] =
 ( a )
2

 a

; b ; 
 b    aq
(1  2)

+
(
b

)
2

 a

; b ; 
  a +  bq
(1  2)

: (B-10)
6.C Asymptotic Covariance Matrix of the Second and Third Stage
Estimates
In this section we give the asymptotic covariance matrix of the coecients of the second stage and
third stage R&D switching regression model. Newey (1984) has shown that sequential estimators
can be interpreted as members of a class of Method of Moments (MM) estimators and that this
interpretation facilitates derivation of asymptotic covariance matrices for multi-step estimators. Let
 = f1;2;3g, where 1, 2, and 3 are respectively the parameters to be estimated in the
rst, second and third step estimation of the sequential estimator. Following Newey (1984) we write
the rst, second, and third step estimation as an MM estimation based on the following population
moment conditions:
E(Li11) = E
@ lnLi1(1)
@1
= 0 (C-1)
E(Li22) = E
@ lnLi2(1;2; ^i(:;1); ^it(:;1))
@2
= 0 (C-2)
and
E[Fit(Xit;1;2;3)] = E[sitXit(rit  X 0it3)] = 0 (C-3)
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where Li1(1) is the likelihood function for individual i, for the rst step reduced form long-term
debt equation. Li2(1;2; ^i(:;1)) is the likelihood function for the second step estimation in
which the joint probability of a rm being an innovator and the rm being nancially constrained is
estimated. Equation (C-3) is the rst order condition for minimizing the sum of squared error for the
pooled OLS regression of Xit on rit for those rms, that have been selected, sit = 1. Xit = ffit, zr0it,
CFit, LQit, SINSit 1;t, DIVit, ^i(:;1), C11(:;1)it, C12(:;1;2)it, C13(:;1;2)it, C01(:;1)it,
C02(:;1;2)it, C03(:;1;2)it, Industry Dummies, Time Dummies g and ^i(:;1)  ^i(di; Zi;1)
is the expected a posteriori (EAP) values, based on the rst stage reduced form estimates.
The estimates for 1, 2, and 3 are obtained by solving the sample analog of the above popu-
lation moment conditions. The sample analog of moment conditions for the rst step estimation is
given by
1
N
L1^1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
Li1^1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
@ lnLi1(^1)
@1
(C-4)
where Li1(1) is given by equation (25), 1 = f; ; g and N is the total number of individu-
als/rms. Under standard regularity conditions, the rst step, reduced form ML estimate, ^1, is
consistent and the asymptotic covariance matrix of ^1 coincides with asymptotic covariance matrix
obtained in the ML estimation.
The sample analog of population moment condition for the second step estimation is given by
1
N
L2^2 =
1
N
NX
i=1
Li2^2 =
1
N
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
@ lnLit2(^1; ^2; ^i(:; ^1); ^it(:; ^1))
@2
(C-5)
where Lit2(1;2; ^i(:;1); ^it(:;1)) is given by equation (31) and 2 = f' 1 ,
'd

,  ,


;  1 ,
d

,  ,


; g. In Appendix A, we have shown, that with i substitute by their EAP values
^i(di; zi;1) still leads to the identication of 2. Let 

1 and 

2, respectively be the true values
of 1, 2. Under the assumptions we make, maximizing Li2(^1;2; :) is asymptotically equivalent
to maximizing Li2(

1;2; :), where ^1 is a consistent rst step estimate of 1 . Murphy and Topel
(1985) and Newey (1984), have derived the asymptotic distribution of the second step estimates of a
two step sequential estimator.
Murphy and Topel have shown that the second step ML estimate of 2 is consistent and asymp-
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totically normally distributed with asymptotic covariance matrix given by
V 2 =
1
N
[V2 + V2[R2V1R
0
2  R1V1R02  R2V1R01]V2]; (C-6)
where V1 is the asymptotic covariance matrix of
p
N(^1   1) based on maximization of L1(1),
V2 is the asymptotic covariance matrix of
p
N(^2   2) based on maximization of L2(1;2; i)
conditional on 1 and i,
R1 = E

1
N

@ lnL2
@2

@ lnL1
@01

and
R2 = E

1
N

@ lnL2
@2

@ lnL2
@01

:
The sample analog of R1 and R2 are given by
R^1 =
1
N
NX
i=1

@
PTi
t=1 lnLit2
@2

@ lnLi1
@01

and
R^2 =
1
N
NX
i=1

@
PTi
t=1 lnLit2
@2

@
PTi
t=1 lnLit2
@01

;
where the derivatives are evaluated at ^1 and ^2. Let 2f and 2s respectively denote the parameters
of the nancial constraint and the selection equation of the second step. Since the second step is
essentially a combination of Heckman and bivariate probit, @ lnL2@2 and
@ lnL2
@1
both involve taking the
derivative of cumulative density function of a standard bivariate normal with respect to 2f , 2s, 
and 1, and evaluated at ^2f , ^2s, ^, and ^1. The score functions of a bivariate probit are stated
in Greene (2002). Murphy and Topel (1985) and Newey (1984), derive the asymptotic distribution
of the second step estimates of a two step sequential estimator only for a single cross section of the
data. However, since we are dealing with panel data, the derivative of EAPs, ^i(di; zi; ; ; ) with
respect to 1 = f; ; g, that appear in the likelihood Lit2(1;2; :) is also evaluated. That is,
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the derivative of ^i(di; zi; ; ; ),
@^i(di; zi; ; ; )
@1
=
@
@1
R
~i
QTi
t=1
1

(dit zit  ~i )(~i)d~i
Li1(; ; )

as an argument of Li2(1;2; i) is evaluated at ^1 = f^; ^; ^g for each individual.
To derive, the asymptotic distribution of the third step estimates 3 consider the Taylor's ex-
pansion of stacked up moment conditions
26664
L11(1)
L22(1;2)
F (1;2;3)
37775
where
1
N
F (^1; ^2; ^3) =
1
N
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
Fit(Xit; ^1; ^2; ^3) =
1
N
NX
i=1
TiX
t=1
sitXit(^)(rit  Xit(^)0^3)
is the sample analog of the population moment condition given in (C-3). A series of Taylor's expansion
of L11(1), L22(1;2) and F (1;2;3) gives
1
N
26664
L111 0 0
L212 L222 0
F1 F2 F3
37775
26664
p
N(1  1)p
N(2  2)p
N(3  3)
37775 =   1pN
26664
L11
L22
F
37775
In matrix notation the above can be written as
BN
p
N( ) =   1p
N
N
Under the standard regularity conditions for Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), see Hansen
(1982) and Newey (1984), BN converges in probability to the lower block triangular matrix B =
limEBN and
1p
N
N converges in distribution to an asymptotically normal random variable with
mean zero and a covariance matrix A = limE 1NN
0
N , where A is given by
A =
26664
VL1L1 VL1L2 VL1F
VL2L1 VL2L2 VL2F
VFL1 VFL2 VFF
37775 ;
206 CHAPTER 6
where a typical element of A, say VL1L2 is given by VL1L2 =
1
NE[L11(1)L22(1;2)
0]. Under the
regularity conditions
p
N(   ) is asymptotically normal with zero mean and covariance matrix
given by B 1 AB 10 . To derive the asymptotic distribution of
p
N(3 3) consider the partitioned
matrix of B
B =
1
N
26664
24L111 0
L212 L222
35 240
0
35
h
F1 F2
i h
F3
i
37775 ;
where with a slight abuse of notation we denote by L111 the expectation of L111 . Then by an
application of the partitioned inverse formula and by using the facts that ( 1NL111)
 1VL1L1
( 1NL111)
 1 = V1 and ( 1NL222)
 1VL2L2(
1
NL222)
 1 = V2, where V1 is the asymptotic covariance
matrix of
p
N(^1   1) based on maximization of L1(1), V2 is the asymptotic covariance matrix
of
p
N(^2 2) based on maximization of L2(1;2; i) conditional on 1 and i, we arrive at the
asymptotic distribution of
p
N(3  3), V 3 , given by
V 3 = F
 1
3
f[F1   [F2V2L21 ]V1([F1   [F 02V2L021 ]] + VL1L2V2L022   VL1F )
+F2V2[VL2L1V1[F
0
2V2L
0
21 ] + F
0
2   VL2F ]  VFL1V1[F 02V2L021 ]  VFL2V2F 02gF 103 + F 13 fVFF gF 103
(C-7)
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6.D Second and Third Stage Estimation Results
List of Variables
f : Dummy for nancial constraints; SINS: Share of Innovative sales in the total sales of the rm;
DEBT : Long term debt to capital asset ratio; CF : Ratio of cash ows to capital asset; LQ: Ratio
of cash reserves to capital asset; DIV : Dummy for positive dividends; MKSH: (Market Share)
Ratio of total sales of the rm to the industry total sales; SIZE: Logarithm of the number of people
employed; AGE: Age of the rm in years ; RAINT : Ratio of intangible assets to total capital asset
ratio; DNCF : Dummy for negative cash ows; DMULTI: Dummy that takes value 1 if the number
of enterprises consolidated within a rm is more than one.
Table 6.3: Second Stage Estimates
Financial Innovation Financial Innovation Financial Innovation
Constraints Constraints Constraints
(A0) (A1) (B0) (B1) (C0) (C1)
SINSt 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DEBTt 0.471 -0.250 0.468 -0.250 0.123 -0.248
(0.149) (0.061) (0.148) (0.061) (0.052) (0.061)
CFt 0.009 0.009
(0.004) (0.004)
LQt -0.102 0.048 -0.102 0.048 -0.030 0.048
(0.031) (0.013) (0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
DIVt -0.031 -0.109 -0.031 -0.109 -0.178 -0.110
(0.081) (0.042) (0.081) (0.043) (0.055) (0.043)
MKSHt -0.015 0.212 -0.015 0.212 -0.002 0.215
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.019) (0.004) (0.012)
SIZEt 0.180 0.101 0.179 0.101 0.189 0.101
(0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.012) (0.021)
AGEt -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
RAINTt -0.042 0.441 0.447 0.447
(0.112) (0.104) (0.103 (0.103)
DNCFt 0.104 0.104 0.227
(0.075) (0.075) (0.056)
DMULTIt 2.071 2.071 2.060
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)


-0.447 -0.444 -0.099
(0.1486) (0.148) (0.051)


0.270 0.270 0.269
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062)


-1.363 -1.355 -0.354
(0.432) (0.432) (0.153)


0.612 0.612 0.607
(0.173) (0.173) (0.173)
 0.528
 0.528  0.530 
Likelihood-Ratio test: 21 (412.049) (412.094) (411.582)
Total Number of Observations: 13034
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
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Table 6.4: Average Partial Eects for Second Stage
The APE's in this table are for the specication in column (C0) and (C1) of Table 3.
Finance Innovation
Coecient APE Coecient APE
SINSt 0.009
 0.001
(0.002)
DEBTt 0.123
 0.016 -0.248 -0.091
(0.052) (0.061)
LQt -0.030
 -0.004 0.048 0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
DIVt -0.178
 -0.022 -0.110 -0.013
(0.055) (0.043)
MKSHt -0.002 -0.0003 0.215
 0.037
(0.004) (0.012)
SIZEt 0.189
 0.025 0.101 0.079
(0.012) (0.021)
AGEt -0.003
 -0.0005 -0.007 -0.003
(0.002) (0.001)
RAINTt 0.447
 0.163
(0.103)
DNCFt 0.227
 0.034
(0.056)
DMULTIt 2.060
 0.545
(0.055)
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
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Table 6.5: Third Stage: R&D Switching Equation
ft -0.3077

(0.1539)
SINSt 0.0122

(0.0012)
ft  CFt 0.0993
(0.0162)
(1  ft)  CFt 0.0001
(0.001)
ft DIVt -0.2101
(0.0728)
(1  ft) DIVt -0.0396
(0.0245)
MKSHt 0.0074

(0.0017)
SIZEt -0.0429

(0.0109)
AGEt -0.0095

(0.0009)
DMULTIt 0.2297

(0.4413)
 0.0155
(0.0053)
C11(:)t 0.3278

(0.0803)
C12(:)t 0.2245

(0.0895)
C13(:)t 1.1382

(0.1613)
C01(:)t -0.0687

(0.0176)
C02(:)t -0.2492

(0.1161)
C03(:)t 0.2943

(0.0519)
Total Number of Observations: 13034
Number of Censored Observations: 6767
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Table 6.6: APE's for the Third Stage
The table reports the Average Partial Eects of some of the variables on R&D intensity. While the APE of ft,
the reported nancial constraint faced by the rms is unconditional, the APE's of the rest of the variables in
column (a) is conditional on being selected. The APE's of the variables reported in column (b) are conditional
on being selected and conditional on being nancially constrained. The APE's of the variables reported in
column (c) are conditional on being selected and conditional on being not nancially constrained.
ft -0.2635
a b c
SIZEt -0.0482 -0.0632 -0.0456
MKSHt 0.7013 -0.0137 0.7026
AGEt -0.0076 -0.0036 -0.0077
DIVt -0.0305 -0.0866 -0.0205
DMULTIt 0.0881 -0.0945 0.1192
6.E Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Censored and Non-Censored Variables
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
r 0.5061 0.3377 0.1914
SINS 8.5349 8.8979 5.668
No. of Censored obs. (2946) (1844) (1981)
DEBT 0.7359 0.712 0.9155
CF 0.8601 0.9671 0.3978
DMULTI 0.2107 0.261 0.2607
LQ 0.9644 0.9407 0.9420
DIV 0.1825 0.1832 0.1772
MKSH 0.5396 0.7318 0.6443
LOG(SIZE) 4.5745 4.1161 4.328
AGE 20.71 23.51 22.99
RAINT 0.036 0.0386 0.0506
DNCF 0.0873 0.0929 0.127
Total no. of obs. (5362) (3424) (4248)
The gures reported are the means of the respective variables
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Table 6.8: Total number of enterprise, Nf , and number of enterprise within a rm sur-
veyed, nf
The table illustrates the number of rms, in each of the three CIS waves, for which the number of number of
enterprise surveyed is equal to the number of enterprise present in the rm, Nf = nf , and the number of rms,
for which the number of enterprises present in the rm exceeds the number of enterprises surveyed. These
gures pertain to the CIS data set prior to merging with the SFGO and the SFKO data set. Since not all the
CIS rms are in the SFGO and the SFKO data set, the data used for estimation after cleaning, is a bit less
than half the size of the original data set.
CIS2.5 CSI3 CIS3.5
No. of rms No. of rms No. of rms No. of rms No. of rms No. of rms
Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf Nf Nf = nf Nf > nf
1 9400 0 1 6155 0 1 7096 0
2 151 1255 2 67 823 2 137 978
3 20 608 3 4 424 3 24 553
4 3 316 4 3 237 4 2 290
5 3 247 5 2 108 5 222
6 149 6 115 6 122
7 107 7 48 7 105
8 60 8 77 8 50
9 2 93 9 58 9 77
10 83 10 39 10 82
11 106 11 63 11 50
12 49 12 39 12 58
13 43 13 15 13 49
14 59 14 50 14 46
15 46 15 17 15 25
16 31 16 28 16 51
17 62 17 15 17 15
18 36 18 26 18 55
19 37 19 13 19 8
20 29 20 21 20 28
21 13 21 2 21 43
22 23 22 27 22 36
23 15 24 5 23 18
25 34 25 9 24 25
26 46 26 8 25 11
27 4 27 21 27 17
29 14 28 13 28 19
30 14 29 8 29 11
31 18 30 8 30 15
32 15 31 3 31 7
33 11 32 16 32 16
34 18 34 22 33 25
37 15 40 10 37 21
38 15 45 14 38 13
43 15 48 18 39 20
44 17 50 19 40 9
45 14 57 16 41 10
48 20 60 16 46 15
49 22 50 16
51 28 53 47
56 19 55 16
66 33
85 41
212 CHAPTER 6
Figure 6.1: APE of long-term Debt to Asset Ratio on Unconditional Probability of Innovation.
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Figure 6.2: APE of long-term Debt to Asset Ratio on Probability of Innovation conditional on being
Financially Constrained, @ Pr(sit=1jfit=1)@dit , and APE of long-term Debt to Asset Ratio on Probability
of Innovation conditional on not being Financially Constrained, @ Pr(sit=1jfit=0)@dit .
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7Conclusions
7.1 Summary, limitations and further research
The central message that comes out of the study is that market failure for R&D investment can be
very acute. The three empirical chapters on R&D and innovation activity conrm this. In order to
arrive at this result, in all the three chapters, we have used information on nancial constraints as
reported by the enterprises. This alternative procedure to test the implication of nancing frictions on
R&D investment, bypasses some the criticism levelled against the more traditional approach of using
reduced form accelerator type model or the Euler equation approach. Besides presenting evidence of
market failure due to nancing friction for R&D related activity, another major contribution of the
thesis has been to show how incentives, that vary with rm distribution, to innovate interact with
nancing decision, or in other words, we show how nancing and innovation decision vary with the
distribution of rm characteristic such as size, age, leverage, and nancing constraints. The study
also shows how among the set of innovating rms, R&D intensity vary with rm characteristics, and
how R&D intensity for each given rm characteristic changes under nancial constraints. Another
important contribution of the thesis has been to show how agency problem between bond holders
and stock holders can arise over R&D investment which is risky because of the technical uncertainty
and because of the intangibility of the assets involved. In the rest of this chapter we summarize our
nding, point out the limitations, and discuss some directions for future research.
In Chapter 2 we estimated both linearized as well as non-linear form of Euler equation, augmented
with nancial variables, for investment derived from the optimization problem of the rm. The study
shows that, ceteris paribus, rms that are highly leveraged are more likely to face binding nancing
constraints and that nancing constraints aect rm level investment. However, we were also able to
point out the misspecication in estimation due ignoring the xed component of adjustment cost. For
future research, it would be interesting to analyze the interaction of nancing frictions and non-convex
adjustment costs. Non-convexity of adjustment costs imply that rm-level investment is lumpy, and
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hence, rms invest infrequently but each investment is large. The presence of nancing frictions
could aect the frequency, as well as the amount, at which investment projects are undertaken.
In Chapter 3 as stated earlier, we use direct information on nancial constraints as reported by
the rms, to assess its eect on R&D investment. For estimation we uses a semiparametric sample
selection estimator. Here we show that nancial constraints adversely aect R&D activity, however
the eect of nancial constraint is reduced when other constraints to innovation bind. The empirical
specication was derived from an optimal lending contract studied by Gale and Hellwig (1985).
One of the limitations of this study is that, since balance sheet information of the rms were not
available, we could not include nancial state variables in the model, which otherwise could have
given us a richer specication for estimation. We overcome this limitation in Chapter 5, where we
study nancing and innovation policy in greater detail using panel data instead of a single cross
section as in this chapter.
In Chapter 4 we have analyzed the nature and the degree of obstacles, in particular nancial
constraints, to innovative activity using statistical information from CIS 3.5 for the Netherlands. In
this chapter we took a dierent approach to assess the impact of nancial constraints on innovation
activity. Rather than looking at the impact of nancial constraints on R&D investment, we studied
the impact on rm decisions to abandon, prematurely stop, seriously slow down or desist from starting
an innovative project as a result of nancial and other hampering factors. Our analysis leads us to
conclude that the constraints faced by innovative rms are important and have had a major negative
impact on innovative activity. The chapter ends with a discussion of policy measures that have been
taken to overcome, or at least attenuate these obstacles, such as R&D tax incentives, venture capital
nancing and policy mix packages.
In Chapter 5 we use the framework of real options to study the interaction of nancing and R&D
investment decision. We show how agency problem between bond holders and stock holders can arise
over R&D investment, which is risky in our model not due to high variance of cash ows, but due to
asset intangibility and presence of technical uncertainty in successful completion of the R&D project.
We nd that, under certain situations, higher intangibility of assets and lower intensity of completion
can both lead stock holders to overinvest, thereby shift the risk of undertaking the R&D on to the
bond holders. The chapter also compares R&D investment to that of scale expansion. We nd that
under certain, reasonable circumstance R&D investment is more desirable than scale expansion and
yet it might be dicult to nance with debt. However, in this study we only indicate the existence
of the potential agency problem that can arise between the bond holders and the owners of the rm.
7.1. Summary, limitations and further research 217
To compute the value of loan commitment it is important that agency cost due to the risk involved in
R&D project be computed. We also recognize that a richer model for R&D, incorporating learning,
an option to abandon the R&D project prior to liquidation, and accumulation of intellectual capital
stock over time could have some bearing on the results we report. For our future work we intend to
incorporate such features into our model.
The sixth and the nal chapter of the thesis again analyzes the eect of nancial constraints on
R&D investment. One contribution of this chapter has been to show how to aggregate enterprise
level data up to the company/rm level, when not all enterprises belonging to the rm had been
surveyed. We performed this exercise since nancial variables, which are the regressors in the model,
were only available at the company level. This exercise was performed for about 20 to 25 percent
of the rms, the others being single enterprise rms. We believe that better aggregation procedure,
for example Bayesian techniques, are available when there are missing data. For our future work we
intend to use such methods for aggregation.
In Chapter 6, we not only assess the impact of nancing frictions on R&D intensity, but also
study how nancing decision and decision to innovate are interlinked. We nd that nancing and
innovation decision vary over the distribution of rm characteristics such as age, size, leverage, and
being nancially constrained. The study in this chapter shows that rms that are more leveraged are
likely to be nancially constrained and that highly leveraged rms are less likely to be innovators.
Besides, we also nd that nancing decision, the decision to innovate, the nancial constraint faced,
and the amount of R&D investment are all endogenously determined.
In this chapter we also introduced a new estimator for panel data with endogenous regressor that
helps us to identify parameters of interest for a system of equations. Though in the literature there
are many estimators for panel data with endogenous regressors, given the nature of our data where
the panel was short and unbalanced, and our problem where we had to estimate a system of four
equations, the existing estimators did not prove helpful. However, for the study in chapter 6, we
had only one endogenous regressor. The procedure can easily be generalized to include additional
endogenous regressors. Introducing dynamics, more than one time invariant individual eect and
possible semiparametric extensions will also be considered.
Though, Chapter 6 is an extensive study of nancing and innovation activity of a rm, one
particular limitation of the study has been the lack of dynamics in the model that was explored.
Economic considerations such as adjustment cost would would raise the issue of introducing dynam-
ics in the model. One reason for not including dynamics in the model was because information on
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R&D expenditure was available only for alternative time periods, while any specication for convex
adjustment cost requires having lagged dependent variable. It is not that we do not recognize a pos-
sible misspecication for not letting R&D investment respond such costs, but in a static framework,
as we have shown in chapter 3, R&D investment is only a function of future expected protability
and the the degree of nancing friction faced. Besides, there is a question of arriving at an empirical
specication derived from a dynamic contractual model of nancing and investment. In general, we
recognize that it is dicult to have an empirical model that adheres closely to theoretical models in
nance and economics, some of which do not even deliver closed form solutions. In such a situation,
the method of indirect inference may be one possible route, which many researchers are taking to
study the complicated interaction between nancing and investment decisions.
As stated in the introductory chapter, innovative activity is important for economic growth and
welfare. But due to the nature of R&D activity that gives rise to worst kind of information asymmetric
problem, market failure for R&D investment can be very acute. Considering this fact, it is important
that further research be carried out on the topic of nancing of innovations. Though the literature in
nance and economics recognizes that market failure for R&D can be severe, we do not know of any
paper that has estimated the price dierential on external nance for R&D investment and physical
investment. This is not only an interesting research question but also important from the point of
view of policy making.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Het belang van innovatieve activiteiten van bedrijven voor het verzorgen van economische groei en
welvaart wordt tegenwoordig algemeen erkend en is uitvoerig gedocumenteerd in de wetenschap-
pelijke literatuur. Hoe belangrijk dit ook moge zijn, we weten eveneens dat het marktfalen voor
R&D investeringen vrij ernstig kan zijn. Bedrijven zonder interne nancieringsmiddelen, boren ex-
terne bronnen aan om hun innovatieve activiteiten te bekostigen. Kapitaalmarktfricties, gegenereerd
door informatieasymmetrie, leiden evenwel vaak tot een grote kloof tussen de kost van externe en
interne nanciering. Dit idee van dure externe nanciering staat in schril contrast met de complete-
markt aanpak die ten grondslag ligt aan de conventionele investeringsmodellen die verwachte toekom-
stige winstgevendheid en gebruikerskosten van kapitaal als de bepalende factoren voor investeringen
beschouwen.
Informatietheoretische modellen in de nanciering en de economie tonen aan hoe informatieasym-
metrie kan leiden tot het heen van een grote opslag op externe middelen, en in extreme gevallen,
zelfs tot het rantsoeneren ervan. Gezien de aard van R&D is het zo dat de risico's die bij investerin-
gen in R&D activiteiten komen kijken groter zijn dan bij fysieke investeringen. Bijgevolg zouden
investeringen in R&D activiteiten aan nog groter marktfalen onderhevig kunnen zijn dan fysieke
investeringen.
Deze informatietheoretische modellen geven echter slechts een kwalitatieve richting aan voor em-
pirisch werk, in de eerste plaats omdat weinige zowel endogene investeringen als nancieringsbeslissin-
gen modelleren, en in de tweede plaats omdat slechts enkele van deze modellen op observeerbare
variabelen gestoeld zijn. Bijgevolg heeft de empirische literatuur zich, met uitzondering van een
paar studies, verlaten op twee losse argumenten om testen van het verband tussen nanciering en
investering te motiveren. En stroming in de literatuur, die bedrijven ad hoc als constrained en un-
constrained classiceert en gebruik maakt van reduced-form accelerator type modellen, veronderstelt
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dat de investeringen van 'geconstrainde' bedrijven gevoeliger zijn voor interne middelen dan het geval
is voor de 'niet-geconstrainde' bedrijven. Een tweede stroming in de literatuur die gebruik maakt van
structurele Eulervergelijkingen, veronderstelt dat de incrementele intertemporele substitutie van in-
vesteringen vandaag voor investeringen morgen wordt benvloed door de schaduwwaarde van schaarse
externe middelen. Hoewel deze modellen oorspronkelijk ontwikkeld werden voor de studie van in-
vesteringen op het niveau van het bedrijf, zijn ze eveneens gebruikt voor de studie van patronen in
R&D investeringen van hele sectoren.
Beide methodologien zijn echter al in vraag gesteld aangezien zij mogelijk niet in staat zijn de
eecten van nancieringsfricties op R&D investering op bedrijfsniveau adequaat te identiceren. Voor
de modellen van het reduced-form accelerator type volgt de kritiek uit het feit dat de proxies die de
onderliggende investeermogelijkheden controleren niet perfect meetbaar zijn, en dat de kasstromen
die als maatstaf dienen voor interne rijkdom gecorreleerd zouden kunnen zijn met vraagsignalen.
Tevens, om het eect van nancieringsfricties op investeringen op bedrijfsniveau vast te stellen, zijn
de bedrijven, zoals eerder vermeld, geclassiceerd als geconstraind of niet-geconstraind. Bijgevolg
wordt de endogeneteit van de nancieringsconstraints niet in acht genomen, wat impliceert dat de
conclusies die we trekken over de gevoeligheid van de investeringen voor gerealiseerde kasstromen als
proxy voor verschuivingen in interne rijkdom wel eens niet geheel correct zouden kunnen zijn. Wat
de schatting van Eulervergelijkingen betreft, daar de vergelijkingen afgeleid zijn onder de aanname
van geleidelijke aanpassingskost en dus de vaste component genegeerd wordt, lijdt het model aan
misspecicatie. In Hoofdstuk 2, dat over investeringen op bedrijfsniveau gaat, beschrijven we deze
bron van misspecicatie.
Gegeven de bovenstaande argumenten is het objectief van deze thesis deels alternatieve strate-
gien te gebruiken om de eecten van nancieringsfricties op R&D investment te bestuderen. Om
precies te zijn, in drie van de hoofdstukken gebruiken we de rapportage van bedrijven over hun -
nancile constraints, om de mate van R&D-investeringsgerelateerd marktfalen te bepalen. Om het
gebruik van gerapporteerde nancile constraints te motiveren leiden we een empirische specicatie
af van een theoretisch model in een contractueel kader. Het gebruik van de gerapporteerde nan-
cile constraint als regressor laat ons tevens toe het probleem aan te pakken van gelijktijdigheid van
investeringsbeslissing en observatie van de constraint.
Naast de kwestie welke weerslag nancieringsfrictie heeft op investeringen en innovatie, gaat de
thesis ook dieper in op hoe andere factoren de investeringen van het bedrijf en de innovatiebeslissing
benvloeden. In Hoofdstuk 6 bestuderen we hoe nancierings- en innovatiebeslissingen gerelateerd zijn
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over de verdeling van bedrijfseigenschappen zoals grootte, leeftijd, leverage, en de nancile constraints
waaraan zij onderhevig zijn.
De verzameling van studies is weergegeven in vijf hoofdstukken die onafhankelijk van mekaar
gelezen kunnen worden. Dientengevolge is enige herhaling, met name in de bespreking van de
bestaande literatuur, onvermijdelijk gebleken. De thesis draagt in verschillende opzichten bij aan
de literatuur over nancieringsfricties en investeringen. In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen we het eect van
nancieringsfricties op investering in fysiek kapitaal dat op bedrijfsniveau plaats heeft. De studie
levert bewijs dat het probleem van asymmetrische informatie de allocatie van investeeruitgaven van
een bedrijf benvloedt. Het blijkt dat het opnemen van het schaduwprijseect van externe nanciering
de prestaties van de Eulervergelijkingen sterk verbetert ten opzichte van de standaard neoklassieke
specicatie. We construeren tevens een index van nancile constraints gebaseerd op de schattin-
gen van het structurele model. Dan blijkt dat de investering van het bedrijf vermindert naarmate
de nancile constraints strakker worden. Een laatste bevinding van dit hoofdstuk is dat voor een
groep van bedrijven die om de beurt investeren en desinvesteren, de Eulervergelijking gebaseerd op
geleidelijke aanpassingskost ongepast lijkt, wat de misspecicatie ten gevolge van het negeren van de
vaste of niet-convexe component van de aanpassingskost weergeeft.
In Hoofdstuk 3 doen we een empirisch onderzoek naar de eecten van nancieringsconstraints op
de investering in R&D. Deze analyse wordt uitgevoerd op de CIS Nederland data. Gebruik makend
van directe informatie over nancile constraints, verkregen door bij bedrijven uitgevoerde enqutes,
in plaats van de gangbare handelsbalansinformatie, presenteert deze studie bewijs dat nancile con-
straints de beslissing van een bedrijf benvloedt hoeveel te investeren in R&D activiteiten. Door het
bestuderen van de eecten van nancile constraints op R&D investeringen, onderzoeken we tevens
welke eigenschappen van een bedrijf dit bedrijf nancieel geconstrained maken. Het blijkt dat oude
bedrijven of bedrijven die bij een groep behoren minder onderhevig zijn aan nancile constraints
wanneer het op R&D investeringen aankomt. Wij zijn ons niet bewust van andere artikelen die het
negatieve eect van nancieringsconstraints, door ondernemingen gerapporteerd, op R&D investerin-
gen empirisch aantonen.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we het belang van nancile en andere obstakels voor innovatie in
Nederland middels de statistische informatie van de CIS 3.5 innovatie-enqute. We rapporteren re-
sultaten aangaande het eect van deze obstakels voor de beslissing van een bedrijf om een innovatief
project te laten schieten, voortijdig stop te zetten, te vertragen, of helemaal niet te starten. Uit
deze studie blijkt dat nancieringsconstraints een zeer belangrijke remmende factor betekenen voor
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het nastreven van innovatie. We vinden tevens dat bepaalde marktfundamentals, zoals marktonzek-
erheid en economische onzekerheid, waarvan bedrijven hun investeringsbeslissingen laten afhangen
relevanter worden als de nancile constraints niet langer bindend zijn. Dit hoofdstuk besluit met een
bespreking van enkele beleidsmaatregelen die getroen zijn om deze obstakels te overwinnen, of op
zijn minst hun eect te verzachten.
In hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we nancierings- en R&D investeringsbeslissingen in een real-options
kader. Hoewel er in de corporate nance literatuur een veelvoud van studies bestaat die agency
problemen bestudeert tussen de verschillende groepen van belanghebbenden bij investeringen van het
bedrijf, hebben wij geen studies gevonden die speciek op de agency issues tussen aandeelhouders
en obligatiehouders voor R&D investeringen ingaat. Hier bestuderen wij de gevolgen van risico's
geassocieerd met R&D investeringen voor agencyconicten tussen obligatiehouders en aandeelhouders
van het bedrijf. Het risico geassocieerd met R&D investeringen komt voornamelijk voort uit de
immaterile aard van de activa die gebruikt worden in het R&D proces, en verder uit de technische
onzekerheid die gepaard gaat met het succesvol afronden van het project. Onze bevinding is dat
wanneer de immaterialiteit van de activa hoog is en de intensiteit waarmee men het R&D proces
uitvoert laag, dan resulteert een overinvestering van de kant van de aandeelhouders, wat impliceert
dat ze risico's afwentelen op de obligatiehouders. Los van de studie van het agencyprobleem, maakt
dit hoofdstuk tevens de vergelijking tussen R&D investering en algemene schaalvergroting van het
bedrijf. Middels deze vergelijking scheppen we klaarheid in de overvloed aan empirische studies
die vaststellen dat R&D intensieve bedrijven minder leveraged zijn dan bedrijven die geen R&D
uitvoeren.
In Hoofdstuk 6 gebruiken we panel data van drie golven om enerzijds het eect van van -
nancile constraints op R&D investment en anderzijds de determinanten van nancile constraints te
bestuderen. We onderzoeken tevens de factoren die bedrijven aansporen om in R&D activiteiten
te investeren. De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 6 kunnen als volgt worden samengevat. Ten eerste,
nancile constraints hebben een negatief eect op de R&D intensiteit gemeten als de ratio tussen
R&D uitgaven en vaste activa. Ten tweede, bedrijven met veel leverage zijn zwaarder nancieel
geconstraind, en zijn bijgevolg minder geneigd te investeren in R&D activiteiten. Ten derde, in geval
leverage stijgt is het waarschijnlijker dat een bedrijf niet innoveert als het geen nancile constraints
heeft tegen als het ze wel heeft. Ten vierde, de verandering in de kans dat een bedrijf innoveert,
geassocieerd met een verandering van n eenheid in leverage, gegeven dat dit bedrijf geen nancile
constraints heeft, is nagenoeg constant. Dezelfde verandering, gegeven dat het bedrijf wl nan-
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cile constraints heeft, varieert over de verdeling van bedrijfseigenschappen zoals leeftijd, grootte, en
leverage. Ten vijfde, de beslissing om te innoveren, de nancile constraints die men heeft, en de
kapitaalstructuur die men hanteert zijn endogeen. Ten zesde, de R&D intensiteit van bedrijven met
verschillende eigenschappen, onder de conditie van nancile constraints en de conditie van geen -
nancile constraints, verschillen van mekaar. Ten laatste, de gevoeligheid van R&D investeringen voor
kasstromen is hoger voor nancieel geconstrainde bedrijven. De gebruikte econometrische exercitie
is een drie-stapsprocedure, waarbij de verwachte a posteriori waardes van tijdsinvariante individuele
eecten, verkregen uit de reduced form van het eerste stadium, als substituut gebruikt worden voor
de tijdsinvariante individuele eecten in het tweede en derde stadium. Het hoofdstuk biedt een the-
oretische onderbouwing van een dergelijke procedure. De schatter voorgesteld om een systeem van
vergelijkingen met endogene regressors te schatten in een panel data setup is, voor zover ons bekend,
nieuw in de literatuur.
Hoofdstuk 7 ten slotte, vat de belangrijkste bevindingen van de thesis samen, bespreekt de grenzen
van het huidige werk, en presenteert mogelijke richtingen voor verder onderzoek.

